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GPS-Signal Hack January 2002 Dorothy E. Denning and Peter F. MacDoran wrote a article on the subject which was published in Computer Fraud & Security in February of 1996. GPS-Hacks in stealing TV signals are possible, but it seems pretty impossible to hijack military devices www.cs.georgetown.edu/~denning/infosec/Grounding.txt
www.911review.org: 911review
More information on GPS testing and september 11th 2001
Some have speculated that Arinc had ultimate power to control the planes that day, and that since the flight maps are incorrect, the planes were swapped. The transponder signal (code) transmitted from the plane tells the air traffic controller what plane they are looking at.I don't know if the following will be able to help an investigation really but i found this :
cartome.org/gps-risk.htm
On september, 10, 2001, the Departement of
Transportation (DOT) released a rapport of the vulnerabilities of
the GPS, due to interferences, the date is probably a hazard.
The rapport is very rich and some parts should be read with
attention there
www.navcen.uscg.gov/gps/geninfo/FinalReport-v4.6.pdf (doesnt work)
www.navcen.uscg.gov/archive/2001/Oct/FinalReport-v4.6.pdf (i found it archived here)
"... a single device that could disrupt military and civil
operations worldwide would be attractive to malicious governments
and groups" (page 43 in your reader)
"An attack on elements of US space systems during a crisis or
conflict should not be considered an improbable act ... National
leaders must assure that the vulnerability of the United States is
reduced and that the consequences of a surprise attack on US space
assets are limited in their effect" (page 44 in your reader)
bischar
11 September 2001
Source: www.nytimes.com/2001/09/11/national/11NAVI.html
The New York Times
September 11, 2001
WASHINGTON, September 10 — The
Global
Positioning System — which airlines plan to use to land
flights in zero visibility, railroads want for avoiding train
collisions and ships use to navigate shoals — is vulnerable
to interference and even "spoofing" by enemies, the Transportation
Department said today.
A report ordered by President Bill Clinton two years ago suggested that older technologies, which are more expensive and less precise but also more robust, needed to be maintained as a backups.
"There is a growing awareness within the transportation community that the safety and economic risks associated with loss or degradation of the G.P.S. signal have been underestimated," the report said.
The receivers are also used by motorists, hikers and even surveyors, although for them failures would presumably not be potentially catastrophic. Banks and electric utilities also use the signals for precise time measurements.
The report did not rank the risks or say exactly what the government should do; instead the transportation secretary gave the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration and other agencies 60 days to report on how they would maintain safety.
The G.P.S. system has tremendous potential for increasing operating efficiencies in aviation, helping planes fly more direct routes and land in low visibility in places that lack conventional instrument landing systems. By letting vehicles determine their positions and radio that information back to a central control point, it can help controllers get more use out resources like railroad tracks and runways.
But the radio signals, which come from satellites, have a strength of less than one quadrillionth of a watt when they reach the receiver; a transmitter of only several watts can blank out large areas. Today's report said an adversary could broadcast a counterfeit signal that would confuse the receivers.
And in case of war, the satellites themselves might become targets, the report said.
The aviation agency's existing system costs about $100 million a year to maintain. That includes about 1,000 radio beacons, which pilots use to triangulate their positions; 1,200 instrument landing systems that guide planes to runways; and scores of radar stations, which controllers use to determine the position of planes. If the planes themselves knew with precision where they were, they could radio that information to the ground and make the radar obsolete.
At the agency, Steven Zaidman, the associate administrator for research and acquisitions, said that he had not yet read the report but that "it's clear that we're not going to get as much savings" as initially hoped.
The aviation administration will not face the decision about what to retire until 2010, Mr. Zaidman said, to give commercial and private planes time to equip themselves with G.P.S. receivers and to let the agency install equipment near airports that would augment the satellite signals, making the signal accurate enough for low-visibility landings.
| 7-September-2001 | |
| GIAC News Flash: | Digital Distortion Anomaly Test |
The final test plan for the waveform anomaly test is confirmed as September 10-12, 2001:
Monday J253/1300 - J254/0306 Configuration 1 Tuesday J254/2003 - J255/0302 Configuration 1 Wednesday J255/2000 - J256/0258 Configuration 2
Notes:
These dates are julian dates. Day 253 is September 10.
All times are in
GPS time, which is basically equivalent to UTC. Time 1300 therefore corresponds to 0900 on the east coast.
In Configuration 1, the NDU Baseband and Processor will re-configured to the A-side, and the L1 MOD-IPA will also be configured on the A-side.
In Configuration 2, the NDU Baseband and Processor will remain on the A-side, while the L1 MOD-IPA will be re-configured to the B-side.
Note that transmission of P(Y) on L1 and L2 is at the discretion of the test operator (2 SOPS/DOUAN.)
Users who do experience problems during the test should report them through the Coast Guard 24-hour information watch. The phone number for the watch is (703) 313-5900 and email: nisws@navcen.uscg.mil. Pilots who experience problems should contact their nearest flight service station to report the details.
Testing will be halted if a large number of users detect problems.
| 14-August-2001 | |
| GIAC News Flash: | Digital Distortion Anomaly Test |
The PRN 19 Anomaly tests scheduled for August 15-18 have been rescheduled to September 10-12.
I apologize for the short notice, and we are still working to improve the coordination process.
I'm accepting comments, complaints and criticisms.
I will send out the test plan and detailed schedule when they become available.
Frank Lorge, GPS Civil Test Director, 609-485-4588, frank.lorge@faa.gov
www.ngs.noaa.gov/FGCS/info/giacmem010607.htm
Other infomation about GPS testing in 2001...
“GOERS”-
Ready To
Go
>By Mike Dodd, GPS TAC/ATP-104
ATS-1 and Associates directed in 1999 that a GPS Outage En Route Simulation (GOERS) study be conducted to address air traffic needs based on current NAS evolution strategy. Later that same year, the initial meeting of the GOERS Working Group was convened. The team consists of representatives from ATP-104, ATP-110, ASD-140, ACB-330, NATCA, NAATS, MITRE, Titan Systems and AMTI. The primary purpose of the study is to provide an initial examination of the workload and operational issues associated with a controller’s ability to manage a GPS outage situation under the simulated conditions. Using the “human in the loop” approach, these conditions represent today’s environment and include several reduced Ground-Based Navigational Aids (GBNA) and mixed avionics environments.
An issue of primary importance in formalizing a meaningful simulation study was the finalization of a formal Simulation Plan, which would include required air traffic scenario assumptions, the selection process of en route controllers, and the selection of an appropriate Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) and its representative sectors. In February of this year, the working group reached a consensus on the Simulation Plan content, and ACB-330 personnel are finalizing the working version. The Center facility site selection has been completed and will be announced shortly. Pending budget approval, the development of initial traffic samples from SAR data will begin in June, and the actual simulation to be conducted at William J. Hughes Technical Center will take place in October and November.
Expected benefits from the simulation results include the assurance of a controller’s ability to safely manage traffic during an actual GPS outage, and confirmation of the FAA’s commitment to RNAV implementation in support of the NAS architecture evolution. Study results will be analyzed to determine what measures, if any, need to be taken to lessen the impact of a GPS outage, and “lessens learned” from this study will be incorporated into the planned GPS Outage Terminal Simulation (GOTS)
GIS/GEOGRAPHY COMMUNITY LOSES THREE IN ATTACKS
The attacks on the US earlier this week have touched virtually every state and every community. The geography and GIS communities were not spared.
Robert LeBlanc, 70, of Lee, N.H., was a professor emeritus of geography at the University of New Hampshire. He was aboard United Airlines Flight 175, Boston to Los Angeles, which crashed into World Trade Center.
Joe Ferguson, Asst. Director of Education Outreach at National Geographic and Ann Judge, Director of the Travel Office at National Geographic were aboard American Airlines Flight 77, Washington to Los Angeles, which crashed into the Pentagon.
We share the loss with their families, friends and colleagues.
This is from VOLPE, now if you look at some pic of these guys, they look like a bunch of geeks www.volpe.dot.gov/images/dutch2.jpg
but, whom better to pull the wool over their eyes ?
www.volpe.dot.gov/newsarchive01.htm
DOT releases report regarding vulnerabilities of GPS- On September 10, 2001, the U.S. Department of Transportation released the results of a study assessing the vulnerability of the national transportation infrastructure that relies on the Global Positioning System ( GPS). The report was mandated by a Presidential Decision Directive and prepared by the Volpe Center. The study notes that GPS is susceptible to unintentional disruption from such causes as atmospheric effects, signal blockage from buildings, and interference from communications equipment, as well as to potential deliberate disruption. It contains a number of recommendations to address the possibility of disruption and ensure the safety of the national transportation infrastructure. The report, Vulnerability Assessment of the Transportation Infrastructure Relying on the Global Positioning System, has been made available to the public to improve user awareness of the vulnerabilities of GPS and avoid over-reliance on GPS in safety-critical situations. It may be obtained through the Coast Guard Navigation Center website at www.navcen.uscg.gov. (added 09/17/01)
62. On July 18, 2001, using his power of attorney, Al-Hawsawi picked up Fayez Ahmed's VISA and ATM cards in UAE.
63. Between July 18 and August 1, 2001, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi caused Fayez Ahmed's VISA and ATM cards to be shipped from UAE to Fayez Ahmed in Florida. (The VISA card was then used for the first time on August 1, 2001, in Florida.)
|
2003: Missing Iraq expert - body
found A body believed to be that of government scientist Dr David Kelly is found |