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GPS-Signal Hack January 2002 Dorothy E. Denning and Peter F. MacDoran wrote a article on the subject which was published in Computer Fraud & Security in February of 1996. GPS-Hacks in stealing TV signals are possible, but it seems pretty impossible to hijack military devices www.cs.georgetown.edu/~denning/infosec/Grounding.txt


www.911review.org: 911review


Update Aug 25 2005

There was GPS testing being done on September 11th 2001
Some say that GPS testing along with the idea that there were tail number oddities
( Flight 93 591UA was reported in 2 places at one time on september 10th 2001, as well as other oddities such as flights 11 and 77 not being scheduled)
could have had something to do with the attacks.

more information on these comapnies and people....
Warren Buffet / Biz Jets / Mitre Corp as well as Global Hawk and remote control technology DARPA's UAV The NRO James R. Clapper NIMA Booz, Allen, Hamilton Osama Bin Laden. Booz, Allen, Hamilton DARPA John Poindexter Information Awareness
http://airgames.batcave.net/reports.html

More information on GPS testing and september 11th 2001

Some have speculated that Arinc had ultimate power to control the planes that day, and that since the flight maps are incorrect, the planes were swapped. The transponder signal (code) transmitted from the plane tells the air traffic controller what plane they are looking at.
Since the transponder code can be easily changed, either by pilot, or automatically, by remote, the air traffic controllers could have tracked the wrong planes. there is evidence to support this becuase the flight maps appear to show inconsistancies.
Some of the oddities are....
flight 175 radar blip indicating that the plane went from 35,000ft to 3,500ft then back up to 12,500ft just after takeoff. (before the hijack)
(in a short period, if this really happened, the passengers would have been thrown around the cabin)
Flight 93 showing an ETA of 2:17 10:38 and 9:34  at different times during its flight.
Flight 93 changing its flight plan after it was hijacked.
Flight 93 several people were not supposed to fly, and many passengers may have come from flight 91 that was cancelled
airgames.bravehost.com/flight93.html
http://airgames.bravehost.com
BTS problems (a government database of planes tail numbers and flight times)

could GPS have an effect on air traffic control ???
YES !
RADAR ???

GPS archived data can be found here...
tf.nist.gov/timefreq/service/gpstrace.htm


NOTICE ADVISORY TO NAVSTAR USERS (NANU) 2001117
CONDITION: GPS SATELLITE SVN15 (PRN15) WAS UNUSABLE ON JDAY 254
(11 SEPTEMBER 2001) BEGINNING 1445 ZULU UNTIL JDAY 254 (11 SEP 2001)
ENDING 1557 ZULU.
REFERENCE NANU: 2001115
http://listserv.unb.ca/bin/wa?A2=ind0109&L=canspace&T=0&F=&S=&P=2349

Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2001 15:17:04 +0000
Reply-To: arnork@CAA.IS
Sender: Canadian Space Geodesy Forum CANSPACE@LISTSERV.UNB.CA
From: A B Kristinsson arnork@CAA.IS
Subject: GPS constellation turned off?
I have been told that due to security reasons or military activities that the
U.S. DoD has desided to take out of service GPS SV4 and SV11 for unspecified
period. Do any of you know if more satellites are being taken out or have
been taken out? I understand that this situation is already causing an
80 minutes RAIM gap in Europe. Where on the net should I look
for the most up to date announchements on this subject?
http://listserv.unb.ca/bin/wa?A2=ind0109&L=canspace&T=0&F=&S=&P=2592



GPS rapport published a day before 911
by Anonymeme on Feb 03, 2003 - 04:06 PM

I don't know if the following will be able to help an investigation really but i found this :

cartome.org/gps-risk.htm

On september, 10, 2001, the Departement of Transportation (DOT) released a rapport of the vulnerabilities of the GPS, due to interferences, the date is probably a hazard.

The rapport is very rich and some parts should be read with attention there

www.navcen.uscg.gov/gps/geninfo/FinalReport-v4.6.pdf (doesnt work)

www.navcen.uscg.gov/archive/2001/Oct/FinalReport-v4.6.pdf (i found it archived here)

"... a single device that could disrupt military and civil operations worldwide would be attractive to malicious governments and groups" (page 43 in your reader)
"An attack on elements of US space systems during a crisis or conflict should not be considered an improbable act ... National leaders must assure that the vulnerability of the United States is reduced and that the consequences of a surprise attack on US space assets are limited in their effect" (page 44 in your reader) bischar

cartome.org

11 September 2001

Source: www.nytimes.com/2001/09/11/national/11NAVI.html

 

The New York Times
September 11, 2001

Report Cites Vulnerabilities of Global Navigation System

By MATTHEW L. WALD


WASHINGTON, September 10 — The Global Positioning System — which airlines plan to use to land flights in zero visibility, railroads want for avoiding train collisions and ships use to navigate shoals — is vulnerable to interference and even "spoofing" by enemies, the Transportation Department said today.

A report ordered by President Bill Clinton two years ago suggested that older technologies, which are more expensive and less precise but also more robust, needed to be maintained as a backups.

"There is a growing awareness within the transportation community that the safety and economic risks associated with loss or degradation of the G.P.S. signal have been underestimated," the report said.

The receivers are also used by motorists, hikers and even surveyors, although for them failures would presumably not be potentially catastrophic. Banks and electric utilities also use the signals for precise time measurements.

The report did not rank the risks or say exactly what the government should do; instead the transportation secretary gave the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration and other agencies 60 days to report on how they would maintain safety.

The G.P.S. system has tremendous potential for increasing operating efficiencies in aviation, helping planes fly more direct routes and land in low visibility in places that lack conventional instrument landing systems. By letting vehicles determine their positions and radio that information back to a central control point, it can help controllers get more use out resources like railroad tracks and runways.

But the radio signals, which come from satellites, have a strength of less than one quadrillionth of a watt when they reach the receiver; a transmitter of only several watts can blank out large areas. Today's report said an adversary could broadcast a counterfeit signal that would confuse the receivers.

And in case of war, the satellites themselves might become targets, the report said.

The aviation agency's existing system costs about $100 million a year to maintain. That includes about 1,000 radio beacons, which pilots use to triangulate their positions; 1,200 instrument landing systems that guide planes to runways; and scores of radar stations, which controllers use to determine the position of planes. If the planes themselves knew with precision where they were, they could radio that information to the ground and make the radar obsolete.

At the agency, Steven Zaidman, the associate administrator for research and acquisitions, said that he had not yet read the report but that "it's clear that we're not going to get as much savings" as initially hoped.

The aviation administration will not face the decision about what to retire until 2010, Mr. Zaidman said, to give commercial and private planes time to equip themselves with G.P.S. receivers and to let the agency install equipment near airports that would augment the satellite signals, making the signal accurate enough for low-visibility landings.





Vulnerability Assessment of the Transportation Infrastructure Relying on Global Positioning System Final
Report John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, August 2001
Assesses the ways users might be affected by a short- or long-term GPS outage. Recommends steps the user
community might take to minimize the impact of such outages.
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation
Location: www.navcen.uscg.gov/archive/2001/Oct/FinalReport-v4.6.pdf
 
overall document (index links)
http://www.cutr.usf.edu/bussafety/documents/apta-terror.pdf
http://tinyurl.com/8soug (html)

7-September-2001
GIAC News Flash: Digital Distortion Anomaly Test

The final test plan for the waveform anomaly test is confirmed as September 10-12, 2001:
Monday J253/1300 - J254/0306 Configuration 1 Tuesday J254/2003 - J255/0302 Configuration 1 Wednesday J255/2000 - J256/0258 Configuration 2
Notes:
These dates are julian dates. Day 253 is September 10.
All times are in
GPS
time, which is basically equivalent to UTC. Time 1300 therefore corresponds to 0900 on the east coast.
In Configuration 1, the NDU Baseband and Processor will re-configured to the A-side, and the L1 MOD-IPA will also be configured on the A-side.
In Configuration 2, the NDU Baseband and Processor will remain on the A-side, while the L1 MOD-IPA will be re-configured to the B-side.
Note that transmission of P(Y) on L1 and L2 is at the discretion of the test operator (2 SOPS/DOUAN.)
Users who do experience problems during the test should report them through the Coast Guard 24-hour information watch. The phone number for the watch is (703) 313-5900 and email: nisws@navcen.uscg.mil. Pilots who experience problems should contact their nearest flight service station to report the details.
Testing will be halted if a large number of users detect problems.

 
14-August-2001
GIAC News Flash: Digital Distortion Anomaly Test

The PRN 19 Anomaly tests scheduled for August 15-18 have been rescheduled to September 10-12.
I apologize for the short notice, and we are still working to improve the coordination process.
I'm accepting comments, complaints and criticisms.

I will send out the test plan and detailed schedule when they become available.

Frank Lorge, GPS Civil Test Director, 609-485-4588, frank.lorge@faa.gov


www.ngs.noaa.gov/FGCS/info/giacmem010607.htm




Other infomation about GPS testing in 2001...

Oct 11   FAA Commissions Precision Runway Monitor for Philadelphia's Airport
Oct 01  Raytheon and Air Force Demonstrate Civil-Military Interoperability for GPS-Based Precision Landing System
Sep 11  Raytheon Wins Contract to Supply Air Traffic System to the Royal Netherlands Air Force
Sep 06  FAA Approval of Raytheon's STARS EDC-2 Clears the Way for Next Deployment
Jun 22  Raytheon awarded German Very Advanced Air Traffic Control Automation System (VATCAS) Contract Valued in Excess of $20 Million
Jun 21  Emirate of Abu Dhabi Selects Raytheon to Provide $30 Million Air Traffic Control System
May 14   Raytheon-Developed Mode-S Radar Technology Destined for Canadian Far-North
Apr 23  Raytheon Team Wins $14.9 Million NASA Task Order For Research and Development of Airborne Technology
Mar 14  Raytheon Says STARS is Ready for Test and Deployment
Jan 22  Raytheon Wins $183 Million Information Technology Services Task Order to Support NASA Langley Research Center
Jan 15  Raytheon Awarded $16.5 Million for U.S. Army Air Traffic Control Services
www.raytheon.com/products/amhs/press_releases/

 

“GOERS”- Ready To Go
>By Mike Dodd, GPS TAC/ATP-104

ATS-1 and Associates directed in 1999 that a GPS Outage En Route Simulation (GOERS) study be conducted to address air traffic needs based on current NAS evolution strategy. Later that same year, the initial meeting of the GOERS Working Group was convened. The team consists of representatives from ATP-104, ATP-110, ASD-140, ACB-330, NATCA, NAATS, MITRE, Titan Systems and AMTI. The primary purpose of the study is to provide an initial examination of the workload and operational issues associated with a controller’s ability to manage a GPS outage situation under the simulated conditions. Using the “human in the loop” approach, these conditions represent today’s environment and include several reduced Ground-Based Navigational Aids (GBNA) and mixed avionics environments.

An issue of primary importance in formalizing a meaningful simulation study was the finalization of a formal Simulation Plan, which would include required air traffic scenario assumptions, the selection process of en route controllers, and the selection of an appropriate Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) and its representative sectors. In February of this year, the working group reached a consensus on the Simulation Plan content, and ACB-330 personnel are finalizing the working version. The Center facility site selection has been completed and will be announced shortly. Pending budget approval, the development of initial traffic samples from SAR data will begin in June, and the actual simulation to be conducted at William J. Hughes Technical Center will take place in October and November.

Expected benefits from the simulation results include the assurance of a controller’s ability to safely manage traffic during an actual GPS outage, and confirmation of the FAA’s commitment to RNAV implementation in support of the NAS architecture evolution. Study results will be analyzed to determine what measures, if any, need to be taken to lessen the impact of a GPS outage, and “lessens learned” from this study will be incorporated into the planned GPS Outage Terminal Simulation (GOTS)

gps.faa.gov/Library/Data/SatNav/satnavJune-2002-text.htm
 
 

 

GIS/GEOGRAPHY COMMUNITY LOSES THREE IN ATTACKS

The attacks on the US earlier this week have touched virtually every state and every community. The geography and GIS communities were not spared.

Robert LeBlanc, 70, of Lee, N.H., was a professor emeritus of geography at the University of New Hampshire. He was aboard United Airlines Flight 175, Boston to Los Angeles, which crashed into World Trade Center.

Joe Ferguson, Asst. Director of Education Outreach at National Geographic and Ann Judge, Director of the Travel Office at National Geographic were aboard American Airlines Flight 77, Washington to Los Angeles, which crashed into the Pentagon.

We share the loss with their families, friends and colleagues.

 www.gismonitor.com/news/newsletter/archive/091301.php


September 2001 (no date)
 
 At press time, technical experts from the FAA, the U.S. Coast Guard and researchers from Ohio and Stanford Universities were due to begin a two-week flight-test program in Alaska to assess the use of loran transmitters to send out GPS WAAS messages across the state.
WAAS was designed to transmit GPS integrity (such as failure, warnings and accuracy corrections) to surface and airborne GPS users from 25,000-mi-high geostationary satellites (GEOs) above the equator. Because their orbital speed is equal to the earth’s rotational speed, GEOs appear in the northern hemisphere to be fixed in the southern sky, where they perform a number of key tasks, including ground and airborne telephone relays, TV retransmission and various long-distance data-handling requirements.
 In the flight-test program, the loran transmitter at Tok, Alaska, was to transmit the WAAS integrity and accuracy correction data on the 100-kHz loran frequency, which was to be received by loran sets aboard an FAA Technical Center Convair CV-580 and an Ohio University King Air. The loran/WAAS signals would then be converted to conventional GPS formats and fed to the onboard GPS receivers and also recorded for later analysis.
 
Loran was chosen for this task because of its powerful long-range signals, which extend from the surface to above jet altitudes and also penetrate mountain passes and valleys where other higher-frequency signals are blocked. The system is also impervious to intentional jamming. Should the tests prove successful–and ground and air tests performed in New England earlier this year
www.ainonline.com/issues/09_01/09_01_loranalaskapg64.html
 
 

This is from VOLPE, now if you look at some pic of these guys, they look like a bunch of geeks www.volpe.dot.gov/images/dutch2.jpg

but, whom better to pull the wool over their eyes ?

 www.volpe.dot.gov/newsarchive01.htm

DOT releases report regarding vulnerabilities of GPS- On September 10, 2001, the U.S. Department of Transportation released the results of a study assessing the vulnerability of the national transportation infrastructure that relies on the Global Positioning System ( GPS). The report was mandated by a Presidential Decision Directive and prepared by the Volpe Center. The study notes that GPS is susceptible to unintentional disruption from such causes as atmospheric effects, signal blockage from buildings, and interference from communications equipment, as well as to potential deliberate disruption. It contains a number of recommendations to address the possibility of disruption and ensure the safety of the national transportation infrastructure. The report, Vulnerability Assessment of the Transportation Infrastructure Relying on the Global Positioning System, has been made available to the public to improve user awareness of the vulnerabilities of GPS and avoid over-reliance on GPS in safety-critical situations. It may be obtained through the Coast Guard Navigation Center website at www.navcen.uscg.gov. (added 09/17/01)


www.cs.cofc.edu/~manaris/spring04/cs220-handouts/FAA-Fiasco-Follow-up.htm

 
 
FINAL CONTRACT REPORT ASSESSING AND MANAGING RISK OF TERRORISM TO VIRGINIA’S INTERDEPENDENT TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
www.virginiadot.org/vtrc/main/online_reports/pdf/05-cr6.pdf
 
www.virginiadot.org/vtrc/main/online_reports/pdf/05-cr6.pdf
 Virginia Transportation Research Council  October 2004

<
 
Why would a train de-railing cause a cell phone outage ?
even if for some reason a major fiber optic line was cut, i dont see it causing outage to cell phones in particular?
if it would, it would cause more outages to land lines...
 
maybe ive got to much time on my hands, but...
 
 
July 18 2001 - In Baltimore, Maryland, a 60-car train derails in a tunnel, sparking a fire that lasts days and virtually shuts down downtown Baltimore.
 
 Another illustration of interdependencies is the derailment of a CSX freight train in the  Howard Street Tunnel in Baltimore on July 18, 2001. The direct impact of this incident included  the closure of the Howard Street Tunnel and some major highways into the city, resulting in  diversions or cancellations of many freight trains carrying coal, paper, and other manufacturing  supplies. Telecommunication services were affected due to damage to a major line of fiber optic  cables supporting the areas between New York and Miami. Damage included loss of cellular  phone services in some Baltimore areas and loss of e-mail services in the Northeast corridor.
www.baltimoresun.com/news/local/bal-te.md.scene19jul19,1,3289559.story?page=2&ctrack=1&cset=true
 
 The Bioengineering Consortium (BECON) met from 3:00 to 5:15 PM on Wednesday, July 18, 2001, in Room 151of Building 1 on the NIH Main Campus. The meeting was an entirely closed session that primarily addressed the status of Bioengineering Research Partnerships (BRP's) and referral criteria for the National Institute of Biomedical Imaging and Bioengineering NIBIB). The following text provides the minutes of this meeting.
 NIH/NSF Bioengineering Training Workshop - A joint NIH/NSF Workshop on Bioengineering and Bioinformatics Training and Education was held on June 13-14 at NSF Headquarters in Arlington, Virginia. A report summarizing discussions and recommendations is in preparation and is scheduled for completion in early August. This report will be distributed to BECON members, posted on the BECON Web site, and used as a basis for consideration of NIH and NSF collaborative training initiatives. .
www.becon.nih.gov/minutes_20010718.htm
 National Institutes of Health (NIH)
9000 Rockville Pike
Bethesda, Maryland 20892
 
  61. On July 18, 2001, Fayez Ahmed (#175) gave power of attorney to Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi for Fayez Ahmed's Standard Chartered Bank accounts in UAE.

     62. On July 18, 2001, using his power of attorney, Al-Hawsawi picked up Fayez Ahmed's VISA and ATM cards in UAE.

     63. Between July 18 and August 1, 2001, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi caused Fayez Ahmed's VISA and ATM cards to be shipped from UAE to Fayez Ahmed in Florida. (The VISA card was then used for the first time on August 1, 2001, in Florida.)

July 18 1969 - After a party on Chappaquiddick Island, Senator Ted Kennedy from Massachusetts drives an Oldsmobile off a wooden bridge into a tide-swept pond and his passenger, Mary Jo Kopechne, dies.
 July 18 1925 - Adolf Hitler publishes his personal manifesto Mein Kampf.
 July 181994 - In Buenos Aires, an explosion destroys a building housing several Jewish organizations killing 85 and injuring many more
 
July 18 

 
 Aug. 31, 2001  Ground-Based Midcourse Boost Verification Intercept Flight Test History - CDI
 The flight test was 18 months behind schedule.  The three-stage Boeing rocket tested with a mass-simulated kill vehicle payload, did not attempt a missile intercept.  It appears there was an anomaly in vehicle roll control in first-stage operation beginning at about 33 sec. into the mission and that could affect kill vehicle performance in an operational scenario.  The second- and third-stage motors performed normally.
www.cdi.org/missile-defense/tests-gmd-boost.cfm
 


The geodynamic GPS network SUDETES, that is established in close cooperation of Polish and Czech geodesists, covers the area of Middle- and East-Sudety Mts. and Sudety Foreland and joins all existing Czech and Polish local GPS networks in this area. The Polish part of this network includes selected points of network GEOSUD, established in 1996 by the Department of Geodesy and Photogrammetry of Agriculture University of Wroclaw. The Czech part (network SILESIA) was designed and monumented in 1997 by the team of Institute of Rock Structure and Mechanics of the Czech Academy of Science in Prague. The whole SUDETES network will be measured during GPS campaign scheduled for September 2001.
www.navcen.uscg.gov/cgsic/meetings/summaryrpts/38thmeeting/CGSIC-SLC2001-NatRep.doc

 At press time, technical experts from the FAA, the U.S. Coast Guard and researchers from Ohio and Stanford Universities were due to begin a two-week flight-test program in Alaska to assess the use of loran transmitters to send out GPS WAAS messages across the state.
WAAS was designed to transmit GPS integrity (such as failure, warnings and accuracy corrections) to surface and airborne GPS users from 25,000-mi-high geostationary satellites (GEOs) above the equator. Because their orbital speed is equal to the earth’s rotational speed, GEOs appear in the northern hemisphere to be fixed in the southern sky, where they perform a number of key tasks, including ground and airborne telephone relays, TV retransmission and various long-distance data-handling requirements.
 In the flight-test program, the loran transmitter at Tok, Alaska, was to transmit the WAAS integrity and accuracy correction data on the 100-kHz loran frequency, which was to be received by loran sets aboard an FAA Technical Center Convair CV-580 and an Ohio University King Air. The loran/WAAS signals would then be converted to conventional GPS formats and fed to the onboard GPS receivers and also recorded for later analysis.
Loran was chosen for this task because of its powerful long-range signals, which extend from the surface to above jet altitudes and also penetrate mountain passes and valleys where other higher-frequency signals are blocked. The system is also impervious to intentional jamming. Should the tests prove successful–and ground and air tests performed in New England earlier this year
www.ainonline.com/issues/09_01/09_01_loranalaskapg64.html



LAAS Integrity Risk Due to Satellite Ephemeris Faults*
September 2001
    Curtis A. Shively, The MITRE Corporation
ABSTRACT
    Standards are under development for use of the FAA's Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) for both Category I (CAT I) precision approach and Differentially Corrected Positioning Service (DCPS) are navigation applications. An ephemeris fault occurs when the actual satellite position in space differs from the position based on the broadcast ephemeris parameters by more than the usual tolerance. Of particular interest is the total integrity risk ensured by an ephemeris fault detection process of the LAAS ground Facility (LGF) in conjunction with protection level (PL) equations that limit geometry of satellites used in the position solution of the aircraft.
    * The content of this material reflect the views of the author. Neither the Federal Aviation Administration nor the Department of Transportation makes any warranty or guarantee, or promise, expressed or implied concerning the content or accuracy of the views expressed herein.
www.mitre.org/work/tech_papers/tech_papers_01/shively_integrity/shively_integrity.pdf
09/10/01

The L-Band navigation signals on SVN19/PRN19 were turned off today at 1750Z (L1)
and 1753Z (L2). After beginning the scheduled Signal Quality Monitor Test,
problems were encountered and a decision was made by 2 SOPS
to end the test and begin disposal actions. It is expected that
SVN19 will be removed from the operational almanac within two days.
http://www.schriever.af.mil/GpsSupportCenter/archive/advisory/2001_archived_advisories.htm
2003: Missing Iraq expert - body found
A body believed to be that of government scientist Dr David Kelly is found


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