Born in 1939, Michael Meacher was educated at Berkhamstead School, New College Oxford and the London School of Economics. He joined the Labour Party in 1962 and has been Labour Member of Parliament for Oldham West (now Oldham West and Royton) since 1970. He contested Colchester in 1966 and Oldham West in 1968. He was Minister of State for the Environment and Privy Counsellor May 1997 - June 2003.
This is the text of an influential article that he wrote
September 6, 2003 in the
Guardian.
We have added hyperlinks to on-line versions of the original
sources he cites, or to
pages on 911review.org/ that discuss in more
detail the topics he is referring to. Any errors in the hypertext
linkage are strictly our own.
This article raised a firestorm in Europe when it was published
(see Links below). In Canada, the USA and Australia, it was
blacked-out by the media; one Internet commentator has called it
The
Cheshire Story.
The 9/11 attacks gave the US an ideal pretext to use force to secure its global domination.
Massive attention has now been given - and rightly so - to the
reasons why Britain went to war against Iraq. But far too little
attention has focused on why the US went to war, and that throws
light on British motives too. The conventional explanation is that
after the Twin Towers were hit, retaliation against al-Qaida bases
in Afghanistan was a natural first step in launching a global war
against terrorism. Then, because Saddam Hussein was alleged by the
US and UK governments to retain weapons of mass destruction, the
war could be extended to Iraq as well. However this theory does not
fit all the facts. The truth may be a great deal murkier. (See
Really
Dodgy Dossier)
We now know that a blueprint for the creation of a global Pax
Americana was drawn up for Dick Cheney (now vice-president), Donald
Rumsfeld (defence secretary), Paul Wolfowitz (Rumsfeld's deputy),
Jeb Bush (George Bush's younger brother) and Lewis Libby (Cheney's
chief of staff). The document, entitled
Rebuilding
America's Defences, was written in September 2000 by the
neoconservative think tank, Project for the New American Century
(PNAC).
The plan shows Bush's cabinet intended to take military control of the Gulf region whether or not Saddam Hussein was in power. It says:
"while the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein."
The PNAC blueprint supports an earlier document attributed to Wolfowitz and Libby which said the US must "discourage advanced industrial nations from challenging our leadership or even aspiring to a larger regional or global role". It refers to key allies such as the UK as "the most effective and efficient means of exercising American global leadership". It describes peacekeeping missions as "demanding American political leadership rather than that of the UN". It says "even should Saddam pass from the scene", US bases in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait will remain permanently... as "Iran may well prove as large a threat to US interests as Iraq has". It spotlights China for "regime change", saying "it is time to increase the presence of American forces in SE Asia".
The document also calls for the creation of "US space forces" to
dominate space, and the total control of cyberspace to prevent
"enemies" using the internet against the US. It also hints that the
US may consider developing biological weapons "that can target
specific genotypes [and] may transform biological warfare from the
realm of terror to a politically useful tool". (See
Anthrax
Attacks)
Finally - written a year before 9/11 - it pinpoints North Korea, Syria and Iran as dangerous regimes, and says their existence justifies the creation of a "worldwide command and control system". This is a blueprint for US world domination. But before it is dismissed as an agenda for rightwing fantasists, it is clear it provides a much better explanation of what actually happened before, during and after 9/11 than the global war on terrorism thesis. This can be seen in several ways.
First, it is clear the US authorities did little or nothing to
pre-empt the events of 9/11. It is known that at least 11 countries
provided advance warning to the US of the 9/11 attacks. Two senior
Mossad experts were sent to Washington in August 2001 to alert the
CIA and FBI to a cell of 200 terrorists said to be preparing a big
operation (
Daily Telegraph, September 16 2001). The list they provided
included the names of four of the 9/11 hijackers, none of whom was
arrested. (See
Hijackers
Patsies)
It had been known as early as 1996 that there were plans to hit Washington targets with aeroplanes. Then in 1999 a US national intelligence council report noted that "al-Qaida suicide bombers could crash-land an aircraft packed with high explosives into the Pentagon, the headquarters of the CIA, or the White House".
Fifteen of the 9/11 hijackers obtained their visas in Saudi
Arabia. Michael Springman, the former head of the American visa
bureau in Jeddah, has stated that since 1987 the CIA had been
illicitly issuing visas to unqualified applicants from the Middle
East and bringing them to the US for training in terrorism for the
Afghan war in collaboration with Bin Laden (
BBC, November 6 2001). It seems this operation continued after
the Afghan war for other purposes. It is also reported that five of
the hijackers received training at secure US military installations
in the 1990s (
Newsweek, September 15
2001 ). (See
Cia Visas
For Patsies)
Instructive leads prior to 9/11 were not followed up. French
Moroccan flight student Zacarias Moussaoui (now thought to be the
20th hijacker) was arrested in August 2001 after an instructor
reported he showed a suspicious interest in learning how to steer
large airliners. When US agents learned from French intelligence he
had radical Islamist ties, they sought a warrant to search his
computer, which contained clues to the September 11 mission (Times,
November 3 2001). But they were turned down by the FBI. One agent
wrote, a month before 9/11, that Moussaoui might be planning to
crash into the Twin Towers (Newsweek, May 20 2002). (See
Zacarias
Moussaoui)
All of this makes it all the more astonishing - on the war on
terrorism perspective - that there was such slow reaction on
September 11 itself. The first hijacking was suspected at not later
than 8.20am, and the last hijacked aircraft crashed in Pennsylvania
at 10.06am. Not a single fighter plane was scrambled to investigate
from the US Andrews airforce base, just 10 miles from Washington
DC, until after the third plane had hit the Pentagon at 9.38 am.
Why not? There were standard FAA intercept procedures for hijacked
aircraft before 9/11. Between September 2000 and June 2001 the US
military launched fighter aircraft on 67 occasions to chase
suspicious aircraft (AP, August 13 2002). It is a US legal
requirement that once an aircraft has moved significantly off its
flight plan, fighter planes are sent up to investigate. (See
Air Force
Stand down)
Was this inaction simply the result of key people disregarding,
or being ignorant of, the evidence? Or could US air security
operations have been deliberately stood down on September 11? If
so, why, and on whose authority? The former US federal crimes
prosecutor, John Loftus,
has
said:
"The information provided by European intelligence services prior to 9/11 was so extensive that it is no longer possible for either the CIA or FBI to assert a defence of incompetence."
Nor is the US response after 9/11 any better. No serious attempt
has ever been made to catch Bin Laden. In late September and early
October 2001, leaders of Pakistan's two Islamist parties negotiated
Bin Laden's extradition to Pakistan to stand trial for 9/11.
However, a US official said, significantly, that "casting our
objectives too narrowly" risked "a premature collapse of the
international effort if by some lucky chance Mr Bin Laden was
captured". The US chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, General
Myers, went so far as to say that "the goal has never been to get
Bin Laden" (AP, April 5 2002). The whistleblowing FBI agent Robert
Wright told ABC News (December 19 2002) that FBI headquarters
wanted no arrests. And in November 2001 the US airforce complained
it had had al-Qaida and Taliban leaders in its sights as many as 10
times over the previous six weeks, but had been unable to attack
because they did not receive permission quickly enough (Time
Magazine, May 13 2002). None of this assembled evidence, all of
which comes from sources already in the public domain, is
compatible with the idea of a real, determined war on terrorism.
(See
Bin Laden)
The catalogue of evidence does, however, fall into place when
set against the PNAC blueprint. From this it seems that the
so-called "war on terrorism" is being used largely as bogus cover
for achieving wider US strategic geopolitical objectives. Indeed
Tony Blair himself hinted at this when he said to the Commons
liaison committee: "To be truthful about it, there was no way we
could have got the public consent to have suddenly launched a
campaign on Afghanistan but for what happened on September 11"
(
Times,
July 17 2002). Similarly Rumsfeld was so determined to obtain a
rationale for an attack on Iraq that on 10 separate occasions he
asked the CIA to find evidence linking Iraq to 9/11; the CIA
repeatedly came back empty-handed (Time Magazine, May 13 2002).
In fact, 9/11 offered an extremely convenient pretext to put the
PNAC plan into action. The evidence again is quite clear that plans
for military action against Afghanistan and Iraq were in hand well
before 9/11. A report prepared for the US government from the Baker
Institute of Public Policy stated in April 2001 that "the US
remains a prisoner of its energy dilemma. Iraq remains a
destabilising influence to... the flow of oil to international
markets from the Middle East". Submitted to Vice-President Cheney's
energy task group, the report recommended that because this was an
unacceptable risk to the US, "military intervention" was necessary
(
Sunday Herald, October 6
2002).
Similar evidence exists in regard to Afghanistan. The BBC
reported (September 18 2001) that Niaz Niak, a former Pakistan
foreign secretary, was told by senior American officials at a
meeting in Berlin in mid-July 2001 that "military action against
Afghanistan would go ahead by the middle of October". Until July
2001 the US government saw the Taliban regime as a source of
stability in Central Asia that would enable the construction of
hydrocarbon pipelines from the oil and gas fields in Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, through Afghanistan and Pakistan, to the
Indian Ocean. But, confronted with the Taliban's refusal to accept
US conditions, the US representatives told them "either you accept
our offer of a carpet of gold, or we bury you under a carpet of
bombs" (
Inter Press
Service, November 15 2001).
Given this background, it is not surprising that some have seen the US failure to avert the 9/11 attacks as creating an invaluable pretext for attacking Afghanistan in a war that had clearly already been well planned in advance. There is a possible precedent for this. The US national archives reveal that President Roosevelt used exactly this approach in relation to Pearl Harbor on December 7 1941. Some advance warning of the attacks was received, but the information never reached the US fleet. The ensuing national outrage persuaded a reluctant US public to join the second world war. Similarly the PNAC blueprint of September 2000 states that the process of transforming the US into "tomorrow's dominant force" is likely to be a long one in the absence of "some catastrophic and catalyzing event - like a new Pearl Harbor". The 9/11 attacks allowed the US to press the "go" button for a strategy in accordance with the PNAC agenda which it would otherwise have been politically impossible to implement.
The overriding motivation for this political smokescreen is that
the US and the UK are beginning to
run out of secure
hydrocarbon energy supplies. By 2010 the Muslim world will control
as much as 60% of the world's oil production and, even more
importantly, 95% of remaining global oil export capacity. As demand
is increasing, so supply is decreasing, continually since the
1960s.
This is leading to increasing dependence on foreign oil supplies for both the US and the UK. The US, which in 1990 produced domestically 57% of its total energy demand, is predicted to produce only 39% of its needs by 2010. A DTI minister has admitted that the UK could be facing "severe" gas shortages by 2005. The UK government has confirmed that 70% of our electricity will come from gas by 2020, and 90% of that will be imported. In that context it should be noted that Iraq has 110 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves in addition to its oil.
A report from the commission on America's national interests in
July 2000 noted that the most promising new source of world
supplies was the Caspian region, and this would relieve US
dependence on Saudi Arabia. To diversify supply routes from the
Caspian, one pipeline would run westward via Azerbaijan and Georgia
to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Another would extend eastwards
through Afghanistan and Pakistan and terminate near the Indian
border. This would rescue Enron's beleaguered power plant at Dabhol
on India's west coast, in which Enron had sunk $3bn investment and
whose economic survival was dependent on access to cheap gas.
Nor has the UK been disinterested in this scramble for the
remaining world supplies of hydrocarbons, and this may partly
explain British participation in US military actions. Lord Browne,
chief executive of BP, warned Washington not to carve up Iraq for
its own oil companies in the aftermath of war (
Guardian,
October 30 2002). And when a British foreign minister met
Gadaffi in his desert tent in August 2002, it was said that "the UK
does not want to lose out to other European nations already
jostling for advantage when it comes to potentially lucrative oil
contracts" with Libya (
BBC
Online, August 10 2002).
The conclusion of all this analysis must surely be that the
"global war on terrorism" has the hallmarks of a political myth
propagated to pave the way for a wholly different agenda - the US
goal of world hegemony, built around securing by force command over
the oil supplies required to drive the whole project. Is collusion
in this myth and junior participation in this project really a
proper aspiration for British foreign policy? If there was ever
need to justify a more objective British stance, driven by our own
independent goals, this whole depressing saga surely provides all
the evidence needed for a radical change of course. (See
Truth
Lies Legend)
Guardian Newspapers Limited 2003.
Audio:
Links:
With questions rising about the facts and timing of the recent
foiled terrorist attacks in London,
Keith Olbermann recaps the top ten occasions that the Bush
administration
used terror warnings and fear for political gain.