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Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the
Disturbances in British Guiana in February 1962


Edited by
Odeen Ishmael

[Notes by Editor in the text are indicated by double asterisks (**)]

GNI Publications
2003


GENERAL CONTENTS
Preface -- 3
Part 1 – The Report of the Commission of Inquiry – 4
Part II – The PPP Memorandum to the Commission of Inquiry – 96
Part III – Comments on the Wynn Parry Report – 125


PREFACE
In Guyana during February 1962, opposition political parties and the Trades Union
Council (TUC) mounted street demonstrations against the Budget introduced by the People’s
Progressive Party (P.P.P.) Government led by Dr. Cheddi Jagan. These culminated in riots, arson
and looting on Friday,16 February. At that time Guyana (then known as British Guiana) was still
a colony of Great Britain. Subsequently, on the request of the Government of Guyana, a
Commission of Inquiry was appointed by the British Government to investigate the causes of the
disturbances.
The February 1962 disturbances were part of a series of politically inspired activities
which continued in 1963 and 1964 aimed at destabilising the PPP Government which was
labelled as being “communist”. This was during the period of the Cold War and US anticommunist
trade unions and other organisations were overtly and covertly involved in providing
financial and propaganda assistance to the TUC and the opposition political parties. The United
States Government itself was deeply involved in the effort to replace the PPP Government, and
at the highest level, it encouraged the British Government to change the electoral system which
eventually in 1964 resulted in what it wanted. The declassified documents of the State
Department on British Guiana released in 1995 provides interesting reading in this respect.
The Report by the Commission is reproduced in full in the first part of this publication. In
the second part, two related documents are reproduced. These are the memorandum of the P.P.P.
which was presented to the Commission; and a review of the findings of the Commission, which
was originally published in Thunder, the weekly newspaper of the PPP, on 6 October 1962.


PART I
REPORT
of a Commission of Inquiry
into Disturbances in British Guiana
in February 1962
London
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office
COLONIAL 354


TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION … 6
Chapter I GENERAL CONDITIONS … 10
Geographical Features – Natural Resources and
Communications – Population
Chapter II RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
… 14
Financial Difficulties – Measures Adopted – Opposition
to the Budget Proposals
Chapter III ECONOMIC DISCONTENT
… 24
Civil Servants – Other Government Servants – Trade
Employees and Factory Workers
Chapter IV THE DISTURBANCES …
31
Opposition Manoeuvres: People’s National Congress –
Opposition Manoeuvres: United Force
Chapter V SUMMING UP … 56
Chapter VI OTHER MATTERS RELATING TO THE DISTURBANCES 59
Declaration of General Strike – Houston By-election – Part
taken by the Police – Arms in the Attorney-General’s House
Chapter VII CONCLUSIONS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
… 66
* * *


Appendix I Text of Warrant appointing the Commission … 68
Appendix II Rules of Procedure … 71
Appendix III List of Witnesses Examined … 73
Appendix IV List of Exhibits … 78
Appendix V Extracts from speeches, etc., by Dr. Jagan and
Members of the P.P.P. showing Communist leanings… 80
Appendix VI Extracts from local press containing anti-Government
Propaganda … 81
Appendix VII The Budget … 85
Appendix VIII Chronological record of events leading up to the
disturbances … 88
Appendix IX Brief notes on Persons who figured in the Inquiry … 91
Appendix X Statement on troop movements … 92
Appendix XI Statement of Casualties and damage sustained; claims
made on insurance companies; and tear gas used … 94


INTRODUCTION
To the Right Honourable DUNCAN SANDYS, P.C., M.P.
Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Sir,
The appointment of this Commission was made under a Warrant signed and issued by your predecessor on
May 11th, l962, in pursuance of the provisions contained in Section 2 of The British Guiana( Commissions of
Inquiry) Order in Council 1962.(*) The Warrant set out the terms of reference as follows:
.For the purpose of inquiring into the recent disturbances in British Guiana and the events leading up to
them and to report thereon.. [* S.I. 1962 No. 632]
2. The members of the Commission held their first meeting in London on May 7th, 1962, at which some
preliminary matters were discussed and certain details of procedure settled. On May 11th, all three members of the
Commission met your predecessor and received the warrant of appointment. On the same day a second meeting of
the Commission was held and some further matters of procedure were discussed and specified. Mr. D. A. Skinner
was formally appointed Administrative Secretary of the Commission, and a direction was given that appropriate
steps be taken in British Guiana to publicise the warrant relating to the appointment of the Commission and to invite
oral or written statements and other evidence concerning the subject matter of our inquiry. The Commission learnt
that Mr. Kenneth Potter would act as Counsel to the Commission during the course of the inquiry, and assist us in
the matter of calling witnesses, marshalling the evidence produced and presenting the relevant facts and
circumstances before us.
3. All three members of the Commission left London by air on May 17th, 1962, and reached Georgetown on
the evening of the following day. Mr. Skinner, the Administrative Secretary, and Mr. Potter were already in British
Guiana, having arrived there a day or two earlier and entered upon their respective duties.
4. May 18th, the day of our arrival was a Friday, and Monday the 21st May had been fixed for our first sitting.
We had therefore two days in which to recover from the fatigue of the extremely long and tiring journey, to review
the material which had been made available to us in London and to pay a visit to the premises where the
Commission was to sit and hold the inquiry. This visit, it may be mentioned in passing, was very necessary as
certain minor but essential changes had to be made upon a careful inspection of the premises and the arrangements
made by the official in charge. We would like to commend the manner in which the entire matter of the
accommodation of the Commission and its staff and for the members of the public was handled. We particularly
mention the public as the hearing of the inquiry was for the most part public and our arrival had evinced a great deal
of interest among the people of British Guiana who seemed to think that the entire future of the country depended
upon our deliberations, and for all the open sessions every available seat in the body of the hall was occupied.
5. On May 21st, 1962 the Commissions held its first session. After some brief preliminaries the members of
the Commission were conducted to view the various places where damage to and destruction of property had been
caused during the course of the disturbances of February 16th, 1962. On May 22nd, the hearing of the evidence
began and the sittings continued till June 28th.
6. At the very outset the Commissions was informed that a number of political parties, and Insurance
Company, and the Mayor and Town Council of Georgetown were interested in the inquiry and wished therefore to
put in appearance through Counsel. The Government was represented by the Attorney-General and, as already
observed, Mr. Kenneth Potter appeared as Counsel for the Commission. There was also the question of procedure
regarding the manner in which evidence was to be produced, witnesses examined, cross-examined and re-examined.
Upon all these matters complete unanimity was achieved and it was agreed that the Governor of British Guiana, four
political parties, the Mayor and Town Council of Georgetown and the Hand-in-Hand Mutual Fire Insurance
Company, would be deemed interested parties and allowed to put in appearance through Counsel. It was also agreed
that in the matter of calling the evidence the following rules would be observed:
(1) All witnesses= statements and documents shall be submitted to Counsel for the Commission who
shall adduce what he considers material.
(2) Any person or his representative may apply to the Commission if not satisfied with the decision of
Counsel for the Commission not to present to the Commission the evidence offered by that person.
(3) After examination by Counsel for the Commission, Counsel representing the witness shall be
allowed to examine the witness and so shall representatives of interested parties as satisfy the
Commission that they have an interest in examining the particular witness.
(4) Counsel for the Commission shall re-examine the witnesses after other examinations by
representatives of interested parties.
7. These rules governed the procedure at the public sessions. Towards the end of the enquiry, it was found
necessary to investigate a matter the discussion of which in public was considered both unnecessary and inadvisable,
because the evidence bearing upon it related to intimate constitutional relations between the Head of State and the
Council of Ministers. The issue involved was whether the assistance of the army to deal with the disturbances was
sought and made available at the appropriate moment. Under the constitution internal law and order is the exclusive
concern of the Government, i.e., the Premier and his Council of Ministers, whereas the unit of the British Army
stationed in British Guiana could only be called upon to support the civil power on the authority of the Governor.
The details of the discussions which took place between the Ministers and the Governor were in our view of a nature
which ought not to be made the subject matter of public comment so soon after the event, thought to the future
historian they might be of considerable interest. We were therefore disposed to accept the submission made by our
Counsel, Mr. Potter, in this respect:
.It is, in my submission, not in the public interest in this, or in any other country where parliamentary and
ministerial government exists, that affairs of state should be publicly investigated a matter of months after
the event. The actions of governments are publicly known and may be criticised or defended, but the
deliberations of Ministers and their deliberations with a constitutional Head of State and differences of
opinion which may or may not have occurred are not a fit subject for public debate, but only for the
researches of the historian long after the event. It is so established by wise tradition and sound practice in
all countries enjoying parliamentary institutions and, in my submission, it must be so, for otherwise,
Ministers and Heads of State would be fatally handicapped in the exercise of their functions if their every
word and thought could be made the subject of public trial within months of the event..
8. We accordingly excluded the public from two sittings at which the Governor of British Guiana, the former
Minister for Home Affairs and three other witnesses were examined in camera. The rules of procedure relating to
these private sessions are set out in Appendix II.
9. It is convenient here to refer to a circumstance which, though it concerned a mere matter of procedure, was
in the light of subsequent events, germane to the issue raised before us. The first witness to be called was Mr.
Weber, the Commission of Police, British Guiana, and he immediately
craved leave to make a personal submission. On being allowed to do so, he complained that he and, indeed, the
entire Police Force suffered from the serious handicap of not being represented at the Inquiry. He apprehended that
his conduct and the conduct of his subordinates in dealing with the disturbances would be subject to criticism by
some of the parties who had been conceded the right of appearance before us. Anticipating this state of affairs he
had made a prayer to the government department concerned for the appropriate relief, following the precedent of the
1948 inquiry into the Enmore Riots when Mr. Cabral, K.C., was engaged to represent the Police. His prayer,
however, had not been granted on the present occasion. In the course of Mr. Weber=s examination it became quite
clear to us that is apprehensions were amply justified, for his manner of handling the situation which arose on
February 16th was subjected, it might almost be said, to hostile questioning. Even before Mr. Weber=s examination
was concluded we felt the compelling necessity of giving expression to our misgivings that the if the Police were to

14
remain unrepresented and without legal assistance we might have presented before us only a partial picture of the
part played by its personnel, and of the reasons which impelled it to play that part. That being so, we might on the
basis of an incomplete picture be persuaded to comment adversely and perhaps unjustly upon the conduct of the
Police, an eventuality which should, according to all canons of natural justice, be avoided. We therefore deemed it
just and proper to make the following statement at the commencement of the resumption of the hearing upon the
following day:
.We are gravely concerned at the circumstances that the Police as a body are not legally represented in this
case. It is already apparent to us, after only one day=s hearing that the Police are and are to be subject to
attack. It may well be right that this should be so. On this aspect of the matter we make no comment.

10
What concerns us as a matter of natural justice is that despite representations of the Commissioner of
Police, no provision for the Police to be legally represented has been made. In our view, as a matter of
principle, this is wrong and the attitude of the Government becomes all the more strange when the
precedent of 1947 cited by the Commissioner is borne in mind when a King=s Counsel was briefed to
represent the Police. We as a Commission have no power to order that the provision for the legal
representation of the Police should be made. If we had that power, we should exercise it. It follows that if,
event at this late hour, no such provision is made, we may well think it necessary to make this omission the
subject of adverse comment in our report..
10. We are happy to record that Mr. Persram was briefed to watch the interest of the Police and he continued to
appear before us throughout the subsequent proceedings.
11. At later stages of the inquiry prayers were made for permission to put in appearance on behalf of the
Georgetown Chamber of Commerce, the Electricity Corporation and the British Guiana Trades Union Council.
These prayers were granted and the final appearances were as follows:.
Dr. Fenton Ramsahoye, Attorney-General, instructed by Mr David Singh, for the Government.
Mr. Forbes Burnham, Q.C., with Mr. John Carter, Mr. Neville Bissember, Mr. C. J. B. Harris, instructed by
Mr. C. M. Llewellyn John for the People=s National Congress.
Mr. Ashton Chase, with Mr. Miles Fitzpatrick and Mr. Derek Jagan, instructed by Mr. Sase Narine, for the
People=s Progressive Party.
Mr. Gilbert Farnum, for the United Force.
Mr. Jai Narine Singh, with Mr. E. A. Triumph, for the National Democratic Party.
Mr. Desmond Hoyte, instructed by Mr. Vivian Dias, for the Georgetown Town Council.
Mr. J. A. King, for the Hand-in-Hand Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Limited.
Mr. Walter Persram, Legal Adviser for the Police.
Mr. Lionel Luckhoo, Q.C., associated with Mr. E. V. Luckhoo, and instructed by Miss Ena Luckhoo, for
the Georgetown Chamber of Commerce.
Mr. Hubert Jack, for the Electricity Corporation.
Mr. J. I. Ramphal, associated with Mr. R. H. Luckhoo, instructed by Mr. Dabi Dyal, for the Trades Union
Congress.
12. 147 witnesses in all were examined by the Commission. Of these, 142 made their statements at the public
sessions and 5 were examined at the two private sessions. In addition to the oral evidence laid before us, a vast
quantity of other relevant material in the form of statements, statistics, newspaper cuttings, transcripts of broadcasts
and speeches was produced all this was carefully examined.
13. The members of the Commission travelled back to England and had detailed discussions on July 9th and
subsequent dates, when all matters arising out of the inquiry were brought under review.
14. The Report is now complete and we, Sir, submit it for your consideration.


CHAPTER I
GENERAL CONDITIONS
15. We begin by giving a few broad facts about British Guiana and outlining the social, political and economic
background against which the events of February 1962 must be viewed in order fully to appreciate their nature and
import
Geographical Features
16. The most significant feature of British Guiana is a small population comprised of several ethnic groups striving
to maintain itself upon the insufficient resources of a large undeveloped, or at any rate greatly underdeveloped,
country. The size of British Guiana (83,000 square miles) is a little bigger than that of Great Britain, but its total
population is only a little more than half a million (590,140 on December 31st, 1961).
17. There are three distinct geographical divisions in the country:
(i) A narrow coastal belt, most of which lies below the high tide level of the sea and is protected by a costly
system of sea defences and canals.
(ii) Dense forest lands which cover nearly four-fifths of the entire country.
These have, for the most part, the appearance and characteristics of a
primeval, impenetrable jungle, offering resistance to intrusion by man.
(iii) The Savannas, lying behind the North Eastern coastal belt and beyond the forest lands.
There are three main rivers, the Essequibo, the Berbice and the Demerara, which are navigable for a few
miles only in their lower reaches, as further progress of water craft is impeded by frequent rapids.
18. It is in the narrow coastal belt that most of the population is concentrated. Georgetown and New Amsterdam, the
only two towns in the country, are also situated in this region. The land for the most part lies below the high tide
level, and the traveller who has the hardihood to motor over the bumpy, unmetalled road to Skeldon, the farthermost
habitation on the northern coast, will see large areas of land completely covered by water in which stand houses
resting on wooden or concrete stilts. These present a dismal though strangely picturesque appearance. The soil of
this region is alluvial and, therefore, rich. Most of the agriculture is undertaken in this belt, the main crops being
sugar cane and rice. The cane crop feeds a number of sugar factories and is also responsible for the allied industry of
rum, which is very popular commodity in the country, particularly among the labourers and working class people.
The quality of rice produced is not very good, but the labours of the present Government have resulted in finding a
ready market for almost all the grain produced. The planning
efforts of the Government to develop agriculture further are confined to the coastal belt, though it must be borne in
mind that the fight against the forces of nature is somewhat unequal, as was admirably pointed out in Rodway=s
History of British Guiana:




.Every acre at present under cultivation has been the scene of a struggle with the sea in front and the flood
behind. As a result of this arduous labour through two centuries a narrow strip of land along the coast has
been rescued from the mangrove swamp by an elaborate system of dams and dykes. Centred along the
rivers and creeks lie a thousand abandoned plantations most of them indistinguishable from the surrounding
forest; these represent the failures of the early settlers. At first sight the narrow line of sugar estates seems
but a poor showing for such a long struggle with nature, but when all the circumstances are taken into
consideration, it is almost a wonder that the Colony has not been abandoned altogether..
19. The cost of maintaining the sea defences and drainage works is very considerable, amounting approximately to
ten per cent of the total revenues of the State.
Natural Resources and Communications
20. The forest lands are almost entirely uninhabited. There are bauxite mines which are being exploited by a
Canadian and an American firm. Gold and diamonds are also recovered but these make a very negligible
contribution to the wealth and economy of the country, and no great attempt is being made at present to extend the
efforts to recover these two commodities. There is some hope of finding oil in the country and a team of Russian oil
experts was recently called in by the Government to make a preliminary reconnaissance of the possibilities of
finding oil.
21. The Savannahs are not productive of any wealth, and as far as we know no serious attempt has yet been made to
explore the possibility of agriculture or any other industry in the region.
22. The means of communication in the country are extremely inadequate. There are two single-track railway lines,
one along the northern coast belt running for a distance of sixty miles and the other along the west coast of the
Demerara River, which is only eighteen miles long. There is only one good motor road, which connects the
Atkinson airfield with the capital town of Georgetown, while the other roads are for the most part long and
exhausting sequences of potholes, surfaced with burnt earth. The interior of the country is approached by amphibian
six-seaters and aeroplanes for which a number of landing strips have been constructed. The amphibians use natural
lakes and rivers.
23.The natural resources of British Guiana, therefore, produce very little wealth. It is clear, even to a casual visitor,
that a great deal of money and human effort are needed before the land can be persuaded to yield whatever riches lie
buried in its bosom. It is thus with a feeling of sad disillusionment that one reads George Chapman’s verses on
Guiana:
“Guiana, whose rich feete are mines of golde,
Whose forehead knockes against the roofe of starres,
Stands on her tip-toes at faire England looking,
Kissing her hand, bowing her mightie breast,
And every signe of all submission making,
Tobe her sister and the daughter both
Of our most sacred maide . . . .”
There seems very little doubt that the poet’s eye was roving in a fine frenzy rather than observing with the
accuracy of a camera lens.
Population
24. The two largest ethnic groups of the population of British Guiana are the East Indians and Africans. At the end
of 1961 the East Indians formed 49 per cent of the total population and Africans 32.7 per cent. The East Indians it
may be mentioned are the descendants of the indentured labour originally imported from India to work on the sugar
cane farms. More than a quarter of a million of them were brought over between 1844 and 1914, and of these 65,000
were repatriated to India, while the rest remained to make a permanent home for themselves in British Guiana. The
Africans are the descendants of the slaves who were brought by European settlers to work on the land and were later
emancipated. They and their descendants adopted British Guiana as their homeland. In addition to these two ethnic
groups, there are some Chinese, Portuguese and Amerindians, who are the descendants of the original Red Indian
residents. As is inevitable in a country of several races, there is a substantial element of what is now known as
“mixed population”'. The East Indians are for the most part agriculturalists and, therefore, residents of villages. They
work on the sugar cane and rice farms. The Africans, for the most part, are factory workers and, therefore, town
dwellers. Thus we find that according to tire Census of 1946 the Africans comprised 53.6 per cent of the population
of Georgetown and East Indians numbered only 15.5 per cent. it would appear that a similar state of affairs also
obtains in New Amsterdam. The Portuguese are mostly town dwellers and are employed in commerce, and almost
all the Chinese and Europeans live in the towns. The Amerindians are to be found in the Savannahs.
25. The initial aloofness of the Indians, springing, perhaps, from a nostalgic attachment to their native land, is no
longer observable and the present generation of East Indians have not only accepted British Guiana as the country
which they inhabit and to which they owe allegiance, but they have without qualification or reservation identified
themselves with every aspect of its life. Their inherent habits of hard work and thrift have enabled many of them to
rise above the humble status of manual workers and enter the professions of law, medicine, commerce, and the civil
service.
26. The Indians now take a prominent part in the social and political life of the country. There are several able
lawyers. including more than one Queen’s Counsel, and a number of highly qualified doctors. Dr. Jagan, the Premier
and several of the Ministers in his Cabinet are East Indians.
27. With regard to the political affiliations of the various ethnic groups, although there is no sharply defined
classification, the Indians, for the most part, support the People s Progressive Party, of which Dr. Jagan, the present
Premier, is the leader. The Africans support, for the most part, the People’s National Congress, which was
inaugurated comparatively recently. Mr. Burnham, a local barrister, is the leader of this party. Until a few years ago
he was a colleague and supporter of Dr. Jagan. The Portuguese, for the most part, support the party known as the
United Force, of which Mr. d’Aguiar, and important businessman of Georgetown is the leader. It is difficult to
escape the hypothesis that considerations of race are to some extent responsible for political affiliations and
loyalties, although it must be stated that many East Indians support Mr. Burnham’s party and many Africans owe
allegiance to Dr. Jagan’s party. The various political parties are of recent birth and, being still in the formative
period, the convictions and loyalties of their members are somewhat superficial and personal.
28. We found little evidence of any racial segregation in the social life of the country and in Georgetown, East
Indians and Africans seemed to mix and associate with one another on terms of the greatest cordiality, though it was
clear that the recent disturbances and the racial twist given to them by some of the unprincipled and self-seeking
politicians had introduced slight, but it is hoped, transient over-tones of doubt and reserve. Among the inhabitants of
Georgetown there is, of course, always present the danger that hostile and anti-racial sentiments may be aroused by
a clash of the hopes and ambitions of rival politicians. We draw attention to this possibility because there have been
indications of such friction in the past, although, as will appear in the course of this report, the disturbances of
February 16th did not originate in a racial conflict, nor did they develop into a trial of strength between the East
Indians and the Africans.


CHAPTER II
RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
29. The political history of British Guiana and a narrative of the constitutional development of the country are fully
and admirably set out in the Report of the Constitution Commission 1950-51, presided over by Sir E. J.
Waddington,* and we need only refer to a few recent events are relevant to the subject matter and purpose of the
present inquiry. [* Colonial No. 280]
30. The emergence of political consciousness in British Guiana dates from 1947, when in the post war period the
colonial territories elsewhere were invested with a substantial measure of self-government, and it was not unnatural
for the British Guianese to hope for a share of the responsibility and fruition of government power. Dr. Jagan
entered the field of politics at this time, with all the enthusiasm of a young man of 29, freshly returned from America
where he had qualified as a dentist. While there he had married Janet Rosenburg, an American citizen of Czech
extraction who was believed to be a confirmed communist. A few years later he formed the People’s Progressive
Party, popularly known as P.P.P. The party professed a leftist ideology, and to make as extensive an appeal as
possible, it declared its aims to be self-government for the country and raising the standard of living of the common
people. Dr. Jagan sought the support of all racial groups, and in this respect he was largely successful. One of his
staunch supporters, at that time, was Mr. Burnham, a Guianese of African extraction, who is now the leader of the
largest party in opposition, known as the People’s National Congress. Universal adult suffrage was one of the
demands made by the P.P.P.. and the Waddington Commission recognised the justness of this claim. While dealing
with this matter the Commission observed:.
.Since the report of the Royal West India Commission was presented, universal adult suffrage has been in
the minds of the majority of the population of the British Caribbean territories and it has indeed been
introduced into many. In British Guiana, therefore, where the standards off intelligence and of articulation
are in no way below those obtaining in these other territories, an indefinite deferment of its introduction
would cause dissatisfaction and the arguments which could justify its being now withheld must be cogent
and based upon conditions which are not to be found elsewhere."
and summed up their conclusions as follows: .
.We therefore recognised the introduction in British Guiana of universal adult suffrage at the age of 21
years for all persons who are not subject to the customary disabilities of civic or mental incapacity."
31.This recommendation was accepted, and the general election of April, 1953, took place on the basis of a
universal adult suffrage. There was, at that time, a bi-cameral legislature consisting of:
(a) a house of Assembly composed of 24 elected representatives and 3 ex officio members;
(b) a State Council composed of 9 members of whom 6 were appointed by the Governor in his
discretion, 2 on the recommendation of the Ministers elected from the House of Assembly and 1
appointed after consultation with the independent and minority party members of the House of
Assembly.
There was an Executive Council in which were vested all the essential powers under the Constitution. This
Council consisted of the Governor as President, with a casting vote only, the 3 ex officio members of the House of
Assembly, 6 Ministers chosen by ballot from among the elected members of the House of Assembly and a member
of the State Council.
32. The P.P.P obtained a clear majority in the House of Assembly, and, owing to the peculiar composition of the
Executive Council, Dr. Jagan and his council of ministers were able to dominate the proceedings and decide every
issue as they wished. This is how the Robertson Commission of 1954* described the situation: .
.In executive matters such decisions were final and the enactment of any legislative measure decided upon
in Council could be checked finally only by the interposition of the Governor’s veto after passage through
both houses. Thus, unless the Governor used the powers reserved to him, the Ministers were in control of
the effective policy-making body and were virtually the Government. Under the Constitution Ministers
could be removed from the Executive Council only by resolution of the Council itself upon the proposal of
the Governor, or by resolution of the House of Assembly supported by at least two-thirds of the members.
The elected Ministers were, therefore, in an impregnable position so long as party solidarity continued.. [*
Cmd. 9274]
33.A series of events which are set out in detail in the Report of the Robertson Commission necessitated the
suspension of the Constitution on October 9th, 1953, and an interim Government wholly composed of ex officio and
nominated members was formed. This continued until 1957, when elections were again held under the new
Constitution which by an Order in Council of December, 1956 provided for:.
(a) a Legislative Council consisting of 14 elected and 11 nominated members (instead of 24 elected as
previously) and 3 ex officio members (as before);
(b) an Executive Council consisting of 3 ex officio members and 7 elected members of the Legislative
council nominated by the Governor.
It was originally hoped that by reducing the strength of elected members in the Legislative Council the risk
of mischievous and irresponsible trends becoming too assertive or assuming dangerous proportions would be
minimised. In fact, after the elections the Governor announced that he would nominate only 6 members to the
Legislative Council and 5 to the Executive Council, all of whom would be elected members. The effect was
therefore to place the elected members in an overall majority in both Councils. There had, in the meantime, been a
split in the P.P.P. and Mr. Burnham, who had been Dr. Jagan’s colleague and supporter since the inception of the
party, separated from him in 1955, and formed his own party. He was content in the beginning to let his party carry
the old designation of P.P.P. though later this name was altered to People’s National Congress or P.N.C. as it is
commonly referred to.
34. In the election held in 1957, Dr. Jagan’s party secured 9 of the 14 elective seats, so that again it was the largest
political party in the Legislature, though owing to the constitutional changes introduced by the above mentioned
Order in Council of December, 1956, the party was no longer in a position effectively to carry out its programme. A
constitutional conference was held in London in 1960, and it was agreed that a new constitution should be
introduced in August 1961, giving British Guiana full internal self-government. The British Guiana (Constitution)
Order in Council, 1961, was accordingly issued. The broad features of the new constitution promulgated under this
Order and which are now in force are a bi-cameral Legislature, and almost complete autonomy in internal affairs.
The two chambers are styled respectively, the Senate and the Legislative Assembly. The Legislative Assembly
consists of 35 elected members, the Senate or the Upper House consists of 13 Senators of whom 8 are appointed by
the Governor in accordance with the advice of the Premier and 3 are .appointed by the Governor acting after
consultation with such persons as, in his discretion, he considers can speak for the political points of view of groups
represented in the Legislative Assembly by members constituting the minority in the Assembly ., and the remaining
2 are appointed by the Governor acting in his discretion. The executive power effectively vests in the Council of
Ministers consisting of a Premier and not more than 9 other Ministers.
35. The Order in Council provided that .the Council of Ministers shall have the general direction and control of the
government of British Guiana and shall be collectively responsible therefore to the Legislature..
36. Elections under the new Constitution were held in August, 1961, and Dr. Jagan’s party won 20 out of the 35
seats. The P.N.C. led by Mr. Burnham won 11 and the United Force, a new party inaugurated in November 1960,
and led by Mr. d=Aguiar, a prominent businessman of Georgetown, won 4. There can be no doubt at all that Dr.
Jagan looked upon the result of the election as incontrovertible proof of his personal triumph and a complete
approval of his policies by the electorate. He had, however, not forgotten the events of 1953 when the Government
of the United Kingdom had suspended the constitution because it was feared that the party in power in British
Guiana was pursuing a course which would lead to a dangerous crisis both in public order and in the economic field
by the wholesale imposition of Marxist ideology on the affairs of the country. He, therefore, proceeded cautiously,
limiting his activity to the seeking of foreign aid for his country’s development plans. He was fully cognisant of the
economic needs of British Guiana and of the inadequacy of his country s internal resources to meet them. The
situation which faced him was somewhat as follows.
Financial Difficulties
37. In 1956 an International Labour Office survey had revealed that 18 per cent of the labour force in the country
was unemployed and 9 per cent was under-employed. A remarkable and not unnatural feature was that of the
unemployed 41 per cent lived in urban areas. A development plan costing $91 million had been prepared, but this
was not considered sufficient to meet all the needs of the country; so in the summer of 1958, Dr. Jagan had
suggested increasing the figure of $91 million to $200 million. He began to make attempts to secure the necessary
funds from foreign countries. He approached a Swiss hank and obtained an offer of a loan of 6 million [pounds]
sterling, provided the British Government were prepared to guarantee the loan. Unfortunately, the British
Government declined to entertain the suggestion as it was against their policy to guarantee such loans for Colonial
governments. Dr. Jagan was advised to go to Washington and make an application to the World Bank. To avoid
delay he drafted an application while he was still in London and sent it to Washington. He made another application
the same year to the United States Government for a loan from what is called the Development Loan Fund. The
object of this loan was irrigation and road projects. Dr. Jagan discussed the matter with officials of the State
Department in Washington, but he was told that the machinery for advancing this loan “had not yet got into full
gear”.
38. Towards the end of 1958 Mr. John Adler, an economist from the World Bank, visited British Guiana. In his
report he approved of the steps Dr.. Jagan was proposing to take for developing his country and said, .It is clear to
me that the top priorities have been correctly selected. There is no question in my mind that the provision of more
agricultural land through drainage and irrigation and
the improvement and expansion of the transportation system, particularly through better and more roads, deserve
top billing..
39. Early in 1959, United States Government officials visited British Guiana and held further discussions about the
economy of the country. In the summer of 1959 the United Kingdom Government approved of a five-year plan of
the order of $110 million for 1960-64 on the advice of Mr. Berrill, a Cambridge economist, who had visited British
Guiana early in 1959. Mr. Berrill=s opinion was that, though the suggested plan of somewhat modest proportions
could scarcely meet all the needs of the country, a bigger project necessitating the expenditure of a higher order
would impose too heavy a burden upon the finances of the country and stultify itself. The United Kingdom
Government also conceded that a more ambitious plan was no doubt needed, but was not practicable
because:
(a) the Government of the United Kingdom had other commitments, and
(b) a bigger loan would become too onerous when the time for repayment came.
Dr. Jagan enquired whether a lower rate of interest to make the transaction less onerous was permissible, but was
informed, he told us, that an Act of the British Parliament had fixed the rate at 6 per cent per annum, leaving no
discretion in the matter to the executive authority. We are assured, however, that in this respect Dr. Jagan must have
been under a misapprehension. The British Government’s view was in fact that a lower rate of interest was not
practicable because it would simply involve the United Kingdom Exchequer in a greater burden and would in effect
be the same as increasing the amount of the grant. In any case, what was done for British Guiana would have to he
done for the other territories for which Her Majesty s Government was responsible, and this could not be accepted.
In the summer of 1959 there were further talks with the World Bank in the United States of America and a loan of
about U.S.$6 to U.S.$8 million was mentioned for road construction. The amount, however, was not advanced. Dr.
Jagan requested the United States Government for the supply of food commodities such as grain, wheat flour, stock
feeds, etc., on a credit basis. But this, too, was not agreed to .because., according to Dr. Jagan, .the Government
officials expressed a point of view which was called >additionality=, that is, that they would only give you grains or
whatever surpluses of food you required based on any additional amount which you are importing.. In other words,
any assistance given would have to be over and above the existing volume of imports. Dr. Jagan next sounded the
Export and Import Bank for aid to equip a flour mill and a feed mill. The response was not encouraging. The answer
given was that congressional interests and United States flour millers were likely to be critical of such assistance. He
hoped that some economic assistance might be forthcoming for a drainage and irrigation project which he had under
contemplation, but in this matter too his hopes were not realised. In 1959, the Federal Republic of Germany was also
approached and there were also discussions in Italy. No substantial results followed these discussions, and all that
Dr. Jagan was able to obtain was a loan of $2.25 million which was approved by the World Bank in 1961. This
amount, however, was restricted to credit in the private sector in the fields of agricultural, fishery and forestry
development. In 1961, Dr. Jagan and the Minister of Trade and Industry visited Canada and the United States of
America, while the Minister of National Resources visited Germany, Italy and France in search of economic aid.
40. The internal resources of the country were extremely small and wholly inadequate to meet the increasing needs
of the development programmes. Foreign aid, as is obvious from the distressing narrative given above, was not
forthcoming. The growing suspicion that Dr. Jagan’s failure to arouse international sympathy was due to his
communist leanings, made the commercial classes of British Guiana apprehensive of the country’s future and of
their own prospects. They began to look elsewhere for opportunities to set up and expand their businesses. Thus, a
flight of capital from British Guiana started. At first, this was gradual, but soon more and more financiers were
transferring their money and assets to other countries. Dr. Jagan, in the course of his statement before us, could not
give the exact figure of the assets which were removed from the country. He was himself not in British Guiana at the
time, but he was informed that the flight of capital was substantial, and his Government was faced with the prospect
of a country depleted of its present resources and unable either to replenish its losses or to restore its economy by


external aid.
Measures adopted
41. So, in December, 1961, the Government introduced stringent currency restrictions, prohibiting the export of
liquid assets from the country. British Guiana forms part of the sterling area and is also a member of the Eastern
Caribbean Currency Board. The currency is therefore a regional one and up to December, 1961, the holders of
Eastern Caribbean dollars in British Guiana could only change them into foreign currencies in accordance with the
exchange control regulations then in force in the Colony. The new regulations suspended their convertibility into
sterling. Financial restrictions have been imposed and do indeed exist in many other countries, and have come to be
accepted as a necessary feature of the present-day complexity of international economics. Nevertheless, the action of
Dr. Jagan’s Government in suspending convertibility into sterling without, it may be added, prior consultation with
the Eastern Caribbean Currency Board, gave rise to considerable alarm and resentment.
42. In addition to these difficulties, the Finance Minister was faced with the immediate need for $15 million for
certain extraordinary expenses and to meet increases in the cost of certain services. The Government had agreed to
increase the salaries for civil servants and for this purpose an additional sum of $3.5 million was required. The
Government also needed $2.5 million for the repayment of certain loans, and $1.5 million for extra expenditure on
sea defences, the maintenance of roads and improvements to the aerodrome which were long overdue.
43. Provision had to made for this money in some manner during the year 1962. At Dr. Jagan=s invitation, Mr.
Kaldor, a well known economist of considerable experience who had served on the United Kingdom Tax
Commission and had advised the Governments of India, Ceylon, Mexico and Ghana, was invited to consider the
problem and suggest ways and means of raising additional revenue. The budget for 1962 was prepared upon the
basis of his recommendations and on January 31st, 1962, this budget was presented to the Legislative Assembly by
Dr. Jacob, Minister of Finance, who opened his speech by observing that the ground was .being laid to strengthen
our economic position and raise living standards by accelerating the rate of economic growth through our own
efforts.. He pointed out that, though for a poor and underdeveloped country external aid was an absolute necessity,
self-help was even more important because foreign aid was no substitute for self-determination. He drew attention to
the fact that the prevailing tax structure was biased in favour of the richer and propertied classes, therefore .an
impartial system of progressive taxation which distributes the burden equitably between those who derive income
from property and those who get their incomes from work is an urgent necessity.. He, accordingly, proposed some
new taxes, the burden of which was to fall on the higher income groups only. He proposed a capital gains tax, an
annual tax on property and a tax on gifts. In addition to these, he proposed certain measures for preventing the
evasion and avoidance of taxes. He also proposed a new mode of assessing the minimum measure of income tax in
respect of commercial transactions. He proposed that the minimum income of a businessman should be deemed to
be 2 per cent of his annual turnover irrespective of whether his business had shown a profit or a loss, but wherever
there was a loss it was to be set off against profits in the subsequent years. It will be seen, at once, that this measure
was aimed at dishonest businessmen who reported a loss year after year although their business continued to
flourish. Another unusual provision in the Bill was a reduction of the advertising allowance to one-quarter of one per
cent of the total turnover. This was intended to prevent unnecessary waste on prestige advertising and the
consequent reduction in the income tax payable. In order to increase the flow of resources for development
purposes, a scheme of compulsory savings was also to be introduced. This scheme contemplated a deduction at
source equivalent to a contribution of five per cent of wage and salary income in excess of $100 a month and 10 per
cent of other income in lieu of Government bonds redeemable after a period of seven years. These measures were
not calculated to yield the full additional amount of $15 million required and the balance had still to be raised. The
Minister of Finance therefore proposed an increase in the import duty on certain goods which he considered were
not necessities of life, e.g., alcoholic drinks, tobacco, concentrates for non-alcoholic drinks, tea, motor spirit,
perfumes, cosmetics, the more expensive dress fabrics, footwear, glassware, chinaware, jewellery, radios,
refrigerators and motor cars. He also proposed some increases on certain types of food for which adequate
substitutes were available in the country, e.g., meat, fish, butter, cheese, fruit, fruit juices, jams, etc There was also
an increase in the excise duties on rum and other spirits, and on beer.
44. The Minister for Finance pointed out that these duties and taxes would not impose any hardship on the people of
the lower income groups and that the increase in the urban consumer price index would be only one per cent. He
hoped, in this manner, to increase the country’s revenues by about $8 million. He also scaled down the figure of $15
million which in his original estimate was necessary to meet the increase in the recurrent expenditure.
Opposition to the Budget Proposals
45. The budget provoked fierce opposition from several quarters and was made the excuse for sustained and
increasingly hostile demonstrations against Dr. Jagan and his Government. It will be seen that there was nothing
deeply vicious or destructive of economic security in the budget. It had been drawn up on the advice of an
experienced economist, who could not be said to have any Communist prepossessions. The budget won immediate
approval from many persons. The New York Times said in an editorial that the budget was courageous and
economically sound. The London Times in a leading article, observed .The immediate problem for the Prime
Minister, Dr. Jagan, is how to win some acceptance for his economic proposals which are courageous and certainly
not far from what Guiana must have”. Sir Jock Campbell, Chairman of Booker Bros., said .It clearly was in
intention a serious attempt by the Government to get to grips with the formidable economic problems of the country
by a hard programme of self-help. It was radical. what have the people of British Guiana got to be conservative
about. but not confiscatory”. Senator Tasker of Bookers in British Guiana gave his own opinion about the budget
by saying "We assessed it as a realistic attempt to grapple with the economic problems of British Guiana”. But there
was a section of the press in British Guiana itself, which was strongly, almost viciously, critical of the budget. The
Daily Chronicle, which is under the effective control of Mr. d=Aguiar, leader of the U.F., and Argosy, which is also
hostile to Dr. Jagan, opened their assault on the day following the introduction of the budget. The Chronicle said that
the Government was going to squeeze dollars from the workers, and a few days later it carried a headline .Tax
Avalanche will Crush Working Classes.. Another headline stated .Slave Whip Budget. and went on to say
.Budget is >Marxist= . A vindictive and malicious spirit prowls through the Budget.. A week after the introduction
of the budget, The Chronicle printed a letter on the .Iniquitous Budget. which contained the exhortation "Stir
yourselves, down with this shameful budget, down with the Government.. Two days later there was another letter
proclaiming .Budget will bring misery to country. and ending .This is a trodden democracy. Let=s unite and fight
for our rights..
46. It is unnecessary to multiply quotations, and it will be sufficient to say that in the course of the days which
followed the introduction of the budget in the Assembly, the volume of opposition in a section of the press
continued to increase. What was the reason and basis of this opposition? If Dr. Jagan’s budget was a realistic attempt
to grapple with the economic problems of his country and if it was not confiscatory, there was really no reason for
such strong hostility on the part of the press and the two political parties which were arrayed against Dr. Jagan. In
our view, the reason is be sought in political rivalries and a feeling that Dr. Jagan had strong communist tendencies
and that if he were left in power his Government would proceed to enact measures injurious to the proprietary rights
of the upper classes and businessmen. Dr. Jagan had, with increasing vigour, dominated the political stage of British
Guiana since his entry upon it in 1947. There was a certain glamour about him, emanating from his youthful
exuberance and a zeal which is characteristic of dedicated men. He seemed to possess a sense of purpose and a
determination to work for his countrymen’s freedom and their material progress. The people voted for him and
every time he stood for election, he and his party secured the largest number of seats in the Legislative Assembly.
But with all his energy and his honesty of purpose he lacked the experience of a practical politician. He failed to
understand that some at any rate of his supporters were not content to remain as mere adjuncts to him, they wanted
the recognition of their own individual merits and longed for the fruition of political rewards. This, they must have
felt, was well-nigh impossible so long as they remained Dr. Jagan’s satellites. In 1953 the constitution was
suspended and all political parties were obliged to take a compulsory holiday. The Interim Government, however,
could not continue for ever, and sooner or later a time would come when political parties would once more be called
upon to play their respective parts. It was, therefore, important to make adequate provision for that eventuality. Dr.
Jagan’s politics and his line of conduct had brought the country’s progress to an ignominious halt and yet the P.P.P.
had undoubtedly a hold upon the people. The Robertson Commission had commented upon this aspect of British
Guianese politics and said .the implications of communist influence in the present leadership of the party are not
yet fully understood by the ordinary people in British Guiana, and although some of the more discerning may have
withdrawn their support, it is the general belief that
the P.P.P. could retain all the characteristics which make it incapable of intelligent government and yet still rely on
securing a majority if elections were held in the near future on a similar franchise..
47. Some people undoubtedly thought that a less ruthless type of freedom and equality might be more desirable, or
at any rate, more practicable.
48. Mr. Burnham left Dr. Jagan in 1955, as the result, he told us, of a crude interpretation of ideological differences
.between him and Dr. Jagan and, as far as his party is concerned, since his separation from Dr. Jagan, signs of
racial awareness have been observable, though happily so far this awareness has not developed into conscious or
active hostility between the East Indians and the Africans. At the general election of 1957, the phrase Appan Jhaat
meaning .support your own people was heard for the first time, and in November, 1960, a new party, the United
Force, or U.F. as it is usually referred to, was inaugurated and Mr. d=Aguiar was chosen as its leader. The political
differences between the U.F. and the P.P.P. have been stated by Mr. d=Aguiar and Senator Ann Jardim. The list of
their grievances against the P.P.P. is little more than a narrative of personal frustration. The U.F. was not opposed to
independence, although when the proposal for appointing a Constitution Committee was mooted in the Legislative
Assembly, Mr. d=Aguiar and his party staged a dramatic walk out. The U.F. wanted a referendum to he held on the
question of independence. They objected to the words .Freedom Year. being stamped on all letters sent through
the Post Office and to 1962 being described as Freedom Year in many letters and documents issued from
government offices. They also objected to the Attorney-General’s seemingly arrogant attitude in reference to the
draft Constitution which he had been asked to draw up. He had, on one occasion, been credited with the statement
that if people did not like his Constitution they could leave the country. What he had said, in fact, was somewhat
different, and much less provocative. Then again Mr. Jack Kelshall, a resident of Trinidad, who had been engaged
by Dr. Jagan as his private secretary, was a source of considerable irritation because he was an outsider and also
because he appears to have behaved in a somewhat arrogant manner. Another basis of the opposition to Dr. Jagan s
party was a fear, indeed a conviction, that Dr. Jagan was a Communist and that the entire ideology of his party was
Communist. Dr. Jagan himself had not confessed to his political beliefs in unequivocal terms but Dr. Jacob, the
Minister for Finance, had in the course of his speech in the Legislative Assembly on 9th October, 1961, expressed
his own beliefs in a manner which clearly indicated that he not only believed in the Communist creed but had the
same aims as the Communist Party. In the course of his speech he had said .My honourable friend, who is a
member for Georgetown Central (Mr. d=Aguiar) has attempted on the floor of this House to refute Marxism. This is
a futile attempt. Learned university professors, of course of the bourgeois tradition, professional mercenaries,
politicians, common vilifiers, have all tried to refute the unassailable logic of Marxism. They have all failed.. He
ended his speech on what he must have considered a high and piercing note of rhetoric: .We will attempt to build a
new society . a society which exists in more than one third of the world today; a society in which there will be
freedom and plenty for everybody. That is a genuine socialist society..
49. Thus, in the beginning of February, the P.N.C. and the U.F. were ready to launch a determined opposition to Dr.
Jagan.
50. The political professions of the P.N.C. were somewhat vague and amorphous. There was a tendency to give a
racial tinge to its policy. Mr. Burnham expressed the opinion that it was Dr. Jagan who was responsible for this
unfortunate development. He referred to the murder of an African supporter of the P.N.C. at Port Mourant, which is
the birth-place of Dr. Jagan. He said that the report of this event was suppressed by the senior information officer at
the request of the government. He also referred to other acts of violence against the supporters of the P.N.C.,
especially in the rural areas where, as we have already observed, the East Indian population was predominant. We
do not, however, think that there is much substance in the contention of Mr. Burnham and it seems to that whatever
racial differences existed were brought about by political propaganda. These differences do not go very deep and it
is to be remarked that there are two** African Ministers in Dr. Jagan’s Cabinet. The counsel of the P.P.P. at the
inquiry was an African barrister and some of Dr. Jagan’s strongest opposition in the proceedings before us came
from East Indians. Mr. Luckhoo, the counsel for the Chamber of Commerce, Mr. Ramphal, the counsel for the Trade
Unions and Mr. Jai Narine Singh, the counsel for the National Democratic Party, are all East Indians. One of the
most vigorous opponents of Dr. Jagan is another East Indian, Mr. Sankar; the Trade Union leader. It may be argued
tint politics do not enter into professional considerations when counsel undertake to appear for any party. We do not
wish to imply that racial loyalties would prevent an East Indian from appearing for an African, or an African from
taking up the case of an East Indian, but we are merely drawing attention to the circumstances mentioned above in
order to show that there is no clear-cut division between the races and that although, broadly speaking. Dr. Jagan’s
supporters are for the most part East Indians and the supporters of P.N.C. are drawn mostly from the African races,
the difference is not really racial, but economic and vocational. As already pointed out, East Indians are for the most
part agriculturalists and they are the supporters of Dr. Jagan. In the towns the percentage of African residents is
greater than the percentage of East Indians. The town dwellers support the P.N.C. not because their leader is an
African, but because they do not approve of some of the socialistic policies of Dr. Jagan which are less favourable to
town dwellers than to the rural population. These policies, in their turn, are dictated, not by the fact of racialism, but
because in British Guiana agriculture is of primary importance and development plans tend to promote agriculture in
a larger measure than industrial schemes. [** Editor’s Note: This is incorrect. There were three African Ministers.]
51. The real motive force behind Mr. Burnham=s assault was a desire to assert himself in public life and establish a
more important and more rewarding position for himself by bringing about Dr. Jagan’s downfall. The weapon be
employed was the argument that the budget contained measures calculated to inflict hardship upon the working
classes by increasing the cost of living. So, the argument continued, if Dr. Jagan’s Government was allowed to
continue in office, further and still more oppressive measures would certainly be enacted. The attitude of the U.F.
was a little more honest and certainly more consistent. This party represented the businessmen and the middle
classes, and these were, no doubt, adversely affected by the new taxes on capital gains, gifts and property holdings.
The U.F. genuinely feared a further decline in their vested interests if Dr. Jagan’s Government continued to remain
in charge of the country’s affairs. They naturally resented the socialistic, if not communistic, leanings of Dr. Jagan.
The Daily Chronicle supported this campaign of criticising the budget and discrediting Dr. Jagan, and developed an
increasingly hostile attack upon the Government. Mr. d=Aguiar, in the course of his statement before us, protested
that he never interfered with the editorial policy of the newspaper; but the fact remains that his share holding
enabled him to exercise effective control over the paper and the editor’s transparent loyalty to his employer and
principal compelled the latter to criticise the editor far not criticising him (Mr. d=Aguiar) enough. This reprimand
was, no doubt, administered in order to remind his employee that he must at least give a semblance of being
independent and not carry his argument so far into the realms of absurdity as to invite the imputation of being a mere
supine hireling. Mr. d=Aguiar based his attack on arguments similar to those advanced by the P.N.C. and
proclaimed that the budget was an oppressive measure and the clearest proof of Dr. Jagan’s Marxist ideology and his
dictatorial methods. The contradiction implicit in a measure being both Communist in substance and oppressive of
the workers was not a matter which troubled Dr. Jagan’s opponent, for political slogans are not infrequently lacking
in logic and the multitude to whom they are addressed does not possess the faculty of discerning an incongruity or
fallacy in what their leaders expound before them.
52. A passing reference may here be made to a matter which is dealt with more fully in a subsequent part of this
report. The P.N.C. challenged the election of several P.P.P. candidates on grounds which are available under The
Legislature (Appointment, Election and Membership Controversies) Ordinance, 1961. One of these petitions
succeeded and the P.P.P. member for Houston was unseated. A by-election to fill the resulting vacancy has,
however, not been held and the Premier has been exploring ways and means of validating the election of the P.P.P.
candidate and thus circumventing the order of the court whereby he was unseated. This infelicitous handling of a
delicate situation was an open invitation to criticism of a vituperative type.

CHAPTER III
ECONOMIC DISCONTENT
53. A brief reference has already been made to the rising cost of living and the inadequacy of the
country’s resources to finance development plans aimed at increasing the material wealth of the
people and providing better amenities for them. A more detailed examination of this matter is
now necessary as economic discontent played an important part in fermenting the agitation
which led to the disturbances of February 16th, in Georgetown.
Civil Servants
54. Let us first take the case of the Civil Servants, who in British Guiana are members of a
well-organised body called the British Guiana Civil Service Association, affiliated to the Trades
Union Council. The last revision of their salaries took place in 1954 on the recommendation of
the Hands-Jakeway Commission. In the course of the next three years the cost of living index
rose from 277 to 300 and the British Guiana Civil Service Association (B.G.C.S.A.) asked for an
increase in salaries. The Government appointed a Commission presided over by Mr. Gorsuch to
enquire into the matter, but owing to a difference of opinion between the B.G.C.S.A. and the
Government, the B.G.C.S.A. declined to take part in the proceedings of the Commission and
rejected its recommendations. The Government, for their part, did not think it fit to implement
the report and matters remained as they were for another four years. In 1961 another body,
known as the Guillebaud Commission, was appointed to review .wages, salaries and conditions
of service in the Public Service of British Guiana.” This Commission found that there was
considerable substance in the grievances of the Civil Servants and observed:
“The cost of living has increased since 1954 by something of the order of 10 per cent; there
have been increases in wages and salaries in commercial and other forms of employment in
the country; and the remuneration of those in the Public Service in other parts of the
Caribbean has risen in many cases. . . .
“There can be no question as to the strength of the feeling of dissatisfaction which prevails
throughout the Public Service in this country. We have heard much evidence on these matters
not only from Staff Associations, but also from the Heads of Departments, whom we have
personally and separately interviewed. As a result of this we have reached the conclusion that
during the last two years there has been a widespread decline in the morale of the Service,
particularly in its lower and middle sections. Much time is being wasted in the discussion and
ventilation of grievances, and the efficiency of the Service as a whole is becoming impaired.”
55. The Commission made a number of recommendations involving a total increase of $2.5
million in the expenditure upon salaries and wages of Civil Servants. The report was submitted
to the Government on July 29th, 1961, and was published in September the same year. The
B.G.C.S.A generally accepted the recommendations. There was, however, considerable delay in
implementing the suggestions regarding the increases of salaries and the final decision of the
Government was postponed more than once. In the meantime the Civil Service continued to
agitate for the suggested increases. In November, representatives of the B.G.C.S.A. met the
Minister for Finance. A few days later a report appeared in the newspapers that according to a
spokesman of the Government the Treasury was empty, and this naturally caused consternation
among the Civil Servants. The Association decided to hold what it called “whistle stop
meetings” at various places. Prolonged negotiations and a period of attrition followed, but the
Civil Servants were unable to obtain anything beyond promises from the Government. In
December, Mr. Benn, who was acting as Premier during Dr. Jagan’s temporary absence,
promised earnest consideration of the Civil Servants’ demands, but said that lack of funds was a
handicap. On December 12th, the Association held a meeting which was attended by a large
number of its members, and on the following day the Government announced increases in
salaries with effect from 1st January, 1961. There was. however, no indication of when payment
would be made and a request for interim payment was not accepted. On December 18th a general
meeting was held in the Town Hall of Georgetown and those present insisted on interim
payment; they even criticised Mr. Stoll, the President of the Association, for being ineffective.
Mr. Stoll promptly tendered his resignation. This, however, was not accepted and he was
requested to carry on negotiations on behalf of the Association. On December 21st, another
deputation met the Minister of Finance. The Minister said that no interim payment was possible.
Another meeting of the Association took place immediately afterwards at which it was
abundantly clear that tempers were getting more and more frayed. On one occasion Mr. Stoll told
Mr. Benn, the acting Premier, that the situation was very tense. He referred to the possibility of a
strike and admitted that the Government was no doubt in a position to defeat the Association, but
in any event a great deal of damage to both parties would result from a clash of this nature.
56. On January 2nd, 1962. there was another meeting between the Finance Minister and the representatives of the
Staff Associations at which the Government conceded the salary increases recommended by the Guillebaud
Commission. but at the same time made a great number of changes in its detailed recommendations which largely
neutralised the good effect of its tardy decision. Even on this occasion the question of salaries was not finally
disposed of. Further meetings followed but the Association failed to obtain satisfaction in respect of any of its major
demands. So, at the beginning of February, the Civil Servants were in a very sullen mood. They had often thought of
holding public demonstrations and even of going on strike. The Government was probably doing the best in the
circumstances, but handicapped as it was by lack of funds and its incapacity to make quick and far-reaching
decisions, it was unable to give adequate satisfaction to its Civil Service. It is important to note that there was a very
considerable measure of deep discontent, amounting almost to a sense of resentment among the Civil Servants, and
in the beginning of February they were ready to take drastic steps in order to ventilate their grievances and have
them redressed.

Other Government Servants
57. The lower paid Government servants had unions of their own. There were in all five separate
bodies .
(i) the Post Office Workers’ Union (P.O.W.U.)
(ii) Medical Employees’ Union (M.E.U.)
(iii) the Transport Workers’ Union (T.W.U.)
(iv) the Public Works, Pure Water Supply and Sea Defence Workers’ Union
(P.W.S.S.D.W.U.)
(v) the Government Employees’ Union (G.E.U.)

These five unions comprised a Federation of the Unions of Government Employees
(F.U.G.E.). Mr. Jackson was the President of this Federation and also of the P.O.W.U. The case
of these employees was almost exactly similar to the case of the Civil Servants considered above.
Their fortunes had passed through the same vicissitudes as the fortunes of the better paid Civil
Servants. The findings of the Hands-Jakeway Commission had been applicable to them; they,
too, had declined to co-operate with the Gorsuch Commission; a strike by them in 1959 had
persuaded the Government to offer a slight increase in their salaries, but this was not considered
adequate. Ever since 1954 the minimum day wage of a Government employee had remained
stationary at the figure of $2.52, though the cost of living had increased by about 10 per cent. In
1959, the Government proposed a revised figure of $2.75 which would have fully counterbalanced
the rise in prices, but the workers wanted to improve their standard of living and
insisted on a minimum wage of $4.50, to which the Government was not agreeable. The
F.U.G.E., however, accepted the Government’s offer for the time being and signed an
Agreement in December, 1959. In this Agreement it was provided that the dispute regarding
wages would be referred to the Whitley Council, a body which resolved trade disputes and
differences between the Government and its employees. The Whitley Council gave its award in
November, 1960, recommending a minimum wage of $3.04.
58. The Government accepted the recommendation and agreed to pay $3.04 with effect from
November 29th, 1960, the date of the Whitley award. But the Federation was not satisfied with
this and, taking their stand on the argument that their claim had arisen on the date mentioned in
the Agreement signed in December, 1959, wanted the higher wage to become effective from
April 1st, 1959. This dispute relating to the award of the Whitley Council taking effect
retrospectively could not be resolved, and it remained a source of discontent and resentment. In
September, 1961, came the report of the Guillebaud Commission and the Federation wanted the
points of difference between the Government and its employees arising out of this report also to
be referred to the Whitley Council. Negotiations continued till the end of January, 1962, without
bearing any fruit, and on 31st January F.U.G.E. repeated its demands in a letter addressed to the
Secretary to the Treasury. After some correspondence, the Minister for Finance agreed to meet
the representatives of the Federation on 12th February, on which date he was also meeting the
representatives of the Civil Service Association.
59. Therefore, at the beginning of February almost the entire body of Government employees,
including the lower as well as the higher paid officials, were in a state of extreme discontent
amounting almost to bitter resentment against the Government.
Trade Employees and Factory
Workers
60. In addition to the Government servants there was a vast body of trade employees and factory
workers whose feelings and activities greatly contributed to the disturbances of 16th February. In
their case there appears to have been no old standing, definite and clearcut grievance against Dr.
Jagan’s Government and their hostility began with, and was founded upon, certain provisions of
the budget which directly affected the working classes. In the beginning their criticism was
confined to the scheme for compulsory savings and the additional taxes on consumer goods,
though, later, income tax allowances and the reduction of advertising expenses were also taken


up as objectionable items in the budget.
61. A word may now be said about the nature and implications of the savings scheme. The idea
was not altogether novel and had already beet exploited in certain Latin-American countries.
e.g., Brazil and also in Ghana. The proposal was to the effect that every wage earner whose
salary exceeded $100 per month would be required to make a contribution of 5 per cent of his
income and this amount would be credited to his account and he would be given bonds of an
equal value. The bonds would carry tax-free interest at the rate of 3¾ per cent per annum and
would be encashable at the end of seven years, except in certain special eases such as the death
of the contributor, when the bonds could be cashed earlier. This scheme was interpreted as a
wholly unjustified incursion into personal property and individual liberty. The fact that, except in
rare cases, the bonds could not be cashed till the expiry of seven years, savoured of an
expropriatory measure and it was said that only slaves could be compelled to save their earnings
in this manner. There were not wanting malicious critics of the Government who suggested that
the bonds would ultimately be confiscated.
62. With regard to the taxes on consumer goods, no one paused to think that they entailed an
increase of only 1 per cent in the cost of living, because in actual fact the situation was
aggravated when most shopkeepers promptly raised the prices not only of those goods upon
which the import duty had been increased, but also of other goods which had not come within the
purview of the budget. Moreover, the increases were in almost every instance more than the
actual increase in the import duty. The all-round higher prices were naturally ascribed to the
radical provisions of the budget.
63. Increased taxes at all times and in all places bring about a stiffening of attitudes towards the
Government, and Dr. Jagan and his Council of Ministers must have expected some adverse
comment and even a certain measure of opposition. But the active hostility and the virulent
propaganda which the budget provoked cannot be attributed entirely to an objective
consideration of the new tax proposals or to their effect upon the economic life of the working
classes. There is very little doubt that, despite the loud protestations of the trade union leaders to
the contrary, political affinities and aspirations played a large part in shaping their policy and
formulating their programme of offering resistance to the budget and making a determined effort
to change the government in office.
64. It has been proved beyond all doubt that the three most important trade unionists, Mr.
Ishmael, Mr. Jackson and Mr. Sankar, were deeply involved in politics. Indeed, when Mr.
Sankar, Assistant General Secretary of the Man Power Citizens Association (M.P.C.A.) was
questioned upon the point, he could not deny the close connection between politics and the trade
union movement. He was asked if there was good relationship between the M.P.C.A. and the
P.P.P. His reply was “The M.P.C.A. tried to be realistic in its approach to the government of the
day. The P.P.P. has gone out of its way to be critical and destroy the union”. A little later when
he was asked if there was any introduction of politics in a meeting of the T.U.C., the witness
admitted “Well, it is unavoidable, because on the General Council we have all three of the main
political parties represented. We have Mr. Burnham from the P.N.C.; we have from the P.P.P.
Mr. Chase, President of the Senate, and Mr. George Henry; and from the U.F. the two defeated
candidates, Mr. Bolton and Mr. Critchlow”. Mr. Sankar, in the course of his examination,
expressed his strong sense of resentment at what he said was an attempt of the P.P.P. to influence
the trade unions. It is significant that the Saw-mill and Forest Workers Union did not join the
strike. The fact that the President of this Union is Mr. Henry, who stood as a P.P.P. candidate at
the last election, can scarcely be a mere coincidence. The question of Mr. Henry s election will
be dealt with more fully in a later part of this report, and here it is sufficient to recall that Mr.
Henry was declared successful, but his election was set aside by an order of a Judge of the High
Court who found upon an election petition that the election was attended with certain
irregularities.
65. Mr. Jackson, the President of the F.U.G.E., used to be, as he admitted, “close to the P.P.P. He
later joined the P.N.C. and became its Secretary. He resigned the Secretaryship, but his political
loyalty no doubt continues, because throughout his evidence a strong anti-P.P.P. slant was
noticeable. Mr. Ishmael, the President of the B.G.T.U.C. and General President of the M.P.C.A.,
vehemently denied any association with politics. There is, however, no doubt at all that his
conduct during the period of the disturbances was actuated by a strong feeling of animosity
towards the Premier and Mr. Hubbard, a Minister of Dr. Jagan s Cabinet. His dislike of Mr.
Hubbard was manifested by an incident relating to the strike of the Electric Power House
workers. Mr. Hubbard, who was the Minister in charge, had issued a circular to the workers
telling them that they were members of an essential service and therefore it was illegal for them
to strike, He made an oblique reference to Mr. Ishmael, who, however, was not named in the
circular. But Mr. Ishmael was greatly piqued at the somewhat derogatory suggestion that no
election of a certain trade union had been held because the President would not have been able to
get a majority of votes. The words used were: “Further the M.P.C.A is unable to secure a strike
of sugar workers, which constitute the bulk of its membership, and indeed its President is not
able to face an election in his union”. Mr. Ishmael explained that the President referred to was
himself. At the Electric Power House, Mr. Hubbard tried to get the workmen to continue their
work. This was a perfectly legitimate thing to do, but it seemed to have incensed Mr. Ishmael,
who spoke of it in the following terms in the course of his examination:
“Mr. Hubbard was called or was informed and came up and sneaked
behind me and attempted to get the workers to change their minds about
not working and not going on strike. And he didn’t only do that; I was
very shocked when I came outside with the last one behind me to find that
he had taken some of the men standing outside into the plant. Not only
was he trying to tell them to work but he was saying all kinds of things.
He called me a capitalist stooge. He said I was bought over by d’Aguiar
and bought over by the big businesses and he told the workers to get me
off the premises.”
This statement shows the extent of acrimonious hostility which entered Mr. Ishmael’s
thoughts and actions in his dealings with the members of the Government. He could not deny
that there were several prominent union leaders who are politicians. He mentioned the names of
Chase, Agard, Burnham, Bolton, Henry and Kirton. Nothing illustrates more clearly the close
collaboration between the trade unions and the political leaders during the disturbances than the
agreement about a meeting which took place on the Parade Ground on the evening of February
14th. The trade unions had obtained a police permit to hold a meeting between the hours of 6 and
10 p.m. The P.N.C. applied for a similar permit, but were informed that a permit had already
been issued to the T.U.C. Thereafter, the two bodies agreed to divide the time so that the meeting
of the trade unions was from 6 to 8 p.m., and of the P.N.C. from 8 to 10 p.m. Both these
meetings were aimed at securing the support of the masses for the anti-Jagan agitation. Mr.
Ishmael himself made the announcement at the T.U.C. meeting that a P.N.C. meeting would
follow. When questioned about this point, he said “Yes, I did [say] at the very commencement
that our meeting was going to be short and the P.N.C. would be taking over the meeting. They
were not to take it to mean that there was any affiliation or collaboration between the P.N.C. and
the T.U.C. I mentioned that it was just a question that they had applied for permission and had
been refused, that we had had permission for a long period of time and we did not need all the
time, so we intended to give it to them”.
66. It is needless to comment on the strain upon one’s credulity exercised by Mr. Ishmael’s
statements. Mr. Ishmael used to be a member of the P.P.P. until 1950 and stood for the
Legislative Assembly as an independent candidate in 1953. In 961 he again offered himself as an
independent candidate but withdrew before the election was held. He took part in two
discussions at the headquarters of the U.F. in order to consolidate the elements opposing the
Government and bring about a single Opposition Party in the country. On the morning of Black
Friday (February 16th) he held discussions with Messrs. Chase, Vernon, Henry, etc., who are
prominent politicians. Mr. Burnham himself is not free from a sense of loyalty to the T.U.C.
Indeed, he was one of the delegates at the T.U.C. meeting. These facts make nonsense of the
reiterated protests of the trade union leaders that they were at all times anxious to keep their
organisation completely free from all political influences. We have drawn attention to these
circumstances in order to point out the extent to which the economic discontent of the country
was influenced and helped by personal and private grievances. This phenomenon. we may at
once concede, is not a peculiarity of British Guianese public life and is to be observed in all parts
of the world and among all peoples.
67. We therefore see that in the beginning of February there were arrayed against the
Government
the political parties in opposition and also a very large body of the workers and civil servants, all
carrying their respective grievances against the Government. It was not long before these forces
combined to form a veritable torrent of abuse, recrimination and vicious hostility directed against
Dr. Jagan and his Government, and each day gave fresh vigour to the agitation.


CHAPTER IV
THE DISTURBANCES
68. At the beginning of the second week of February, there were signs of a gathering storm. There
arose in certain quarters an apprehension that something untoward might follow, if not directly result, from the
mounting agitation engineered by the political leaders of the opposition parties. From February 9, onward, the
intensity and the frequency of anti-Government demonstrations increased and it becomes necessary from this stage
to give a more detailed narrative of the events which culminated in the fierce outburst of February 16, a day which
came popularly to be known as Black Friday.
69. On February 9, the Government was expected to make a statement relating to the appointment of a Committee to
consider the draft Constitution for British Guiana. Long before the Assembly Session was due to begin a crowd had
begun to gather in front of the Public Buildings as the Assembly Chamber is called. Assistant Commissioner of
Police De Abreu saw a crowd of about 400 seeking admission to the chamber. The public gallery could
accommodate no more than 118 and De Abreu had to close the door against the rest who remained standing outside,
disappointed and obviously discontented. Inside the chamber the proceedings commenced with the Minister of
Finance making a statement that “in order that the Government may give careful consideration to all of the
representations received, it is proposed to deter consideration of the Second Reading of the Appropriation Bill to a
date to be announced. Discussions will be held immediately with all persons and organisations so that the Budget
may be debated in the House without undue delay”. So the debate scheduled to take place on February 12 was
postponed to an unspecified date. The government hoped that this act of procrastination would, in some measure at
least, allay the fears of the Opposition and placate the agitators.
70. The Premier then proceeded to move a resolution having reference to the forthcoming Constitutional
Conference, due then to be held in London in May, for the purpose of fixing a date for the inauguration of
independence in British Guiana. He pointed out that as suggested in a despatch by the Secretary of State for the
Colonies “the Conference should be an all party Conference”, so he (the Premier) proposed a Committee of 16
members of whom eight would be drawn from the P.P.P., six from the P.N.C. and two from the U.F. In addition to
these 16, the Speaker of the House would act as chairman of the Committee and this Committee would consider and
report on a draft Constitution for the country, which was to be prepared in the first instance by the Attorney-General,
after taking into consideration representations and suggestions made by the proposed Committee and by members of
the public. The Premier’s proposal provoked a resolute indeed a defiant opposition from Mr. Burnham, leader of the
P.N.C., and after delivering a long speech in the course of which he attacked the Premier and challenged his claim to
speak for the people of British Guiana, Mr. Burnham walked out of the chamber, taking with him the remaining nine
members of his party. At the same time almost all occupants in the public gallery also left the chamber. The
simultaneous emptying of the seats occupied by a major section of the opposition and the public must have given the
appearance of a pro-planned and somewhat histrionic demonstration designed to shock and humiliate the
government. This impression was further strengthened when Mr. D’Aguiar, the leader of the U.F., went through an
exactly similar performance by giving a speech opposing the Premier’s resolution and walking out with his
followers. This reduced the proceedings in the Chamber to the farce of a unilateral debate solely conducted by the
party in power. But to preserve an air of dignity and overcome the sense of mortification induced by the dramatic
walk out, the Attorney-General who was to speak next rose to his feet and delivered a speech supporting the motion.
71. The Premier then stood up to reply to the debate but before dealing with the motion he read out
a statement couched in solemn terms. The statement was a brief one and, as it adumbrated to some extent the
unfortunate events which were enacted in the course of the week, it is set out below in full:
“It has come to the knowledge of the Government that violence is actually
being planned on a general scale by certain elements acting for a minority
group. In addition, it is understood that attempts against the Premier’s life
and the lives of certain of his Ministers and supporters are contemplated.
These acts of violence are intended to secure the overthrow of the legally
elected Government by force and the tax proposals in the budget are being
used as a screen for the general plan.
These plotters intend to call a general strike for Monday, February 12.
Since there is no likelihood of this strike call being widely supported by
the workers, certain elements of the business community plan to shut
down their business houses. The intention is in effect to stage a general
lock-out on the excuse that the strike has created conditions which prevent
continued business operations.

Every step possible is being taken to bring the Civil Service in on this
strike and if these designs are successful, the total result will be to cause
widespread dislocation of the Colony’s economy.
Such a course of action will be very likely to end in riot and violence. The
people who plan this operation must be aware of this. It seems that they
are seeking to cause turmoil and unrest in order to halt our march to
Independence and economic well-being for all.
This small clique is determined to preserve their positions of privilege.
They want to create another Congo here. They talk-about freedom and
democracy, but are determined to use unconstitutional means to achieve
these ends. They feel that they can depend on foreign support.
In the circumstances the Government intends to take energetic steps to
forestall this plan and I am now appealing to all reasonable public-minded
citizens not to allow themselves to be persuaded or fooled into taking part
in what can only be a disastrous and futile effort on the part of a small
misguided and selfish element in the community to turn back the clock of
history.”
72. The Premier then reverted to the motion before the House and declared that in view of the nonco-
operative attitude displayed by the opposition, he craved leave of the House to withdraw the motion. This was
agreed to, and the House adjourned to an unspecified date to he determined later.
73. Outside the Chamber a large crowd had collected and was waiting for the moment when the Ministers would
leave for home. The demonstrators were carrying banners and slogans and as the Ministers came out they were
jeered. When the Premier emerged from the Chamber the crowd became even more vociferous and impeded his
departure. The Police came to his assistance by forcing a way through the crowd and bringing up an emergency
vehicle to act as a shield against the onslaught of the hostile demonstrators. One of them . a Dr. Reid . pushed a
banner in front of the windscreen of the Premier’s motor car, obscuring the driver’s view. It was after an
uncomfortable moment or two that the Premier was finally able to leave. Assistant Commissioner of Police De
Abreu estimated the size of the crowd at 5,000. Mr. D’Aguiar was with the crowd.
Opposition Manoeuvres .
People’s National Congress
74. At This stage it is convenient to discuss the policies and immediate objectives of the two major political parties
in Opposition, viz., the People’s National Congress and the United Force. The energies of these parties were aimed
at forcing Dr. Jagan into a position which would be wholly untenable and from which he would be compelled to
resign. Mr. Burnham, while giving evidence before us, said “our tactics were to remain silent, make no public
reference until the second reading on the 12th February, then we would make known our standing. It would then be
a matter of prestige. They would be unable to withdraw the budget. Then Dr. Jagan would be embarrassed, his
unpopularity would increase”, and he would have no choice but to resign.

75. When on February 9, the Finance Minister announced the postponement of the budget date, these plans had to be
revised and a public meeting for the 12th was fixed. Mr. Burnham spoke at this meeting. He began on a note of
self-pity by making an appeal for money on behalf of his party, which he said was the poor man’s party with no
fairy godmother or rich uncles. He went on to explain the party’s stand on the question of independence and
declared that the P.N.C. wanted independence immediately, and there was no question of a referendum, for it was
superfluous to ask the people if they wanted to be free. He then turned his attention to Dr. Jagan and the latter’s
reported intention to bring his farmer supporters to Georgetown in order to provoke an outbreak of violence, so that
he could justifiably call in British troops to help him. Mr. Burnham next dealt with the harsh tax measures
introduced by the budget and ended his speech by working on the emotions of his audience in the manner of Mark
Antony. “Comrades,” he exclaimed, “the fight starts now. Tomorrow at 2 o’clock in the afternoon there is a
demonstration organised by the Trade Union Congress, a demonstration against the harsh proposals of the budget,
which make life unbearable. No doubt the Riot Squad will be there. Do you still want to go? . . . Comrades,
remember that tomorrow Jagan’s army is coming down from Cane Grove and Windsor Forest. Do you still want to
go? . . . Comrades, I will be seeing you tomorrow at 2 p.m., when we will all join the demonstration. Thank you and
goodnight.” The next day there was a mass demonstration organised by the workers and trade unions. A procession
was taken through the streets of Georgetown ending at the old parade ground where a meeting was held. Mr.
Burnham arrived somewhat late at this meeting because he had been detained by professional work. On the morning
of the 14th the Government issued a proclamation declaring the Public Buildings and the area around it a proclaimed
area, in which public processions and meetings were forbidden. The political opponents of Dr. Jagan decided to
contravene the proclamation and on the morning of the 15th a large procession was taken through the proclaimed
area. This was considered a great triumph and on the evening of the 15th another meeting was held. This meeting, as
already observed, was the result of collaboration between the political parties and the Trades Union Council. The
Trades Union Council had agreed to give some of their own time to the political parties and in lieu of this
concession, the political parties had made available to the Trades Union Council their public address system because
their apparatus was somewhat defective. At this meeting Mr. Burnham spoke. He began by congratulating his
listeners on the splendid performance of the morning when there had been a wholesale breach of the proclamation.
Exhilarated and carried forward by the flow of his rhetoric, be criticised the unsympathetic attitude of the Volunteer
Force and of the police. In his peroration he declared that a government could not be got rid of by merely saying
“Resign” or “Down with Jagan”. “Those are useful and helpful slogans, but much more than slogans are required in
the present circumstances. Comrades, first of all, let me say this, that the People’s National Congress sees the way
clearly, step by step and phase by phase. All I can tell you is this, that it is no sense taking part in this explosion
which has happened at this moment if you are going to peter out or turn back half-way. You have to see it through . .
. . I believe that the P.N.C. knows what we all want and knows how we will seek to achieve what we all want; but
one thing I know you do not want, one thing I know the P.N.C. will not countenance, and that is violence.
Comrades, violence we shall never start because we are a peaceful people. If there is to be violence, let others start
it, not the People’s National Congress; but comrades, they shall not pass.” After this, Mr. Burnham advised his
audience to take a rest on the following day, but be had by now worked them up into such a state of frenzy that they
declared their firm determination to continue the agitation in the morning. There was an ominous foreboding in the
promise which Mr. Burnham made in reply to the reaction of the audience to his exhortation for rest.
“I have heard what you have had to say, and I have noted very carefully what you prefer and want, and
therefore, Comrades, you will be informed what exercises may be necessary tomorrow. Comrades, you will
be informed. I do not want to make any suggestions here tonight what that exercise should be. You will be
informed through the usual channel which has proved effective in spite of the fact that our comrades, the
Post Office workers, are on strike, and tomorrow we shall meet again some place, somewhere, somehow.”


Opposition Manoeuvres .
United Force
76. The policy of the U.F. was clear and categoric. Mr. d’Aguiar was espousing the cause of businessmen and the
upper middle-class. He himself had an important stake in the country and his politics were therefore not quite free
from personal motives. He told us that in 1953 he offered himself as an independent candidate for the Legislative
Assembly. He was defeated and chose not to stand at the next election of 1957, because (he said) a racial element
had entered the elections. In 1961 he stood and was elected as the Member for Georgetown Central. He told us that
he re-entered politics because he thought it necessary to reveal to the people the dangers of Communism. He
described his own function as leader of one of the Opposition parties, to “oppose, expose and depose the
government”. This objective he pursued with the most vigorous consistency. After staging the dramatic walk-out
from the Assembly on February 9. he addressed a public meeting in the course of which he said “there is only one
thing . to show your mettle, buck up and kick off the braces, unite and fight to break this bare-foot. bare-back,
bare-faced budget. It is breaking already. . . . let them resign, they are, shaken by your solidarity. Do not fall back
now, press on, break this budget, destroy it”. He seized every opportunity of attacking Dr. Jagan s government and
inciting the crowds during the week of disturbances. On the 10th and 11th February he went into the country on a
speaking campaign. From Monday onwards he was in considerable prominence. He led several processions, and
gave a number of speeches. Before us he posed as one of those individuals who, as Shakespeare says, have greatness
thrust upon them, for he was at pains to emphasize that it was not he who led the crowd, but the crowd who wanted
to be led by him. On Monday, the 12th, when he came out he saw that a large number of workers were forming
small groups in the streets, instead of attending to their business. He addressed them and congratulated them. He
advised them to go home, but they said that they wanted to march. So Mr. D’Aguiar led them in a procession
through the streets of Georgetown, passing deliberately in front of Mr. Kelshall’s house and then past the Premier s
house (the Premier and Mr. Kelshall had become the two main objects of odium to the Opposition), ending at the
Parade Ground where speeches were made. The supporters of Mr. d’Aguiar had taken the precaution of fitting a
public address system at the Parade Ground. Here someone from the crowd shouted “Radio Moscow”. This was
rightly interpreted to mean “Radio Demerara” against which frequent complaints appear to have been made on
account of Dr. Jagan’s Marxist views having been propagated through its machinery. Mr. d’Aguiar accepted the
invitation of the crowd and led the procession to “Radio Demerara” because, as he said, he wanted “to protest
against the attitude of the Government in not allowing other political parties to use the Radio Station to express their
views in connection with the Budget”. According to law, a police permit for holding a procession in a public place
was necessary and, as this had not been done, Superintendent of Police Barrow stopped the procession and pointed
out that the law was being contravened Mr. d’Aguiar replied with the specious argument that since the procession
was spontaneous, no illegality [was] attached to it. He continued on his way and the police, anxious at that stage to
avoid a clash, offered no further obstruction and Superintendent Barrow decided not to provoke an excited crowd by
arresting Mr. d’Aguiar on the spot, but to take action against him by mean of a summons, to be issued later on. The
procession was brought back to Mr. d’Aguiar’s premises, where he addressed them again. On the next day both Mr.
d’Aguiar and Anne Jardim, another U.F. leader and a member of the Senate, went to the T.U.C. meeting at the
Parade Ground after the token strike and mass demonstration. Mr. d’Aguiar gave a speech at another meeting when
he called upon the Government to resign. On Wednesday. February 14th, Mr. d’Aguiar told his supporters that there
would be a surprise in store for them and that they should be available in the afternoon. Mr. d’Aguiar, who had a
special predilection for the spectacular and the flamboyant, had arranged a parade of his trucks bearing slogans
through the streets of Georgetown. The parade did take place and we have no doubt that the population of
Georgetown was duly impressed. The proclamations issued by the Government prohibiting public meetings and
processions in the area around the Public Buildings had exasperated both the Opposition parties and they looked
upon it as an extremely provocative move. Mr. d’Aguiar had not, like Mr. Burnham, made a decision to contravene
the proclamation. He had to give a broadcast that afternoon and when he drove into the town he saw a large crowd
and people asked him to join the procession which Mr. Burnham was leading into the proclaimed area. Mr. d’Aguiar
was, as he says, “propelled” forward to join Mr. Burnham, and the two leaders, followed by a large crowd, made
three circuits of the Public Building The procession ended at the headquarters of the P.N.C. where the two leaders
shook hands ostentatiously and in full view of the crowd of their supporters, and were photographed doing so. In his
broadcast speech that evening, Mr. d’Aguiar said “If any budget has to be substantially changed because pressure
has been brought by the people who are being taxed, then it amounts to a vote of no confidence. The Government
must stand or fall by its budget. In a democratic country, in such circumstances, the normal procedure would be for
the Government to withdraw their budget and resign”.
77. Mr. d’Aguiar was no doubt referring to a broadcast by the Premier on Wednesday evening when he announced
some modifications of the budget. The view taken by Mr. d’Aguiar was that it was not enough to make any
modifications in the budget and the only course open to the Premier was to resign. He intended to use every means
of bringing down the government. On the morning of Friday the 16th, he went to time Parade Ground and, seeing a
crowd, had his mobile equipment for public address set up. Speeches were given by various persons and Mr.
d’Aguiar himself spoke. He then went back to his office where he was told that tear gas was being used in front of
the electric power station. He hurried to the power station, and there he heard that two young children had been
seriously injured by tear gas fumes and taken to hospital. A crowd was standing in front of the Power Station which
at that moment was being protected by a police riot squad. Mr. d’Aguiar walked through the riot squad paying no
heed to the impediment . we were shown a photograph of him passing under the extended arm of a policeman. A
number of persons followed him. He went to his own premises and addressed the crowd which had collected in front
of his premises. Mr. d’Aguiar told us that someone passed up a note to him which said that one of the two children
who had been affected by the tear gas had died in the hospital. He did not wish to incite the crowd unduly and so
instead of reading the note out to them he said that the message which he had received was to the effect that one of
the children was seriously ill. He advised the crowd to remain non-violent because violence led to innocent people
being hurt, as the small child had been. A number of witnesses appearing before us stated that what Mr. d’Aguiar
told the crowd was that the child had, in fact, died. We are inclined to take the view that Mr. d’Aguiar did not
exercise any restraint upon himself and that he, in fact, announced the death of the child to the crowd and not its
mere illness. We are constrained to observe that his being wedded to truth did not impose so stern a cloisteral
isolation upon him as not to permit an occasional illicit sortie, in order to taste the seductive and politically
rewarding adventure of flirting with half-truths. We found more than one instance of this lack of ingeniousness on
his part and when he was being examined by Mr. Potter, he confessed to no less
than eight occasions when the crowd compelled him to take the initiative. It is scarcely possible to believe that a
leader of an opposition party, whose creed is to oppose. expose and depose the Government should be no more than
a passive, if not an almost reluctant, leader of processions and initiator of political moves. Mr. d’Aguiar admitted
before us that whenever an opportunity offered itself he took advantage of it in order to further his projects. The
information given to him in the note regarding the death of the child must have placed far too great a strain on his
perfectly natural urge as a political leader to make him suppress the information.
78. We thus see that both the political parities in opposition followed a course which was calculated to excite the
mobs which were wandering about the streets of Georgetown with little to do except look for mischief. Nothing is so
well calculated to drive a mob to acts of violence as a state of prolonged boredom and the continued exhortation of
leaders, even though they make a pretence of pointing out the extreme desirability of everyone remaining peaceful
and non-violent.
79. Something must also be said about the part taken by the members of the Georgetown Chamber of Commerce.
The Chamber was incorporated under an ordinance and one of aims is to “promote or seek to promote, or to oppose,
legislative matters and other matters relating to trade, industry and commerce”. It was natural to expect that the
members of the Chamber who constitute what may be called the “big business” of Georgetown, were agitated by
certain provisions of the budget which affected them adversely. On February 6 they called a meeting and passed the
following resolution:.
“This Chamber, in general meeting assembled, condemns many of the
most significant items of the budget which are penal in their incidence,
and considered to be not in the best interest of the country as a whole, and
it is also resolved that a Select Committee be appointed to thoroughly
investigate the impact of such sections on trade, industry and commerce
generally, and to report back to the Chamber what action should be taken.”
In the meantime it was bruited abroad that the businessmen of Georgetown intended to close down their business
and thus force an impossible situation upon the government On February 8, the Premier’s Private Secretary spoke to
Mr. Tasker, Chairman of the Booker Group of Companies, and mentioned the rumour to him. Mr. Tasker assured
the Secretary that there was no question of Bookers, who constitute the largest business organisation in the country,
countenancing any such move. Two days later Thunder, which is the organ of the P.P.P., published the following
news item:.
“Water Street businesses are to close so as to force on a strike. The Georgetown Chamber of Commerce
has decided on the lock-out. Indeed, there is now a formidable alliance between big business and the
workers’ unions.”
The news item appeared in Thunder of February 10, but the paper was on sale on the previous day, that is
February 9, on which day a meeting of the Chamber of Commerce was called. In this meeting the decision of a
lock-out or a strike was brought up. A letter from Mr. Hubbard, the Minister of Trade. and Industry, addressed to the
Chamber was also considered. In his letter Mr. Hubbard had said "I have learned with a great deal of concern that a
section of the commercial community is planning to close business on Monday next in protest against the
government’s budget proposals.” The letter went on to say that the discussion on the budget in tire Legislative
Assembly had been postponed to February 12, and that the decision to take protest action without first stating the
objections to the budget, was a negation of democratic processes.
80. The Chamber as a whole did not take a stand favouring the lockout, but several members were very positive
about their sentiments. Their attitude was far from conciliatory or helpful. They were not desirous of offering
constructive criticism and Mr. Nascimento, who is the Personal Assistant of Mr. d’Aguiar and the General Manager
of the Daily Chronicle, which we have already observed may be considered an unashamed and remorseless
protagonist of U.F., took up a very forceful attitude. He advocated that in case the workers walked out, their
employers should pay them. This was tantamount to suggesting that the employers should subsidise the
contemplated strike. When the question was put to the members, Mr. Figueira, another businessman, stood up to
indicate that he would pay his employees if they walked out. Mr. Gajraj, another businessman, was even more
positive. He advocated the cessation of all transactions in non-taxable commodities, e.g., sugar, flour, oil, and the
discontinuance of all credit facilities to their customers; because these actions, he thought, would cripple the people
and bring tremendous pressure on the government. This would lead to economic chaos. “People will then have to go
to the banks and draw out their money and that will force government to reduce the tax on savings.” Mr. Gajraj was
no doubt referring to the scheme for compulsory savings. Mr. Bettencourt-Gomes, another important businessman of
Georgetown, also expressed agreement with the suggestion that if the factory and shop workers walked out they
would do so with the blessings of the employers. With the exception of four firms, including Bookers and Sandbach
Parker, every member of the Chamber of Commerce was in favour of paying the employees in case they went on
strike. We cannot therefore escape the conclusion that there were many businessmen who were in entire sympathy
with the strikers, and their attitude encouraged and fostered the strike. The Chamber as a whole was exonerated by
the Premier in a letter which was issued on his behalf on March 12. This letter contained the following paragraph:.
“The Premier has never at any time alleged that a plot to use violence was
formulated by the Chamber of Commerce. He has stated that certain
persons in the Chamber used it as a forum to advocate a shut-down of
business places, and in fact organised such a shut-down among a number
of the members of the Chamber with the intention of helping a general
strike planned by the T.U.C. to paralyse the business life of the
community. This was done in order to force government to withdraw its
budget proposals.”

We cannot, however, refrain from saying that the Chamber turned a blind eye to the attitude and intentions
of its members. Mr. Steele, the President of the Chamber, when questioned on this
Point, was only able to say that the Chamber being a democratic body could not regulate the individual action of its
members. This lamentable confession of impotence scarcely redounds to the credit of a responsible body
incorporated by special ordinance and professing the lofty aim of promoting the interests of trade and commerce.
There can be no doubt at all that many members of the Chamber were happy to watch the unfolding of events as the
week under review proceeded along its unfortunate course. The undertaking to pay the strikers undoubtedly
encouraged them and provided the material which became more and more combustible as time went on.
81. We return to the narrative of events. After the Premier’s departure the crowd around the Public Buildings slowly
dispersed and melted away. Nothing further happened that day and on the following day there were several
conferences and consultations. There was an emergency meeting of the Central Executive of the Clerical and
Commercial Workers Union. Guy Edwards, one of the employees in Messrs. Fogarty’s, saw some of his colleagues
standing in front of Fogarty’s stores. He thought this surprising because the workers did not usually stand at that
spot. One of the men asked him what the Union had decided. Edwards, however, could give no information on this
point. A decision had been made not to call a strike on Monday as originally planned, but to stage a mass
demonstration on Tuesday. On Sunday the campaign was opened, and in the afternoon a large crowd of people
gathered at Bourda Green, which is one of the open places in the centre of Georgetown where public meetings are
held. Police permission to lead a procession from Bourda Green to the Parade Ground, another open place for
holding public meetings and demonstrations, had been obtained and a large mass of people carrying
anti-government placards marched along time prescribed route. The placards carried various slogans, e.g.. AXE

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THE TAX, CHOKE AND ROB BUDGET, SLAVERY IF JAGAN GETS INDEPENDENCE NOW. The size of the
procession was assessed at 9,000 and a number of Trade Union leaders addressed it. The audience was urged to
make peaceful demonstrations and demand the dismissal of Kelshall, Private Secretary to the Premier. The meeting
at the Parade Ground finally dispersed at about 7 p.m.
82. Despite the decision of the Trade Union Council to call off the general strike on Monday, the supporters of the
United Force were under the impression that the strike was to take effect on Monday morning and they decided to
call out the commercial workers who were not members of the union, in order to lend strength to the party
propaganda by synchronising it with the trade union agitation There were indeed conflicting reports about the Trade
Union plan, and the United Force thought that a strike would almost certainly take place on Monday morning. So
they decided to proceed with their plans. It is somewhat strange that no one tried to secure correct information from
T.U.C. headquarters. The organisers of U.F. asked the workers to assemble at 6 a.m. on Monday in front of the
Public Buildings with placards and slogans, and march through Water Street. On Sunday evening, however, it was
learnt that there was to be no strike on Monday, but only a mass demonstration on Tuesday afternoon. The U. F.
supporters at the last moment cancelled their original plan and worked all night to send out information of the
cancellation, and telling the men to go to work as usual on Monday morning.
83. Early on the morning of Monday the 12th it was noticed that small groups of shop-workers of
Water Street were collecting at various points. The employees of Messrs. Fogarty were prominent
among them. Some of them were carrying placards. There was a certain amount of confusion at the other stores. At
J. P. Santos the workers were inside the store, but they were not attending to their business. The workers of
Bettencourt had been locked out. Senator Anne Jardim, a young and attractive but by no means an unenthusiastic
supporter of the U.F., tried to reassemble the broken pieces of a plan shattered by inept handling. Miss Jardim had
entered British Guiana politics in “a haphazard way” in January 1961, and, a few months later, earned the distinction
of being nominated a senator . as a person who could speak for the political points of view of the minority groups
in the Legislative Assembly. Thus, ostensibly to prevent victimisation of the workers at the hands of their
employers, but in effect to promote the agitation against Dr. Jagan, she joined the straggling groups of workers, and
forming a procession, began to march up and down the streets. We have already related the story of Mr. d’Aguiar
having been prevailed upon to lead the crowd of agitators past the houses of Mr. Kelshall and Dr. Jagan to the
Parade Ground. and thence on further persuasion to the Radio Demerara Station in order to protest against the biased
attitude of those in charge of the broadcasting programmes. It will be recalled from the brief narrative given earlier
that when he arrived near the radio station Superintendent of Police Barrow met him and told him that he was
leading an unlawful procession because the usual Police Permit bad not been obtained for it. Mr. d’Aguiar replied
that the procession was a spontaneous one and therefore not illegal. He declared that he was going to continue on
his way. The police did not want at that stage to provoke an open clash and so the Superintendent decided to issue a
summons to Mr. d’Aguiar later instead of arresting him on the spot. The crowd was led back to the place from where
they had started, in front of Mr. d’Aguiar’s premises, and Mr. d’Aguiar addressed them once again. Later that
evening Mr. d’Aguiar attended a party meeting.
84. Mr. d’Aguiar’s own plant of soft drinks remained working and his men did not go on strike.
85. Groups of men had also collected and begun to agitate in other parts of the town. Small and unorganised
processions were moving from one street to another and intimidating shop-workers to come out and join them.
There were, however, very few defections from work and most of the shops and stores carried on in their normal
manner. The Assembly was sitting and during the afternoon crowds continued to fluctuate outside and around it.
When the Premier left the crowd booed him.
86. The following day, Tuesday the 13th, there was great agitation in the town, and in anticipation
of the mass demonstration planned for 2 p.m., the majority of the shop employees absented themselves from work.
Many of them were intimidated by the strikers to come out and join them. There were several instances of groups of
strikers calling upon the businessmen to close their premises and let the employees join the strikers. The
demonstration in the afternoon was a very large one and was entirely successful from the point of view of the
strikers and agitators. The procession ended at the Parade Ground where a mass rally was held. Speeches were given
by a number of persons, and the audience soon reached a state of excited animation.
87. It was known by now that the British Guiana Civil Service Association had declared a strike effective from 1
p.m. that day. Somebody informed one of the speakers on the rostrum that the Premier had threatened, in the course
of a broadcast, to dismiss any civil servant who absented himself from his post. This matter will be dealt with more
fully in a subsequent chapter, and here it is sufficient to observe that the consternation caused by this piece of news
provoked the Trade Union leaders suddenly to declare an immediate strike in anticipation of ratification by the
respective Executive Councils. The enthusiasm of the crowd had risen to a pitch of frenzy and the declaration of a
strike by the various union leaders appears to have given complete satisfaction to everyone. A sense of triumph
prevailed after the announcement had been made.
88. Later in the evening the Trade Union leaders felt that they had perhaps been too precipitate in acting upon a
piece of information which perhaps was not quite reliable. Mr. Ishmael, the representative of flue Trades Union
Council, either experiencing a certain measure of remorse or apprehending criticism when the matter would be
further considered, decided to investigate the truth regarding the Premier’s broadcast. He learnt that the Premier had
not threatened to dismiss any civil servant and there was some misapprehension about what the Premier had said in
the course of his broadcast. Mr. Ishmael and the other Trade Union leaders must have realised the enormity of what
they had done and they tried to seek justification for declaring the strike. The only issue which they had so far raised
was the budget and the matter had been fixed for discussion with the Finance Minister on the 13th. It may have been
good tactics to organise a mass demonstration and make an exhibition of trade union strength in order to lend weight
to their argument with the Finance Minister, but it amounted to a breach of faith and a display of irresponsibility to
bang the door of negotiations, as it were, in the very face of the Minister and declare a general strike. When the
information regarding the broadcast was found to be false, the Trade Union leaders sought shelter behind a circular
which had been issued that morning. Mr. Chase, one of the representatives at the meeting on the morning of the
14th, pointed out the impropriety of the decision and Mr. Stoll came to the rescue by saying that even though there
was no threat to dismiss civil servants, the strike had in fact been declared and should continue because it was in the
fitness of things that the Civil Service Association and the Trade Unions should make common cause against their
common adversary.
89. Agitation had continued to increase and a large number of the shop employees were on strike.
Many of the premises were forced to close down. A number of witnesses appearing before us stated, that although
their own employees were perfectly willing to go on working, the processionists continued to intimidate them, and
groups of strikers frequently entered the shops and called upon the owners to close their premises. There was a
partial closure of the electricity plant and a temporary cessation of the water supply. We have already related how in
the evening the government issued a proclamation prohibiting meetings and processions in the vicinity of the Public
Buildings. The political opponents of Dr. Jagan, however, decided to defy this proclamation and lead a procession
into the proclaimed area. This was done on Thursday the 15th. The strike on this day was almost complete and
business in Georgetown had come to a standstill. Messrs. Bookers had announced their decision that employees
absenting themselves from work would not be paid their wages, with effect from Thursday morning. There was a
number of their employees who did not attend. Excitement had increased considerably by the evening when, as
already narrated, Mr. Burnham made his somewhat mysterious and ominous announcement regarding the plans of
the following day.
90. On the morning of Friday, February 16, crowd activity began at an early hour. Shopworkers of the commercial
area in Water Street began to collect in small groups and Senator Anne Jardim went out with them at 7.30a.m. She
exhorted them to form themselves into a procession and march to the Parade Ground. In the meantime a small crowd
had collected outside the electricity power house. The men were shouting and agitating against the employment of
blacklegs to work the plant. Two
members of the volunteer force were on sentry duty at the gate of the Power House and even this passive show of
force irritated the crowd. Assistant Commissioner of Police De Abreu was asked to go to the Power House and when
he arrived there, at 8.55 a.m., he saw a crowd of about 400 people shouting and vociferating and demanding that the
blacklegs should come out and the plant be closed down. De Abreu told them that the electric plant was one of the
Essential Services and its maintenance was necessary. He advised the agitators to go and consult their leaders and
not intimidate workers. The crowd were, however, in an angry mood and one of them said in the local dialect “I can
dead today”, meaning that he was desperate enough to lay down his life for his cause. De Abreu succeeded in
placating the crowd and told the men on sentry duty to go inside the gate and remain out of the view of the crowd.
The crowd shortly after went to the Parade Ground where a meeting was in progress. De Abreu himself went away
leaving a number of men to guard the Power House.
91.At the Parade Ground a number of speeches were made. Among the speakers were Anne Jardim who had led the
crowd to the Parade Ground, and Mr. d’Aguiar who dwelt on his customary theme of opposing, exposing and
deposing the government. As soon as the meeting finished someone announced that there were “scabs” working at
tile Electricity Power House and that voluntary pickets were needed there. A crowd again collected at the Electricity
Power House and began to throw empty bottles and stones at the windows. This necessitated the calling out of the
riot squads each consisting of 30 men including a team for using tear gas to disperse crowds. The size of the crowd
was assessed by the policeman on duty at 1,000 but soon afterwards it swelled to about 3,000. Senior Superintendent
of Police Puttock was in charge of the operations and, after giving a formal warning to the crowd to disperse, he
prepared to use tear gas grenades. The warning was repeated three times, but the crowd had by now become reckless
and they replied to Puttock’s direction to disperse by saying “No, no. use smoke”. A number of tear gas grenades
were thrown at the crowd and the agitators ran back to take shelter in the “alleyways and yards” near the power
house. They, however, continued to throw missiles and several windows of the power house were broken. A woman
came out carrying a small child in her arms and the crowd began to chant “They killed a child, they killed a child”.
The child had, in fact, been only slightly affected by the fumes and on being treated at the hospital was completely
restored within a short time. In the meantime, however, a wild rumour spread through the town that a child had been
killed by the firing of a tear gas grenade by the police. Some persons even said that two children had died as a result
of police callousness. Mr. d’Aguiar arrived on the scene and passing through the riot squad went to his premises
followed by a crowd. There he addressed them through a loud-speaker calling upon them to remain peaceful. We
have already related how, while he was speaking, a note was passed up to him containing the information that one
of the two children had died on being affected by tear gas. Mr. d’Aguiar says that he did not communicate the full
information contained in the note and contented himself with announcing that two children had been injured and that
this was the result of the use of violence. Therefore, he argued, violence must be eschewed at all costs. He told the
people to disperse and asked them to meet at the Parade Ground at 4 p.m. that afternoon. He added that the crowd
had achieved their objective of having the Power House closed down. The Power House had in fact closed down as
the result of a decision made by the officers in charge, who felt that the activity of the crowd might cause irreparable
damage to the electric plant.
92. In spite of the closure of the electricity plant, a part of the crowd had continued to remain standing and shouting
in front of it. A blue Volkswagen carrying a public address apparatus passed by asking the people to go to the

Parade Ground. The crowd gradually melted away and the scene of activity now moved for a brief period to the
Parade Ground where a crowd of 500 persons soon collected. There was considerable restlessness amounting to a
state of excitement and when a police van passed by, people threw bricks and bottles at it. The policemen in the van
defended themselves by throwing out two tear gas grenades and one shell. The crowd began to swell and move to
Robb Street. where Freedom House, the headquarters of the P.P.P. is situated. A large crowd of persons collected in
front of Freedom House and filled the streets around it. A strong contingent of police hastened to the spot to restore
order. When they arrived they found that stones and other missiles had been thrown at Freedom House. The crowds
were pushed back, but by now they were in a very angry mood and had been worked up into a state bordering on
frenzy by the spreading of the rumour that the police had murdered a child.
93. One contingent of police, manned by Superintendent McLeod, who was later joined by Assistant Commissioner
of Police Phoenix, took up its position at a point in Robb Street, East of Camp Street. It was here that the crowd
made its greatest exhibition of force. Missiles were thrown at the police officers and tear gas shells were of no avail.
The response of the crowd was “We are going to murder you, we are going to eat you, we arc not going to disperse”.
While this disturbance was in progress someone was heard to fire shots from an automatic weapon. Superintendent
McLeod was hit and he fell down. He was carried away to the hospital where later he succumbed to his injury. Some
more shots were fired and Phoenix was also hit. He, however, stood his ground and fired back, not indiscriminately
at the crowd, but in the direction where the shots appeared to be coming. Corporal Austin, who was with him, also
said that he was hit. Phoenix saw a motor vehicle being pushed forward and it seemed that two men were advancing
towards him under cover of this vehicle. Believing that they intended to fire again at him, Phoenix fired back This,
however did not stop the vehicle and Phoenix was shot a second time. This injury was more serious and he had to be
taken away to hospital. As he was getting into a Land Rover more shots were fired at the vehicle. In all, six police
officers, including McLeod, deceased, were wounded at the spot.
94. By now, the disturbances had extended to several other parts of the town. Fires had begun and wholesale looting
of shops had started. The first call for fire assistance was received at 12.51 p.m. An electric pole near the power
station had been set fire to. This was a serious matter because most of the power in Georgetown is carried by means
of overhead lines, and the burning of an electric pole could cause very serious interference with supplies; and
indeed, the resumption of supplies was greatly hampered by the burning of a number of electric poles. Several calls
for the fire brigade were received during the course of the afternoon, there being in all three major fires which
spread owing to the fact that the houses in Georgetown are constructed mostly of wood and there is always a strong
breeze to fan the flames. There were cases of fires jumping over streets and enveloping a number of further houses
and premises. Chief Fire Officer Atkinson gave a very vivid account of the manner in which the Fire Brigade
overcame what seemed almost insuperable difficulties and did their best to control the fires. He said the morale of
his staff was not very high because there had been a dispute about their wages and there was present the usual
danger of dealing with large fires. There was no water in the mains between 2 and 5 p.m. which was the period of
acute need, because owing to the stoppage of power supply, the waterworks had ceased to operate. There were only
a few fire tenders available and they were wholly insufficient to deal with the extensive fires with which they had to
cope. Owing to the absence of water the mains, all that was available was 600 gallons of water in each tender. This
had to be obtained from trenches and canals which were not always available where the water was most needed.
There was also considerable interference from the crowds and a length of about 4,000 feet of hose was cut and lost
that day. On one occasion the members of the Fire Brigade were even fired upon. In the circumstances, it must be
conceded that the Fire Brigade did a magnificent piece of work in bringing the fires under control by midnight and
in putting them out by Saturday morning.
95. This seems an appropriate moment to describe what has been happening at the Power House and the water
supply station.
96. On the afternoon of February 12, Alexander, Mechanical Superintendent of the Electricity Works, saw a circular
to the effect that the Union would be calling out the employees on strike on Tuesday afternoon. Fearing that this
might entail the closure of an essential service, he called the representatives of the Union, including Mr. Ishmael,
President of the Man Power Citizens Association, to come and discuss the matter with him. They accordingly met
him the same afternoon. They confirmed that a partial strike had been called to take place between the hours of 2
and 4 on the afternoon of February 13. After a brief discussion, however, it was agreed to allow a skeleton staff to
continue operations in the power house during the period of the strike. Accordingly, the power house continued to
send out power as usual on February 13. On the morning of February 14, there was another meeting with the Union
representatives who said that the Union intended to call out all the workers on strike. Mr. Ishmael on this occasion
was not prepared to allow a skeleton staff to continue working the plant. He said he wanted to withdraw his men
immediate1y. He was told that this might cause irreparable damage because a sudden closing down of a plant of this
type was liable to result in grave danger to the equipment. Mr. Ishmael relented sufficiently to allow half an hour for
the purpose of making the necessary adjustments. The plant was accordingly closed down at 8.30 a.m. It was,
however, restarted with the help of some departmental employees and by 10.55 p.m. the power house was in
working condition once again. There was no further trouble till Friday morning when the menacing attitude of the
crowd compelled those in charge of the electricity plant to close it down for reasons of safety and security. The
supply was resumed between 4.30 and 6 p.m.
97. The waterworks at Georgetown are intimately connected with the power house because without electric power
there can be no water supply, though in an emergency a temporary arrangement can be made by switching over to
some Diesel engines. There was no trouble at the waterworks until the morning of the 14th, when the daily shift
failed to arrive. Mr. Bentley, Chief Engineer of the waterworks, remained undaunted and with the help of his
assistant he managed to carry on. At 8.15, however, the electric supply failed and Mr. Bentley was powerless. When
the power supply was resumed the water supply machinery was restarted, though there was a short time lag owing to
the technical difficulty of restarting the machines after a complete stoppage. On the morning of the 15th the usual
shift did not report, but Mr. Bentley continued with the help of specially employed labour. On the morning of the
16th a large number of union men came to the waterworks and complained that Mr. Bentley had employed
blacklegs. The union men demanded the immediate dismissal of these blacklegs and promised to give a skeleton
staff. Mr. Bentley had no alternative but to agree to this suggestion. The skeleton staff continued working the
waterworks till 10.30 a.m. when the electricity failed. The supply was switched on to the Diesel engines, but these
could not give adequate supply and Mr. Bentley had to inform the mayor and the fire brigade that there was no water
in the mains. The water supply remained closed between 1 p.m. and 5 p.m., due to the failure of electricity, and this
made the task of the fire brigade extremely difficult.
98. A word only need be said about the conditions in the Georgetown hospital. The Secretary of the Georgetown
Hospital had on February 9 seen reports of unrest in the country, and fearing that they might have repercussions on
the hospital, he took precautionary steps to cope with the possible emergency of having to deal with an unusually
large number of casualties. He did this by reducing the number of admissions and operations which were not urgent.
On February 12, he called a meeting of the departmental heads and , after conferring with them, ordered extra
supplies. He was told that day at 1 p.m. that the British Guiana Civil Service Association had decided to go on strike
and that the strike would affect the hospital staff also. Fortunately, however, none of the doctors absented
themselves at any time, though there were many nurses and ward orderlies who remained away from duty. On
Monday and Tuesday the situation was normal and there was full attendance. On Wednesday, however, only 89 out
of 181 nurses reported in the morning and out of 36 ward orderlies only 8 reported. The Secretary was, however,
able to got commendable assistance from the League of Friends, the Red Cross and St. John Ambulance. On the
15th, too, there were many nurses and ward orderlies absent. The work at the hospital, however, was carried on
without any difficulty, even though an attempt appears to have been made on the 16th to set fire to a part of the
building. A burning piece of boarding was introduced into the hospital, but it was discovered immediately and
before it could do any damage it was thrown out.
99.The situation in the town worsened very rapidly and riots broke out in several streets; looting began at the same
time and there were sporadic attacks upon police officials wherever they tried to control the crowd or to arrest
looters. At 1.35 p.m. it became clear to Mr. Weber, the Commissioner of Police, that his men were unable to control
the situation. He therefore decided to call in military aid.
100.We may pause here for a moment to narrate the events which preceded the calling in of the army. Lieut.-
Colonel Warren, the Commander of the First Battalion of the Royal Hampshire Regiment, had arrived in British
Guiana on Sunday, February 11. He was staying at Government House and was soon informed of the political
situation in the country and more particularly in Georgetown. His subordinate, Major Wilson, told him that there
was a probability of a general strike occurring within the course of the next few days. On Monday, February 12,
Colonel Warren saw the Commissioner of Police and asked him his views on the tactical point of bringing in a
contingent of the army from Atkinson Field where one company of the Royal Hampshire Regiment was stationed.
Atkinson Field is about 27 miles from Georgetown and so the matter had to be considered well in advance. Colonel
Warren suggested that the Company could be moved into Georgetown, or at any rate one platoon. A fear was,
however, expressed that to move the army at that stage might give unnecessary provocation to certain individuals
and precipitate a clash. As the week advanced it was noticed that the processions of agitators and strikers were quite
orderly and no clashes had taken place, and so the question of moving the army into Georgetown was deferred. On
February 14, however, Mr. Rai, the Minister for Home Affairs, made a specific request that some portion of the
army at Atkinson Field should be alerted to move into Georgetown. The Governor pointed out that under the terms
of the Constitution then in force the Guianese Ministers were solely responsible for internal security,
and that to call the assistance of the army was an extremely serious step, to be resorted to only in the case of an
extreme emergency. On the evening of February 15, another consultation took place between the Governor, the
Premier and Mr. Rai, the Minister for Home Affairs. The Governor was informed that there was a danger of the
police and the prison officers going on strike that very night, and if that happened it would be impossible to maintain
law and order in the city. The Commissioner of Police had in the meantime written a letter to the Governor which
arrived while this discussion was in progress. The letter contained a definite request for army assistance. The letter
was in the following terms:
“I am of the opinion, as result of the events of the past four days, the
present Government can resist the demand to resign by the opposition
Political Parities which have today shown definite signs of uniting, only
by the ultimate use of physical force. The dispersal of a crowd by the use
of tear smoke is of a temporary nature only, and will not prevent the
ultimate need for the use of more extreme measures. Having reached this
conclusion I must give it as my considered opinion that the only means of
maintaining the Government without the loss of life will be the presence
of a sufficient number of troops.”
Both the Premier and Mr. Rai asked the Governor to have the army brought in from Atkinson Field at once.
The Premier’s view was that the situation had reached a stage at which the Opposition were deliberately trying to
throw out by force the Government established by law and he needed sufficient armed men to maintain law and
order. The Governor told the Ministers that the armed services of the United Kingdom would not be used to
maintain P.P.P. Ministers in power regardless of what they might say or do, and that British troops would only be
used to restore and maintain law and order if all Guianese resources proved or were likely to prove inadequate.
101. It seems to us that there was some slight misunderstanding between the Ministers, on the one hand, and the
Governor and Colonel Warren, on the other. The impending, or at any rate the apprehended, strike of the Police
Force and the prison officers had figured prominently in the discussions relating to the necessity and advisability of
bringing in troops from Atkinson Field. The discussion had left an impression on the mind of Colonel Warren, that if
no strike took place, no troops need be brought in. On the other hand, the Premier and Mr. Rai left Government
House convinced in their minds that troops would be brought to Georgetown in the early hours of Friday morning.
No strike of the police and the prison officers did in fact take place, although there was a highly unpleasant incident
at police headquarters in the course of which some officers expressed their unwillingness to obey orders. The
Commissioner of Police was, however, able to smooth things over with his characteristic tact and firmness. In any
event on the morning of Friday the 16th the troops had received no instructions to move from Atkinson Field.
102. As the day proceeded the situation began to get out of hand and at about 1.30 p.m. the Commissioner of Police
came to the conclusion that it was absolutely essential to have the assistance of the army. This is how he described
the situation in the course of his statement: .

“At about 11.30 a.m. while at the meeting with the Hon. Minister, the
Staff Officer, Deputy Superintendent Soobrian, reported in person that a
crowd had tried to stop work at the Electricity Works and that the late
Superintendent McLeod (Riot Unit) had dispersed it with the use of tear
smoke and that the crowd had left in the direction of the Premier’s
residence. I ordered a Riot Unit to proceed there. Almost immediately
afterwards a note was handed to the Minister from Mr. Hubbard (Minister
of Trade and Industry), which stated that tear smoke had just been used at
the Power Station to disperse a very dangerous crowd. Shortly after I left
the Minister for Headquarters. I proceeded along Water Street where I saw
cyclists riding in a westerly direction from the area of Wellington, Robb,
Regent and Church Streets, holding handkerchiefs to their faces. I visited
the area at the E1ectricity Works and the Premier’s residence. Both were
clear of persons. At 1.20 p.m. on arrival at Headquarters I spoke by radio
from my office to Puttock (Riot Unit) who gave his position as the
Metropole Cinema, and stated that he was endeavouring to disperse a large
crowd with tear smoke. He said the situation was ‘not nice’ and that he
was running out of tear smoke. I instructed him that if he or any of his
party were in danger he must open fire and that he must endeavour to
disperse the crowd at all costs. At 1.25 p.m. I spoke to the late
Superintendent McLeod who made a similar report of being attacked with
bricks and bottles by a hostile crowd which he was endeavouring to
disperse with tear smoke. I gave him similar instructions to those I gave to
Puttock. I spoke with Yaw, he too reported being under pressure from a
hostile crowd.”
103. The Commissioner of Police tried to obtain the orders of the Governor and telephoned him in
his office. The Governor, however, was not available. He therefore decided to take the initiative himself and
telephoned the second in command at Atkinson Field. and was told that Colonel Warren and Major Wilson were on
their way from Georgetown to Atkinson Field. The Commissioner asked for immediate despatch of a contingent of
the army to relieve the situation in Georgetown. A few moments later he again telephoned Government House and
this time he was able to speak to the Governor. He informed him of what he had done. The army contingent arrived
in Georgetown shortly after 2.30 and was conducted to police headquarters at Eve Leary. The Commissioner of
Police signed the usual form of request which was in the following terms:
“I have now come to the conclusion that the civil power is unable to control the situation and that the
assistance of the military has become necessary, and I accordingly request such assistance.”
104. The part played by the army in dealing with the disturbances is quickly told. The story was narrated by Major
Wilson of the Royal Hampshire Regiment who directed the entire operation, Lieut. Neville and three
Non-commissioned Officers who acted under instructions issued by Major Wilson. No attempt was made to
question the accuracy of any part of the depositions made by these witnesses, and this part of the evidence at least
may be said to be acceptable on all sides as completely true.
105. Major Wilson established his Control Post at the Police headquarters in Eve Leary and began to post his men to
the various scenes of mob activity as and when the exigencies of the situation required. He remained in continuous
wireless communication with his men and also continued to receive directions from Colonel Warren who was in
Government House. In addition, he was given detailed reports of what was happening throughout the disturbed area
as information was received in the Force Control Room from police patrol cars or other police stations. He,
therefore, had as full a picture of the disturbances as was possible in the circumstances, and was thus in a position to
give the necessary directions to his men.


106. It is scarcely necessary to describe in detail the activities of the various Army Units operating in different
sections of the town. It may, however, be mentioned that of the three platoons which had been brought to
Georgetown one was sent to guard the Premier’s house in compliance with a specific direction given by Colonel
Warren. There was no crowd or disturbance at this spot and the officer in charge took two-thirds of the platoon to
clear Water Street and the landing wharf of riotous crowds to facilitate the docking of the Royal Naval vessel which
had brought a naval contingent. This task was soon accomplished and the men left to guard the Premier’s house,
having been relieved by the naval unit, rejoined their platoon and continued to clear the streets of looters. They were
compelled to open fire three times, causing the death of one looter and wounding four others. The second platoon
was engaged in a similar task in the area of Camp Street, where an obstreperous mob was looting stores and shops in
a most persistent fashion till one looter, after repeated warnings, was shot dead. The third platoon, which to start
with had been kept in reserve, was sent to the Robb Street area to protect Freedom House which was besieged by a
hostile mob. A portion of this platoon later went to protect a store owned by an East Indian..
107. By 8 p.m. quiet had been restored in most of the storm centres, though patrolling continued until the early hours
of Saturday morning, by which time all that remained visible of Black Friday’s events were the smouldering remains
of some buildings and a few dozen shattered shop windows.
108. The total number of casualties resulting from army activity was 2 killed and 4 wounded, and this, we feel, in
the circumstances of the case was not a heavy price to pay for restoring the peace of the town.
109. We may also at this stage draw attention to the strangely unreeling attitude of the political leaders when the
passions aroused by them had been let loose on the town.
110. An appeal was made by the Governor to Mr. Burnham to use his influence and advise the crowds to desist from
acts of violence. The Governor asked him to employ his loudspeaker system and ask the crowds to leave the streets.
Mr. Burnham, however, replied that he would consult his executive. Strangely enough, the executive could not see
their way to accede to the Governor’s request. This is how Mr. Burnham dealt with the matter in his statement
before us: .
“We could not help. There were two main obstacles, one was that we were
very short of petrol and we felt that if we went all round Georgetown
using up this petrol at the Governor’s request, we would have no petrol for
the vehicles to carry out Party work. We also considered it ill-advised to
go and tell people to desist from what they were doing when we had
nothing to do with the starting of it. The man who calls off the dog owns
the dog.”
This callous and remorseless attitude is reminiscent of Mark Antony’s observation “Mischief
thou art afoot. Take thou what course thou wilt.”
111. As regards Mr. d’Aguiar, all he could think of was to ask the Governor to give protection to his wife and
family. He telephoned the Governor and said that he could not see his way to making an appeal for peace to the
riotous crowds of Georgetown.
112. We find no substance whatever in the contention made on behalf of the Government that the disturbances of
Black Friday were the culmination of a deliberate plan to overthrow the Government by the use of force. The
Premier referred to it in unequivocal terms in a statement made on February 9. which has already been quoted in
extenso in an earlier part of this Chapter. It will be remembered that what the Premier said was that violence was
being planned by certain elements and that attempts against the Premier’s life and the lives of certain of his

 Ministers were contemplated. He went on to say that these acts of violence were intended to secure the overthrow of
the legally elected Government by force.
113. The matter is therefore of considerable importance and it is necessary to examine it in some detail. The Premier
himself was questioned on this point at some length. He had on February 6 made a somewhat similar statement in
the course of a radio broadcast. What he said on that occasion was “For too many years this country has been ruled
by a clique who got away with murder, who lived at the expense of the working people, and they want to continue to
ride on your backs. They are planning to demonstrate. We hear rumours about shooting of Ministers”.
114. Therefore, until February 6. the Premier had only heard rumours. On February 9, however, he
made a categorical statement about the existence of a definite plot. In the course of his examination the Premier was
asked whether he received any information between February 6 and February 9. His reply was that information was
always coming to him, some from Government sources and some from private sources. He could not, however,
specify the nature of this information nor its source. Questioned further, he said “I have information of various
kinds, direct and indirect, which added altogether, came to the conclusion that this plot was being hatched”. Nothing
further could be elicited from the Premier on this subject. Dr. Jacob, the Minister for Finance, was also questioned
on this point by the Counsel for the United Force and his statement was so eloquent that we set it down in extenso
from the official transcript.
Q: Did you hear of that plot for the first time on the 9th February or did you hear of it before?
A: No. Sir, we the Ministers. . . .
Q: Must have discussed it before?
A: We had personally received threatening letters and things like that and
we heard that there was this plot on foot.
Q: Thank you. Dr. Jacob, you have been very helpful. The Ministers had received threatening letters. Were
they anonymous?
A: The ones I received were.
Q: You had received anonymous letters and, as far as you know, did the Premier tell you he also received
anonymous letters?
A: I know the Premier had received some during that week.
Q: Anonymous letters?
A: Yes, I said they were.
Q: He told you so. He must have mentioned it?
A: I heard so. I cannot remember if he actually told me so.
Q: Then there were rumours of plots?
A: Plenty rumours.
Q: Georgetown, British Guiana, perhaps is more prone to rumours than any other place?
A: I would not say that.

Q: This is the position as I see it. On February 9, the Premier was in possession of anonymous letters. You
knew that other Ministers were also in possession of anonymous letters, and there were rumours. Right?
A: Yes.
Q: You are in Government, you must know. Is it the fact then that the Premier made that public statement
in the Legislative Council based upon anonymous letters and rumours?
(Objection was taken to this question, but the objection was overruled by the Commission.)
A: I did answer the question by saying no.
Q: You say there were anonymous letters, several rumours?
A: And you also have threats by the mob before the 9th. Don’t forget that, please.
Q: When you say threats by the mob, what do you mean?
A: The crowds that congregated when the Duke of Edinburgh had arrived. There were violent
demonstrations shouting, threats.
Q: What threats did you hear from the mob when the Duke of Edinburgh arrived?
A: There were violent demonstrations . even on the way down from the airport.
Q: Please explain what you mean when you say violent demonstrations.
A: Loud shouting when the cars of certain Ministers went through the crowd.
Q: When you said violent demonstrations you refer then to loud shouts from the crowd?
A: Threats of violence.
Q: What threats?
A: The demonstrations and gesticulations of the crowd. They were holding up their fists. I personally
experienced this. They were holding up their sticks and shouting. This I took to indicate that they meant
threats or violence. I had to wind up the glass of my car.
Q: Dr. Jacob, I do appreciate the lot of a politician is even harder than the lot of a policeman, but no doubt
you are consoled by the fact that you are a public servant. But any way, tell me this. There were shouts and
people. . . .
A: Pushed sticks at us.
Q: This took place when?
A: On my way down from the Airport on the day the Duke of Edinburgh arrived. I experienced this. I
know.
Q: Did you construe that as a threat to topple the Government?
A: That coupled with banners and placards and what was written on these placards . surely.
Q: You construed this incident of which you have told us as constituting evidence of a threat to topple the
Government by force?
A: That there was likely to be trouble in the country. That appeared to me to be the beginning.
Q: What I am trying to get from you Dr. Jacob. . . . You see you told us the Premier and the Ministers
discussed the situation before the Premier made his public statement. Am I correct?
A: I told you the Premier and the Ministers received threatening letters.
Q: Did the Premier and the Ministers discuss the events leading up to his statement on the 9th February?
A: I think we did, yes.
Q: It is hardly something you can forget. Now at that discussion did the Premier indicate to you what
evidence he bad that there was a threat to topple the Government by force, and to assassinate the Ministers?
A: We had received information and I am not in a position, I cannot disclose the source of that information.
Q: I did not ask you that. What I asked you is this, did the Premier discuss with the Ministers, the evidence
which caused hint to make the statement that he did on the 9th February?
A: Yes, I think so, he did.
Q: What was the evidence which he said he had?
A: If I may say so, Sir. I think you had better ask the Premier.
Q: I am asking you, what was the evidence?
A: I cannot disclose the information.
Q: I am not asking you who gave the information, I am asking you what the type of information was. Did
lie disclose the type of information?
A: The type of information was that Ministers were likely to be shot.
Q: Was that information conveyed by anonymous letters?
A: No, Sir, in addition to anonymous letters.
Q: Did you convey your information to the police?
A: This information was . . . .
Q: Confidential, I know, but did you convey it to the Commissioner of Police.
A: I had conveyed to the Commissioner of Police information that I had received some bullets on my desk.
Q: Did you get any threatening letters that were signed, or did you receive any warnings that were signed?
A: No, all of the threatening letters were unsigned, or signed with some fictitious name.
Q: Now did the Premier show you those letters which were signed?
A: I said I do not know whether the Premier’s letters were signed or unsigned; I did not see any of them.
Q: Those you saw were unsigned?
A: I heard he received letters, and I have no reason to doubt that.
Q: I have no reason either. The Premier told you he had received letters of warning and threatening letters.
You don’t know if they were signed or unsigned ; you heard these rumours. Did anybody suggest at this
meeting that all of these letters should be handed over to the Commissioner of Police immediately?
A: I think some of the letters were handed to the Police I cannot be sure.
Q: Were yours handed over?
A: I think I left mine with the Premier.
Q: If you can remember this detail it will be of the greatest possible assistance. Was this information about
which you have given evidence received by the Premier before the visit of the Duke of Edinburgh?
A: I cannot answer that. I am not sure.
Q: It was received some days before the 9th?
A: I cannot say for sure.
Q: You do not understand the question. I do not want you to get confused, it is an easy thing to happen.
A: I am not confused.
Q: The Premier made this statement in the House of Assembly. I want you to give some idea of how long,
prior to the 9th February the information was received or discussed?
A: I cannot say.
Q: Well, how long before the statement on the 9th, did you hold your discussions?
A: Oh, shortly before.
Q: Two days?
A: Possibly.
Q: Not less than two? I am not trying to tie you down.
A: I cannot be sure; it was prior to the 9th; not a very long period.
Q: Now the Duke of Edinburgh came on the Wednesday?
A: The 7th.
Q: So you could not have discussed it on the day of the Duke’s arrival; that is hardly likely, but could you
have discussed it the day before?
A: Possibly before.
Q: It could be the 6th?
A: Or it could be the 8th.
115. It would be superfluous to comment on the naivety of Dr. Jacob’s replies, but we must draw attention to one or
two other matters which are relevant to this issue. Police Commissioner Weber, when questioned about safety
measures in relation to Ministers, stated before us that he was not apprehensive about the lives of the Ministers until
February 16 when violence actually broke out. The Premier said that he had drawn Mr. Weber’s attention to the
danger which he anticipated, and if the Commissioner did not appreciate the danger the Premier could not blame
him, because it was a question of values and the Commissioner could not necessarily see all the “facets of life”
which came to the Premier’s knowledge. This contention seems to us singularly lacking in conviction, because if the
Premier had in his possession any material to support his fears, he must have brought this to the notice of the
Commissioner of Police in order to convince him that measures for the safety of the Ministers were necessary. Such
a step, however, does not appear to have been taken. We find that in fact no actual attempt on the life of any
Ministers was made. We attach no importance to the incident which took place in front of the Public Buildings on


February 9, when the Premier was leaving the Assembly Chamber. It is said that a Dr. Reid pushed a banner in front
of the wind-screen of his motor-car. This act cannot by any stretch of imagination be construed as an attempt on the
Premier’s life. The Premier’s house did not draw the attention of the riotous mobs, even on February 16. Processions
did on one or two occasions pass in front of it, and we have no doubt that critical and even hostile slogans were
uttered by the passers by. But there is no evidence of any missiles having been thrown at the house, far less is there
any material to support the story of an attempt on the Premier’s life. The only other incident of violence in reference
to a Minister is the throwing of stones at the house of the Attorney General on February 16. The Attorney-General
drove back to his house and found that the members of his family had left during his absence. He was driven to the
Premier’s house and was at no time molested by anyone. None of the other Ministers were even mentioned in the
course of the inquiry as having been targets of violence on the part of any of the demonstrators. We have already
found that violence broke out on the morning of Black Friday, by the spread of a rumour that a child had died as a
result of tear gas released by the police. Excitement had been mounting during the week, strikers and unemployed
men with nothing to do had been marching up and down the streets, and suddenly, the hooligan and criminal
elements began to loot some of the stores. Gradually, others joined in when it was realised that the forces of law and
order were inadequate to control the situation. Acts of looting, throwing missiles, and arson, were the result of
individual initiative, or of small gangs of hooligans who went about the streets smashing up windows and telephone
booths, setting fire to motor-cars and looting property. This cannot be construed into a deliberate plan to overthrow
the Government by the use of force. We find no evidence of any organised plan or concerted action
116. It must also be emphasised that the outbreak of Black Friday was not a manifestation of racial rivalry or hatred.
There were no clashes between exclusively racial groups. Indeed, there was very little rioting directly aimed at
causing personal injury to individuals of any particular race or group. The malice of the agitators, even at the height
of the period of lawlessness, was concentrated upon looting and doing aimless damage to property. It was more an
exhibition of the lowest in human beings, when they break down the restraints imposed by civilisation and begin to
act like brutes. The victims were certainly not members of one race or group only, though political persuasions and
the measure of sympathy expressed towards the strikers were relevant factors. The first few stores to be looted no
doubt belonged to East Indians, but the reason for this was that these were stores which seemed to offer the best loot,
and also they were the stores of which the employees had been extremely tardy in joining the strike. Many of these
employees were not even members of a union and had for this reason kept themselves aloof from the mob activity
during the earlier stages of the disturbances. The looting was done by small groups of hooligans drawn from all
races. Some witnesses said that the Portuguese predominated, others said that they noticed more Africans than
members of other races among the looters. Most of the witnesses, however, said that the groups were mixed,
meaning that they were comprised of individuals drawn from all classes and races. There is the story of a group of
hooligans led by a tall lame negro, who was called “Bonny Limpy”. This group went about committing acts of
hooliganism at random. Once or twice their leader said that they would burn down a car because it belonged to a
coolie, which term is used in a pejorative sense in reference to Indians. The evidence of Janki Persaud, an employee
of Messrs. Kirpalani. is to the effect that a crowd consisting mostly of Portuguese came to the shop on Monday and
forced the proprietors to close the business. On Tuesday he saw a number of persons including Bashir Khan,
Cleveland Charran, and Sankar, all East Indians, leading people to a store and one of these men pulled a shop girl
out in order to stop her from working. The evidence of Widdup, the Managing Director of Messrs. Brodie & Rainer,
is significant. He said that he saw a group of about 50 persons comprising all types looting the shops and they came
up to loot the store of Messrs. Brodie & Rainer, but their employee, Campbell, told them that the proprietor of the
store belonged to the P.N.C. On hearing this, the riotous crowd passed on without doing any harm to the store.
Eventually the premises of Messrs. Brodie & Rainer were destroyed by fire which spread from a neighbouring store.
117. A careful reading of the evidence, therefore, shows that although there was a certain element of racial
consciousness which promoted the tension among the different political parties, the disturbances were not racial
riots in the sense that members of one race strove to do injury to the personal property of the members of the other
race. The real origin of the riots lay in political rivalries and jealousies which finally found expression in the
criminal acts of a few groups of hooligans.


CHAPTER V
SUMMING UP
118. To sum up, we find that the disturbances and acts of violence were confined almost entirely
to the capital town of Georgetown, where the most active and the most clamorous section of Dr.
Jagan’s political opponents are to be found. The fierce violence of Black Friday, resulting in the
looting of a large number of shops and the destruction by fire of 56 premises, was caused by a
sudden upsurge of anger occasioned by the false rumours of the death of a child caused by tear
gas fumes. This was made possible by the fact that thousands of idle persons had been marching
through the streets of Georgetown with nothing to do except listen to the inflammatory speeches
of the political opponents of Dr. Jagan. There had, however, prevailed for some months
previously a feeling of unrest mounting in some cases to a sense of resentment which led
naturally, if not inevitably, to the events of the week under review. This feeling was due to the
manner in which Dr. Jagan and his Government had handled the affairs of the country.
119. The Opposition of Dr. Jagan came from five distinct sources:
(i) the United Force led by Mr. d’Aguiar,
(ii) businessmen and members of the propertied class,
(iii) People’s National Congress led by Mr. Burnham,
(iv) the British Guiana Civil Service Association,
(v) the Trades Union Council.
The United Force and the commercial people were activated by personal motives rather than
ideological differences. They wanted to safeguard their interests because they felt that the
policies of the government under Dr. Jagan were leading the country towards Communism. The
personal political belief of Dr. Jagan is relevant only in so far as his deeds and declarations
caused certain reactions among the people and brought about a state of affairs in which tensions
grew and spread. In the course of his examination at the inquiry Dr. Jagan evaded answering the
question whether he was a communist and began to give lengthy explanations. In his case it is
true to say qui s’explique se complique and ultimately the discussion may be reduced to nothing
more than the bathos of semantics. All that is necessary for our purpose is to say that the
utterances of the Premier had conveyed to many people in British Guiana and to the outside
world that he was indeed a communist, although he said at the time of the inquiry that he
believed in private property and he and his government had no intention of expropriating private
property without the payment of compensation, and he also believed that free and periodic
elections must be held in a democratic country. There is very little doubt that many of his
speeches and some of his deeds gave rise to the apprehension that despite his evasions and
profession to the contrary, he was acting as a communist. On returning from a visit to
Tanganyika, he said that he admired the system of one party government without an opposition.
He banned the Daily Chronicle from government offices and, in order to exercise control over
the Press, he drew up a scheme of setting up a Press Council. In July 1961 he took over as many
as 51 denominational private schools which were controlled by churches. He frequently
expressed admiration for the way Russia was being governed and the way in which Fidel Castro
had conducted himself in Cuba. We have already referred to the utterances of Dr. Jacob, the
Finance Minister. An article was published in the Los Angeles Times in which Dr. Jagan was
listed among the twelve most important communists of the world, including Krushchev and Mao
Tse-Tung. He did not choose to deny the necessary implication of his being associated with
Krushchev and Mao Tse-Tung. His wife, who is supposed to be a confirmed communist, was
believed to exercise a great deal of influence on him and to shape his policies and course of
action. All this naturally induced a sense of insecurity among a certain section of the people and
there began a flight of capital from the country. In December the government imposed currency
restrictions to counteract this flight, but inevitably, this act of the government increased the sense
of insecurity. The price of properly began to fall and it was stated before us that its value had
decreased to almost half what it was some years ago. Depositors began to withdraw their money
from the Post Office Savings Bank and also from the New Building Society. In the months of
January and February $2 million amounting to 10 per cent of the total deposits were withdrawn
from the Post Office Savings Bank. The New Building Society could not meet all the demands,
and as already narrated, issued a notice that they could only pay out a small proportion of the
monies deposited. Young men who were members of Dr. Jagan’s political party were being
given scholarships and sent to Russia, Tanganyika and Cuba for training, and there were
complaints that many of these persons were wholly unsuitable to receive any education, and that
the sole object of sending them there was to give them some form of military training so that
they could take up arms on behalf of Dr. Jagan’s political party. The new budget introducing
levies and taxes on the propertied classes exacerbated the feeling of discontent and provoked the
members of the United Force and the business people to organise a more active form of agitation
against Dr. Jagan’s government. They encouraged and fostered strikes by shop assistants.
120. The leaders of the People’s National Congress were actuated through the failure of their
ambitions and a realisation that there was no future for them as Dr. Jagan’s allies and supporters.
Mr. Burnham left him in 1955 to form his own party. Another supporter of Dr. Jagan who joined
the Opposition was Mr. Jai Narine Singh. The Civil Service Association were moved to action
by the procrastination of the government and the unsatisfactory response they had received to
their demands for higher salaries and better conditions of service. The trade unionists, although
professing to be completely free from political taint, made common cause with the Civil Service
Association and with the politicians, and a gathering together of all these forces was made
possible by the fact that Dr. Jagan was not endowed with the breadth of vision which could have
enabled him to foresee that his purpose was progressing towards a lamentable end. Nor did he
possess the nimbleness of intellect or the dexterity of political manoeuvring which allows a
politician to change his plan of action without incurring the odium of his supporters or inviting
the derision of his opponents.
121. Thus the agitation began on Monday by a few young shop-workers developed into a mass
agitation on Tuesday afternoon, when a general strike was declared. During the whole of
Wednesday thousands of people were parading through the streets with placards and banners.
They marched shouting slogans, held meetings and forced others to join them. There was a
temporary stoppage in the working of the electricity plant and a consequent cessation of water
supply through the town. On Thursday the agitation continued and there were one or two
sporadic but minor acts of violence. Some shop assistants who had not joined the strike were
molested and bricks were thrown at one shop. On Friday morning the town was ready to witness
a major outbreak of violence and when tear gas was used in front of the power plant and a small
child was affected by it, a false rumour spread through the town and because there were not
available sufficient policemen to deal with the disturbances, the criminal and hooligan elements
broke loose and began to commit acts of violence which finally culminated in widescale looting
and destruction. The outburst was not brought about by a deliberate plan to overthrow the
government, but was the sudden and almost unanticipated result of the inflammable magazine of
mob wrath having been ignited by the spark of a false rumour.

CHAPTER VI
OTHER MATTERS RELATING TO THE DISTURBANCES
122. We may now deal somewhat more fully with two or three matters to which a brief reference
has already been made, and a fuller discussion of which was postponed to avoid a distracting
interruption of the narrative of events.
Declaration of General Strike
123. We first take up the sudden declaration of a general strike on the afternoon of Tuesday,
February 13, on the occasion of the mass meeting at the Parade Ground after the great procession
in which the Civil Servants, the Trade Unions and members of the general public took part.
124. The story put forward before us was that the unbending and indeed the provocative attitude
of the government was the sole reason for the decision to call a general strike, or at any rate for
precipitating that decision. We find it difficult to believe this version and we are of the opinion
that the facts have been greatly distorted by the trade union leaders for the purpose of placing the
responsibility of arousing the workers hostility upon the government. As the matter is of some
little importance it is necessary to examine the evidence on the point in detail.
125. The mass demonstration and procession of Tuesday afternoon ended at the Parade Ground at about 4 p.m.
There was present a huge concourse of people of which the size has been assessed variously between 8,000 and
30,000. A number of speakers addressed this crowd and then at about 4.30 p.m. Mr. Hill, a resident of Georgetown,
gave the information that the Premier had just given a broadcast in the course of which he had announced that all
civil servants who absented themselves from their posts would be dismissed. When this information was given to the
speakers on the rostrum a decision was at once taken to declare a general strike, subject to subsequent ratification.
126. Mr. Hill’s story is that a casual acquaintance of his, Edmond Singh, told him that he had just
heard this news on the radio. The Premier denied having made such an announcement and indeed
a news item was published in the Guiana Graphic contradicting if. When Hill was questioned
about the matter at the inquiry he said that in his opinion what Singh told him was a very
important piece of information, because it was a very serious affair if civil servants who had
gone on strike should lose their jobs. He therefore considered it his duty to warn the civil
servants at the gathering to be careful of what they were going to do. He was doing this as a
citizen who takes a lively interest in what takes place around him and he thought that not many
persons at the meeting might have been as privileged as he was to know that a circular had
already been sent out to civil servants that morning indicating that civil servants who went on
strike were liable to be dismissed. Hill had taken the precaution of questioning Singh and asking
him whether what he was saying was absolutely correct. Singh told him that he had not himself
heard the broadcast but had learnt of it from someone in his house.
127. Although the trade union leaders acted upon Hill’s information by making a most dramatic
announcement of the strike, Ishmael, President of the T.U.C. did not leave the matter there.
When he went home that evening Mr. Seymour, the Chief Government Information Officer,
telephoned him and said that a false report about the Premier’s broadcast had been received by
him. He said the Premier wanted it to be known that he had made no such statement. Ishmael
was disinclined to accept Mr. Seymour’s assurance and questioned him about the matter further.
 
He asked him if the Premier had in fact spoken over tile radio that day. Mr. Seymour replied that
the Premier had spoken twice. Ishmael then asked Mr. Seymour to bring over the tapes
containing the Premier’s speeches and play them over to him. Mr. Seymour brought only one
tape which contained nothing about civil servants on strike being dismissed. The second tape had
apparently been misplaced. Ishmael, not being satisfied with this partial evidence, telephoned
Hill and asked bins about the source of his information. Hill mentioned Singh, and Ishmael then
phoned Singh, and Singh said that his wife had heard something about the dismissal over the
radio. This confusion was resolved when Mr. Seymour telephoned the radio station, and
someone at the radio station read over the transcript of the Premier’s second speech. In this
broadcast there was something about the Minister of Education advising Principals to dismiss
their schools.
128. On behalf of the government it was suggested that the broadcast which Singh is alleged to
have heard may have been made by a pirate radio which was later discovered. In any event, it has
been clearly established that the Premier did not make any broadcast in the course of which he
said that civil servants on strike would be dismissed. Ishmael’s explanation is not at all
satisfactory because the Minister of Education may have advised the Principals of schools to
close the institutions. He could not have used the word “dismissal” with regard to schools. On
the other hand, the Government, without accepting the truth of Hill’s story, ascribed the
misunderstanding to a broadcast made by the pirate radio.
129. Hill himself is a wholly unreliable witness. He told us that he gave information by word of
mouth, whereas the trade union leaders said that a small note was passed over. Hill said that he
remained at the spot for sometime, but he did not hear the dramatic announcement of the strike
by the various trade unions, although this announcement was made immediately after the note
was passed up.
130. On the other hand, we know that a week before the Trades Union Council had at a meeting
decided that if the Finance Minister could not give them a satisfactory reply to their demands on
the 12th February, they would recommend a general strike with effect from the morning of
Wednesday the 14th. No notice to government was given as required by the “Essential Services”
Ordinance of 1956.* The somewhat self-righteous explanation given of this omission was that
the practice of giving notice had fallen into desuetude. The leaders had not even hesitated to call
out the medical services in their entirety without leaving a skeleton staff to attend to urgent cases
and helpless patients in hospital. The fact that some of the medical staff remained on duty was
due not to any instructions given by the trade union leaders, but to the individual discretion of the
doctors and nurses who chose out of humanitarian consideration to attend to their work as usual.
[* Public Utility Undertaking & Public Health Services Arbitration Ordinance No. 44 of 1956]
131. The British Guiana Civil Service Association had, out of a sense of frustration and defeat,
following the long and inconclusive negotiations, called a strike of their affiliated unions with
effect from 1 p.m. on Tuesday the 13th. Their decision was made at 11.30 a.m. They also took
part in the mass demonstration jointly with the Trades Union Council from 2 p.m. to 4 p.m., and
the civil servants may be assumed to have mixed freely and exchanged views with the members
of the trade unions. So that when the meeting at time Parade Ground started, almost everybody
must have been aware of the fact that civil servants were on strike and intended not to resume
work until they had received satisfaction with regard to their various demands. The Trades Union
Council must have felt that the Civil Service had displayed courage and a sense of honour in
defying the government. The suggestion of defiance could not have escaped the trade union
leaders because the decision to strike coming as a sharp retort to the morning’s circular savoured
of a retaliatory measure. So it was natural that at the meeting there prevailed a feeling of being
only a second best and a realisation that inaction would be construed as a display of timidity.
132. Earlier, Ishmael had been told “to do something”. His followers were restive and straining
for some kind of positive action and a release from time unrewarding discipline of debate and
negotiation. A dozen speakers had already employed their oratory to whip up the passions of the
large gathering and as emotions mounted reason diminished. In this state no external stimulus
was needed to prod the trade union leaders into following the course taken by their more
courageous brethren of the Civil Service. We have no doubt at all that the inevitable, perhaps the
ineluctable, consequence was a declaration of a general strike, despite the lack of authority
vesting in those who made these dramatic decisions. When the legality of these decisions was
questioned at a meeting on the following day, the leaders countered the objection and satisfied
their conscience by saying that the declaration of the strike was not caused by a rumour, but was
the result of the issue of the circular by the government on Tuesday morning, as this circular
contained a threat of dismissal by drawing attention to General Order 95 which said that a person
who is absent from his work is liable to dismissal and which easily could be construed as
victimisation.
133. From the above discussion it is quite clear that the trade union leaders were determined to
declare a strike, and the decision was precipitated not so much by any false information of a
broadcast made by the Premier, but because of the decision taken by the Civil Service and the
desire of the trade union leaders to appear as bold and decisive as the Civil Service.
Houston By-election
134. A word or two must be said regarding the unsavoury episode of the Houston by-election,
though the narrative will take us beyond the date of the disturbances under review. At the general
election held in August 1961, Mr. G. M. Henry, the P.P.P. candidate, was declared elected by a
majority of 448 votes over the P.N.C. candidate, Mr. H. Green. It was a three-cornered contest,
but the U.F. candidate received very few votes. The P.N.C. candidate filed an election petition
challenging the validity of Mr. Henry’s election, on the ground that his election was
accompanied by corrupt and illegal practices. The matter was enquired into by Mr. Justice
Fraser, of the Supreme Court of British Guiana, who giving judgement on 27/11/1961, held that
Mr. Ashton Chase, an agent of Mr. Henry, had been guilty of corrupt practice inasmuch as he
had been a party to an act of impersonation on the part of one of the voters. The election of Mr.
Henry was accordingly declared void, and as a consequence of this decision Mr. Chase became
incapable of remaining a member of the Senate. Subsequently action was taken against Mr.
Chase and he was tried before a Judge and Jury for the offence of impersonation. He was,
however, acquitted of this charge on a unanimous verdict of the jury on March 8, 1962. Mr.
Chase now moved that the incapacity attaching to him by virtue of the order of Mr. Justice Fraser
should be removed because he had been acquitted of the charge of impersonation by a competent
court. The matter went before Mr. Justice Fraser, who, by his order of April 28, 1962, removed
the incapacity and reported his finding to the Speaker under Section 37 of the Legislature
(Appointments, Election and Membership Controversies) Ordinance, 1961.
135. Although the election of Mr. Henry had been declared void at the end of November, 1961,
no steps were taken by the government to hold a by-election. Indeed, no by-election has been
held to the present day. Dr. Jagan was questioned upon this point and his reply was that since
Mr. Chase had been acquitted of the offence of impersonation it was morally in the fitness of
things that the original election should be held to be a good one, because the reason upon which
his incapacity was founded no longer subsisted. The government was therefore finding ways and
means of restoring Mr. Henry’s election, or at any rate validating it. This had naturally given rise
to a great deal of resentment on the part of the P.N.C. and Dr. Japan was charged with flouting
the decision of Mr. Justice Eraser in the election petition. We do not wish to offer any further
comment on this matter because the question of validating the original election has not been
finally resolved, and we merely wish to draw attention to the sense of resentment created by the
refusal, or at any rate the reluctance of the government to hold a by-election and give the P.N.C.
an opportunity of adding to their strength in the Legislative Assembly, in the event of the
election going in favour of the P.N.C.
Part taken by the Police
136. We have next to consider the promptness with which the police made their sorties and the
adequacy of the steps taken by them. There is no indication of any delay on the part of the police
to arrive at the various places where demonstrations or disturbances took place. Indeed, the
evidence points to the most commendable vigilance at all relevant times. Meetings, even
peaceful ones, were attended by police officers especially detailed for the purpose and
processions were invariably escorted. On February 12, the Police Emergency Plan was put into
action. This meant the cancellation of leave and the ordering to duty of all police personnel. On
the next day a special constabulary force of 26 was called out. The same day a request for
embodying the British Guiana Volunteer Force was sent out by the Council of Ministers. Three
special riot squads of thirty men each were kept in constant readiness. There is further abundant
evidence to show that when violence broke out in various parts of the town on February 16,
patrols both on foot and in motor drawn vehicles were organised. There was continuous
communication between these patrols and the Central Control room at Police Headquarters and
every possible effort was made to send immediate assistance wherever it was needed.
137. But the resources of the police were insufficient to meet the situation. The effective strength
of the police force in Georgetown on February 16, was 200 subordinate officers and constables,
26 special constabulary, and 25 Mounted Police and three riot squads of 30 men each.* Also the
fact must be recorded that there was an element of discontent among the members of the force,
which stemmed from a feeling that their salaries were inadequate. This discontent found
expression in a lamentable incident at Police headquarters when two subordinate officers refused
to obey orders and one of them made a distressing exhibition of cowardice. The Commissioner
of Police was, however, able to deal with the refractory element firmly and tactfully and after he
had spoken to his men there was no further display of recalcitrance or dereliction of duty. To add
to the difficulties of the police there were repeated requests from officials and private individuals
for personal protection. The crowds in Georgetown were bigger than ever seen before, and
though in the earlier stages they were peaceful, their formidable size was pregnant with a
foreboding of evil. [* The figures originally given by the Commissioner of Police in his public examination
were subsequently corrected by him.]
138. With regard to the steps taken by the police, it must be borne in mind that the task of the
police, upon occasions of this nature, is an extremely difficult one. They have, when faced by a
hostile and menacing mob, to avoid alike the Scylla of vicious retaliation and the Charybdis of
seeming timidity. A too hasty step may arouse and exacerbate the latent wrath of a sullen crowd
and provoke its members to commit acts of open violence, and yet a period of prolonged inaction
may be mistaken for a display of cowardice, and encourage wanton breaches of the law.
139. After a very careful and anxious consideration of the evidence led before us, we are
satisfied that the police officers of Georgetown conducted themselves with courage worthy of the
highest traditions of any police force and exercised a measure of restraint which is in itself proof
of their deep sense of responsibility and the fearlessness with which they discharged the onerous
burden of their duties. They had to cope with political demonstrators, members of Trade Unions,
Civil Servants, commercial employees, the unemployed, and hooligan and criminal elements.
The Commissioner of Police stated before us that he “did not want a clash between the police
and the public, unless it became absolutely necessary. The crowds although they were
technically breaking the law” by making an entry into the proclaimed area, remained peaceful.
“It is very unwise in these circumstances to attempt arrest, very unwise because inevitably it
brings about clashes. When you have got thousands of people and a handful of police, such
action would not be advisable.”
140. So it was that until Thursday the 15th, the police confined their activities to maintaining a
close watch over the demonstrators while they held their meetings and marched in processions
up and down the streets of Georgetown. There were several instances of intimidation of
employees who had declined to join the strikers or of shopkeepers who had persisted in keeping
their premises open, but the police held their hand because there was, so far, no manifestation of
force or violence apart from the solitary instance of a brief spurt of stone throwing at Kirpalani
Stores. On the 16th, however, when disturbances broke out simultaneously in several parts of the
town, the police acted promptly and firmly, but even on that day the use of force was limited to
the barest minimum required to disperse the crowds or quell their riotous activities. As already
narrated, at first only tear gas was used and at the Power House this sufficed to break up the mob
though not before they had pelted the building and the police personnel with stones, empty
bottles and bottles filled with kerosene oil, designed to catch fire on bursting. In Robb Street the
mob became uncontrollable and its fury increased with the spreading of a rumour that tear gas
had mortally affected a small child. Tear gas had not proved effective at this storm centre and as
the crowd became more frenzied, someone opened fire on the police. We have already observed
that several members of the police force were injured, one of them fatally. It was only then that
the police felt constrained to use their fire arms in self-defence. Supt. Phoenix who was in charge
of the operations was wounded by shots which were clearly aimed at him. In order to defend
himself against further attack he fired back, aiming not indiscriminately at the surging crowd, but
at the man who seemed to have fired the previous shots and who now appeared to be coming
towards him under cover of a slowly approaching vehicle. Unfortunately the hostile firing
continued and Phoenix was hit a second time. This injury was more serious and obliged him to
leave his post and go to the hospital for medical attention.
141. The Robb Street score was one police officer killed and four wounded by fire arms, as
against one member of the riotous mob known to be fatally wounded. The balance was thus
heavily adverse to the police and it cannot be said that the police used more force than was
justified by the circumstances. We are unable to subscribe to the view that the police were guilty
of any dereliction of duty by being too niggardly in the use of fire arms. The crowd in Robb
Street was, no doubt, riotous and violent. They were pelting the police with missiles but their
objective appeared to be Freedom House and their fury was aimed at the police only in so far as
their way was barred. As long as the police could succeed in keeping the mob away and as long
as they could protect their own lives by using tear smoke or firing shots wide of the men facing
them, they were adequately performing their duty. Supt. Phoenix’s unit fired eighteen rounds and
kept the crowd at bay until the arrival of the army unit at whose appearance the mob began to
dissolve.
142. Another instance of shooting of the police occurred in the course of driving looters away
from a store, late on the evening of February 16.
143. It could perhaps be argued that a readier and more liberal use of fire arms by the police
might have reduced the incidence of looting to some extent, but we are far from convinced that
the police were guilty of any culpable disinclination in defending public property and it seems to
us abundantly clear that none of the fires could have been prevented by anything that the police
could do with the resources at their disposal. The very paucity of their numbers, a fact obvious to
everyone, was an encouraging factor to the ruffianly elements who could, with the greatest of
ease, play a vicious game of hide and seek with the policemen on patrol. It was the sight of the
unusual and more numerous army personnel as much as the use of force by them that emptied
the streets and restored peace.
Arms in the Attorney-General’s House
144. A few words may be said regarding the story that a gang of toughs was brought in to guard
the Attorney-General’s house, which on the night of Friday the 16th, was stocked like a small
arsenal with arms and ammunition. The relevant evidence on the point consists of a statement by
Small who stated that when he was passing by the Attorney-General’s house soon after 8.30 p.m.
he was set upon and severely beaten by a group of eighteen persons, several of whom were
armed with guns. He was then dragged into the yard where he saw a motor car on the back seat
of which lay a large quantity of arms and ammunition. Small went on to say that someone
telephoned the police, but before the police arrived the arms and ammunition were removed. The
police took charge of him (Small) and took him to the hospital where his injuries were examined
by a doctor. He was then allowed to go away. Early the next morning he went to Freedom House
with the object of looking for his assailant of the previous evening. He was able to recognise one
whose ear had been injured by Small in the course of the scuffle. We are not at all impressed by
Small’s statement and his demeanour in time witness box was far from convincing.
145. The next witness we examined was Paul, the Attorney-General’s chauffeur, whose
straightforward testimony furnished an explanation of Small’s extraordinary story. Paul said that
his master’s house was stoned during the day and when he drove his master back from the office
in the afternoon, the house was empty save for a special constable on sentry duty. He drove the
Attorney-General to the Premier’s house and returned home alone. Later in the day a group of
men from the country, of whom Toolsie Persaud was known to him as a supporter of the P.P.P.,
came to protect the house. They saw Small passing by with a box which appeared to contain
looted property. They apprehended him and beat him. Small cried out for help and Paul, coming
down into the yard, advised the men not to use violence, but send for the police. The police were
accordingly called and Toolsie Persaud was found to be in possession of a revolver. The police
took Small and Toolsie Persaud away, as also the box recovered from Small and the revolver
found on the person of Toosie Persaud. Paul’s story is corroborated by Police Supt. Isaacs who
saw Toolise Persaud and another young mart in police custody and was informed that a loaded
revolver had been recovered from Toolsie Persaud’s pocket. Toolsie Persaud was also called as a
witness but regarding his testimony we need say nothing more than it is a tissue of lies. Toolsie
Persaud has a long criminal record and he was convicted of criminal offences upon several
occasions. He, however, denied his previous convictions thinking, no doubt, that the police
records were not readily available to confront him. The relevant police file was called and as
soon as this
circumstance became known to Toolsie Persaud he was forced to admit all his previous
misdeeds.
146. We cannot give any credence to Small’s story of a motor car full of guns for it is
inconceivable that anyone guilty of hoarding a large quantity of unlicensed fire arms should have
the temerity to summon the police for the express purpose of advertising the unlawful act of
having made an unprovoked assault on an innocent passer-by. It is, therefore, more probable that
Small was found carrying a box which bore the appearance of having been looted and the
somewhat over-zealous farmers guarding the Attorney-General’s house apprehended him and
gave him one or two blows (Supt. Isaacs said that Small’s arm was swollen). Small cried out and
Paul stopped the unruly behaviour and sent for the police. It is unnecessary to dwell further on
this unsavoury episode which has none of the significance attached to it by some of the parties at
the hearing.


CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
147. We may conclude by briefly setting out our conclusions:
(1) The disturbances of February 16 were not the result of a deliberate plan formulated by any individual or
body of individuals to overthrow by force the Government of British Guiana established by law. The riots
resulting in the destruction of, and damage to, property were clearly not a manifestation of rebellion or civil
war.
(2) There is no evidence of the disturbances being the direct result of a racial conflict,
though a certain measure of tension between the East Indian and African races which had
lately become noticeable acted as a contributory factor.
(3) Political rivalries and the frustrated ambitions of some of Dr. Jagan’s erstwhile supporters** fostered a
sense of resentment and antagonism towards Dr. Jagan and his party. Other factors which contributed to a
state of mounting discontent were:
(a) a feeling of insecurity experienced by the commercial and moneyed classes,
because they believed that Dr. Jagan’s political convictions were increasingly
assuming a Communist pattern;
(b) a sense of fear that the country would obtain independence under a Government
with obvious Communist leanings;

(c) the failure of the Government to remove the grievances of its civil servants who
were asking for higher salaries and better conditions of service;
(d) the hostility of Trade Union leaders, some of whom, e.g., Ishmael, had personal
grievances against Dr. Jagan and his Ministers.
[** Editor’s Note: This is illogical. The Commission apparently meant to state “opponents”.]
The disturbances were confined to Georgetown where the bulk of Dr. Jagan’s
political opposition, the civil servants and the trade unionists, are located. (The sugar
estate workers outside Georgetown, about 20.000 in number, it will be recalled, did not
strike.)
(4) The outburst of February 16, was comparable to an act of spontaneous combustion
when some highly fermented substance is subjected to long pressures. The mass of
discontented and idle workers on strike was inexorably driven by the sheer force of bored
monotony to find release in rowdyism and rioting. The false rumour of a child s death
caused by the deleterious effects of tear gas furnished the immediate stimulus to violence.
(5) The rioters were not drawn from one particular race or political party,
nor were the victims chosen from any one class. The looters belonged to
the category of irresponsible individuals consisting for the most part of
hooligans and criminals, who in moments of excitement and mass hysteria
throw away the inhibitions of a civilised society and seize the opportunity
of preying upon their fellow citizens.
(6) The police performed their extremely difficult and onerous task to the
best of their ability and capacity. If they failed in maintaining law and
order on February 16, they cannot be blamed, for in no country is it
possible to have available a police force large enough to control a sudden
and extraordinary outbreak of violence on such an extensive scale.
(7) The army responded to the call with admirable promptness and handled the situation
firmly and effectively without using more force than was absolutely necessary.
(8) In all, 56 premises were destroyed by fire, 87 were damaged of which 66 were also
looted. The total loss occasioned has been assessed at B.W.I. $11,405,236, though it is
impossible to state the exact figure with any degree of accuracy.
148. One policeman was shot dead by the rioters and 39 more were injured. Of the rioters and
looters, four men lost their lives as a result of shooting, and 41 were injured.
149. We cannot take leave of this matter without placing on record our sense of gratitude to Mr. Kenneth Potter,
Counsel to the Commission, whose indefatigable energy in securing, collating, and marshalling the voluminous
evidence, both oral and documentary, won our admiration We were extremely fortunate in having his assistance,
for the task with which we were entrusted could not have been accomplished with such expedition and thoroughness
without his clarity of mind and the unbounded energy which he bestowed upon it. We arc greatly indebted to our
Secretary Mr. D. A. Skinner of the Colonial Office, whose organising ability, resourcefulness and ceaseless toil were
of incalculable help to us both in our work and our journeys to and from Georgetown. Mr. E. Burke, Liaison Officer
and the staff under him performed their task with admirable competence. And lastly, we must acknowledge with a
sense of gratitude the contribution of the Secretariat staff under the supervision of Miss Ruby Harry. Their
competent and uncomplaining willingness to work late into the night made it possible for a verbatim transcript of
each day’s oral evidence to be made available for our study upon time following morning. This necessitated the
transcribing, correcting and cyclo-styling of a hundred or more foolscap pages every day and the punctual rendering
of this essential service was therefore no mean achievement.

(Signatures)
H .WYNN PARRY.
E.O. ASAFU-ADJAYE.
G.D. KHOSLA.

APPENDIX I
WARRANT APPOINTING THE HONOURABLE SIR HENRY WYNN PARRY and others to inquire into certain
matters concerning British Guiana.
I, the Right Honourable Reginald Maulding, Member of Parliament, one of Her Majesty=s Principal
Secretaries of State, by virtue and in exercise of all powers enabling me in that behalf, do hereby direct and declare
as follows:.
1. I HEREBY APPOINT The Honourable Sir Henry Wynn Parry, Knight, Sir Edward Asafu-Adjaye,
Knight, and The Honourable Justice Gopal Das Khosla to be a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of inquiring
into the recent disturbances in British Guiana and the events leading up to them and to report thereon.
2. AND I FURTHER APPOINT The Honourable Sir Henry Wynn Parry to be Chairman of the said
Commission of Inquiry.
3.The Chairman may appoint a person to be Secretary of the said Commission of Inquiry and such other
persons to assist the said Commission of Inquiry as he may consider necessary.
4.Any two of the members of the said Commission of Inquiry shall form a quorum for the purpose of
discharging any of the functions (other than that of reporting) of the Commission.
5. The said Commission of Inquiry may make such rules for their own guidance and the conduct and
management of the proceedings before them and the times and places for their sittings as they may from time to
time think fit.
6. The said Commission of Inquiry shall have the powers of the Supreme Court of British Guiana .
(a) to summon witnesses;
(b) to examine witnesses on oath;
(c) to call for the production of books and documents.
7. . (1) All persons summoned to attend and give evidence, or to produce books, plans, or documents, at
any sitting of the Commission, shall be bound to obey the summons served upon them as fully in all respects as
witnesses are bound to obey subpoenas issued from the Supreme Court, and shall be entitled to the like expenses as
if they had been summoned to attend the Supreme Court on a Criminal trial, if the same shall be allowed by the
Commission, but the Commission may disallow the whole or any part of such expenses in any case, if they think fit.
The procedure for the payment of such witnesses shall be the same as nearly may be for the payment of witnesses in
the Supreme Court, and they shall be paid at such time and in such manner as the Commission may direct.
(2)if any person .
(a) on being summoned as a witness before the Commission makes default in attending; or
(b) being in attendance as a witness refuses to take an oath legally required by the Commission to
be taken, or to produce any document in his power or control legally required by the Commission
to be produced by him, or to answer any question to which the Commission may legally require an
answer; or
(c) does any other thing which would, if the Commission had been a court of law having
power to commit for contempt, had been contempt of that court;
The Chairman of the Commission may certify the offence of that person under his hand to the Supreme
Court of British Guiana, and that Court may thereupon inquire into the alleged offence and after hearing any
witnesses who may be produced against or on behalf of the person charged with the offence, and after hearing any
statement that may be offered in defence, punish or take steps for the punishment of that person in like manner as if
he had been guilty of contempt of the Court.
8. Any person who shall wilfully give false evidence before the said Commission of Inquiry concerning the
subject matter of such inquiry shall be guilty of perjury under section 327 of the Criminal Law (Offences) Ordinance
of British Guiana, and be liable to be prosecuted and punished
accordingly.
9. No member of the Commission of Inquiry shall be liable to an prosecution, action or suit in respect of
ant thing done by him as such member.
10. No person giving evidence before the said Commission of Inquiry shall be compellable to incriminate
himself, and every such person shall, in respect of any evidence given by him before the said Commission of
Inquiry, be entitled to all the privileges to which a witness giving evidence
before the Supreme Court of British Guiana is entitled in respect of evidence given by him before such Court.
11. . (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) of this paragraph, the Inquiry shall be held
in public.
(2) If in their opinion it is expedient in the public interest so to do, the Commission may direct that any part
of the Inquiry shall be held in private.
(3) The Commission shall determine who may be present at any time when any part of the Inquiry is being
held in private.
12.The Commission may authorise any person giving evidence or any person who appears to them to have
an interest in the subject of the Inquiry to be represented at the Inquiry or any part thereof.
13.This Warrant may be amended, added to or revoked by any further Warrant supplemental thereto under
the hand of one of Her Majesty=s Principal Secretaries of State.

Given under my hand this eleventh day of May, 1962.
R. Maulding
Her Majesty=s Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies.
APPENDIX II
BRITISH GUIANA COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
RULES OF PROCEDURE
Rules applicable to all sittings
1. All witnesses= statements and documents shall be submitted to Counsel for the Commission, who shall
adduce what he considers material.
2.Any person or his representative may apply to the Commission if not satisfied with the decision of
Counsel for the Commission not to present to the Commission the evidence offered by that person.
3. Counsel representing the witness shall be allowed to examine the witness and so shall such
representatives of interested parties as satisfy the Commission that they have an interest in examining the particular
witness.
4.Counsel for the Commission shall re-examine the witness after other examinations by representatives of
interested parties.
Rules applicable to private sittings
5. No persons shall be present other than the Commissioner, the Secretary to the Commission, Counsel for
the Commission, the witness and his Counsel, and such other Counsel (or persons appearing without Counsel) as
shall satisfy the Commission that they have an interest in the evidence of the particular witness.
6. Witnesses or their Counsel may apply to the Commission if they wish to exclude any person or his
Counsel claiming to be interested in their evidence.
7.Each witness shall provide one copy of his statement for Counsel for the Commission at least three clear
days before he gives his evidence, and Counsel for the Commission shall not at any time show that statement to any
person whatsoever without the authority of the witness or his Counsel.

8. The witnesses= statement shall be read by Counsel for the Commission after the witness has been sworn
and has tendered three copies of the statement for the use of the Commissioners. The witness shall provide one copy
for himself and may (but shall not be required to) provide further copies for the use of other interested parties.
9. At the conclusion of the Inquiry Counsel for the Commission shall return to each witness Counsel’s copy
for his statement.
10. Examination of a witness by Counsel for other interested parties (or by an interested party in person) in
accordance with Rule 3 may be allowed .
(a) upon matters arising out of the witness’s statement; and
(b) upon such other matters as in the opinion of the Commission are within their terms of reference.
11. Examination of the witness by his own Counsel and re-examination of the witness by Counsel for the
Commission shall be on such matters as the Commission may allow, being matters relevant to their terms of
reference.
12. No note of any of the evidence shall he taken by any person other than the Commissioners, Counsel and
the Secretary to the Commission.

APPENDIX III
LIST OF WITNESSES EXAMINED
Individuals listed who are marked with an asterisk gave their evidence in private session.
I. Government Ministers and officials
Mr. W. G. Stoll (Commissioner of Inland Revenue).
Mr. R. Singh (General Register Office).
Mr. A.. I. Crum-Ewing (Clerk of Legislative Council).
Dr. C. B. Jagan, Premier.
Mr. W. P. D’Andrade (Secretary to the Treasury).
Dr. C. R. Jacob (Minister of Finance).
*His Excellency the Governor Sir Ralph Grey.
*Mr. B. S. Rai (Ex-Minister for Home Affairs).
2. Representatives of Political Parties
Mr. H. Green (People’s National Congress).
Miss M. A. Jardim (United Force).
Mr. P. S. d=Aguiar (United Force).
Mr. L. F. S. Burnham (People=s National Congress).
Dr. C. B. Jagan (People=s Progressive Party).

3. Police
Mr. W. R. V. Weber, Commissioner of Police.
Acting Senior Superintendent M. L. Barrow.
Assistant Superintendent C. G. Glasgow.
Acting Assistant Commissioner (Administration) E. N. M. Isaacs.
Deputy Superintendent C. Haynes.
Assistant Commissioner of Police (Crime) F. T. De Abreu.
Senior Superintendent I. L. Puttock.
Senior Superintendent J. A. Phoenix.
Police Constable E. A. Forde.
Cadet Officer J. W. Lashley.
Inspector C. A. Gravesande.
Corporal C. J. Bentinck.
Assistant Superintendent W. Yaw.
Inspector S. S. Jackson.
Inspector A. Hoosein.
Inspector J. Jarine.
Corporal C. Persaud.
Special Constable G. Semple.
Detective Corporal W. Swamy.
Superintendent R. De Freitas.
Inspector St. Clair Fraser.
Assistant Superintendent C. A. Roberts.
Detective Corporal R. Jamieson.
Detective Constable M. Hoosein.
Detective Corporal N. G. Brandon.

Senior Superintendent K. Beharry Singh.
Constable A. Aaron.
Sergeant A. A Smith.
Corporal W. H. Thompson.
Constable S. Pilgrim.
Constable P. Jagmohan.
Sergeant E. Williams.
Detective Constable E. McAlmont.
Detective Constable J. Wilson.
*Inspector A. H. Creavalle.
4. British Forces personnel
Major M. F. A. Wilson.
Lieutenant D. H. Neville.
Sergeant A. M. Herbert.
Corporal B. Restall.
Corporal A. Hadfield.
*Lieutenant Colonel D. J. Warren.
5. Fire Brigade
Chief Fire Officer J. T. Atkinson.
Sub-Officer H. Norton.
Fireman H. Inniss.
Fireman I. Singh.
6. Electricity Corporation
Mr. C. A. Alexander.
Mr. P. H. Huggins.
Mr. R. F. Moriah.
Mr. M. Yassin.
7. Water Works
Mr. H. R. B. Bentley.
8. Hospital
Mr. I. Persaud.
Mr. R. David.
Mr. H. Joseph.
Mr. T. Dyal.
Mr. N. C. Jain.
9. Commercial Community
Mr. V. J. Fitt.
Mr. D. Khalil.
Mr. G. Kawall.
Mr. C. R. Jacob.
Mr. A. Hardinge.

75
Mr. W. Mongal.
Mr. A. St. Hill.
Mr. J. Thani.
Mr. M. Kirpalani.
Miss S. Wong.
Mr. C. Mayers.
Mr. A. Parsram.
Mr. S. Campbell.
Mr. R. Maraj.
Mr. F. D. Widdup.
Mr. G. Singh.
Mr. A. K. Kalamudeen.
Mr. A.. Deygoo.
Mr. G. Edwards.
Mr. P. Soloman.
Mr. W Johannies.
Senator A.Tasker.
Mr. H. Greathead.
Mr. J. E. Lawrence.
Mr. B. A. Baxter.
Mr. G. A. King.
Mr. W. S. Gomes.
Mr. J. St. F. Dare.
Mr. J. Jardim.
Mr. H. N. Couchman.
Mr. J. Persaud.
Mr. S. M. de Franca.
Mr. H. L. Steele (President, Chamber of Commerce).
Mr. F. W. V. Green (Executive Officer, Chamber of Commerce).
Mr. C. Figueira.
Mr. M. B. Gajraj.
Mr. P. B. Hibbins.
Mr. C. Bettencourt-Gomes.
Mr. J. H. Rodrigues.
Mr. C. Vieira.
Senator Miss M. A. Jardim.
Mr. P. S. d=Aguiar.
10. Trade Union Representatives
Mr. G Edwards (Clerical and Commercial Workers Union).
Mr. S. M. de Franca (Clerical and Commercial Workers Union).
Mr. W. G. Stoll (Civil Servants Association).
Mr. A. Jackson (Post Office Workers Union).
Mr. D. P. Sankar (Man Power Citizens Association, British Guiana Headmen=s Union, Clerical and Commercial
Workers Union and Trades Union Council).
Mr. R. A. A. Ishmael (Trades Union Council).
Mr. C. Charran (Man Power Citizens Association).
Mr. A. P. McLean (Labour Union and Trades Union Council)
Inspector A. H. Creavalle (Police Federation).
11. Insurance Companies
Mr. R. E. Pairaudeau.

76
Mr. J. H. B. Moore.
Mr. H. A. M. Brassington.
Mr. A. J. Hale.
Mr. E. M. G.Austin.
Mr. O. R. Green.
Mr. H. McCowan.
Mr. A. G. Fernandes.
Mr. J. F. Ferraz.
12. Others
Mr. H. Singh.
Mr. G. Sewrattan.
Mr. R. Singh.
Mr. D. Douglas.
Mr. R. Griffith.
Mrs. A. Demonick.
Mr. C. Small.
Mr. K. Paul.
Mr. B. Ramsaroop.
Mr. C. Delphin.

78
Mr. P. E. W. Hesketh.
Mr. C. Nascimento.
Mr. M. S. Vincent.
Mr. I. Hughes.
Mr. R. C. Hill.
Mr. B. B. McG. Gaskin.
Mr. P. E. Armstrong.
Master C. Waithe.
Mr. C. Lewis.
Mrs. P. Hunter.
Mr. R. Licorish.
Mr. I. Morris.
Mr. T. Persaud.
Mr. E. N. W. Hutchinson
Mr. C. A. Bourne

79
APPENDIX IV
LIST OF EXHIBITS
Date Exhibit
22nd May 1A Map of part of Georgetown.
22nd May 1B Map of part of Georgetown.
28th May 2 Copy of Circular dated 13.2.1962.
28th May 3 Letter from M.P.C.A. with circular attached.
31st May 4 Wire-mesh Mask.
6th June 5 Copy of Thunder newspaper of 10.2.1962.
6th June 6 Circular letter of United Force dated 6.2.1962.
6th June 7 Pamphlet marked D.C.O.. l6,819.
6th June 8 Pamphlet marked D.C.O.. l6,818.
7th June 9 Request for Military Assistance.
8th June 10(a) Broadcasts of the Premier.
8th June 10(b) Broadcasts of Dr. Jacob.
8th June 10(c) Broadcasts of Senator Hubbard.
8th June 10(d) Broadcasts of News Conference of Premier.
8th June 11 Copy of letter from Executive Officer of Chamber of
Commerce to the Minister of Trade and Industry dated 13.3.1962.
12th June 12 Broadcast of News Item of 9.2.1962.
12th June 13 Broadcast of News Item of 12.2.1962.
12th June 14 Broadcast of Radio Talk by Mr. L. F. S. Burnham on
14.2.1962.
12th June 15 Broadcast of Radio Talk by Mr. P. S. d=Aguiar on 15.2.1962.
12th June 16 Pamphlet “If Kelshall, Benn and Jagan win, we are lost.”
12th June 17 Copy of Daily Chronicle of 14.5.1962.
12th June 18 Copy of Daily Chronicle of 15.5.1962.
13th June 19 Copy of Evening Post of 6.2.1962.
13th June 20 Pamphlet “T.U. Leaders bought out.”
15th June 21 Table of Population Statistics.
15th June 22 Insurance information from Hand-in-Hand Mutual Fire
15th June 23 Endorsement incorporating revised explosion conditions of
Hand-in-Hand Mutual Fire.
15th June 24 Letter dated 28.2 962 from Hand-in-Hand Mutual Fire to
Policy Holders.
15th June 25 Insurance information from British Guiana and Trinidad
Mutual Fire.
15th June 26 Endorsement incorporating revised explosion conditions of
British Guiana and Trinidad Mutual Fire.
15th June 27 Insurance information from British Guiana Insurance
Agencies, Ltd.
15th June 28 Insurance information from Royal Insurance Co., Ltd.
15th June 29 Insurance information from Antony Gibbs & Sons (Insurance) Ltd.
15th June 30 Insurance information from New India Assurance Co. Ltd.
15th June 31 Insurance information front Alliance Assurance Co. Ltd.
15th June 32 Insurance information from Netherlands Insurance Co. Ltd.
15th June 33 Insurance information from Caledonian Insurance Co.
15th June 34 Insurance information from Home Insurance Co.
15th June 35 Insurance information from Phoenix Assurance Co. Ltd.
18th June 36 Letter dated 2.1.1962 from Chairman P.P.P. to Group
Secretaries.
18th June 37 Letter dated 19.2.1962 from Premier to the T.U.C.
18th June 38 Statement from Royal Navy signed by Commodore J. E. L.
Martin and Commander J. P. Parker.
19th June 39 Extracts from Official Gazettes of 7.10.1961 and 14.10.1961.
19th June 39(a) Map of British Guiana showing Electoral Districts.
19th June 40 Letter dated 28.11.1961 from Mr. Justice Fraser to the
Speaker.
19th June 41 Letter dated 30.11.1961 from Mr. Justice Fraser to the
Speaker.
19th June 42 Judgment of the Supreme Court dated 27.11.1961.
20th June 43 Letter dated 28.4.1962 from Mr. Justice Fraser to the Speaker.
20th June 44 Judgment of the Supreme Court dated 28.4.1962.
22nd June 45 Information in support of the Premier’s evidence.
25th June 46 Album of photographs.
25th June 47 Financial information.
APPENDIX V


EXTRACTS FROM SPEECHES, ETC., BY DR. JAGAN AND MEMBERS OF THE P.P.P. SHOWING
COMMUNIST LEANINGS
Big business will always be opposed to this Government because it will mean their ultimate destruction.
Ultimately we will destroy them and that is why Big Business are afraid of us.. (Statement by Mr. Mann,
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Communications in Legislative Assembly, 15th May, 1962.)
It is easier to stop tomorrow than to stop Communism.. (Mr. Benn.)
To call a man a Communist is to pay him the highest compliment you can.. (Mr. Hubbard.)
My Hon. Friend . . . . has attempted . . . . to refute Marxism. This is a futile attempt. Learned University
Professors, of course of the bourgeois tradition, professional mercenaries, politicians. common vilifiers, have all
tried to refute the unassailable logic of Marxism They have all failed.. (Mr. Jacob, Hansard, 20th October, 1961.)
The poverty in this country and in countries like ours is due to the fact that the economies are tied to those
of the capitalist-exploiting countries of Europe and North America.. (ibid.)
We will attempt to build a new society . a society which exists in more than one-third of the world today;
a society in which there will be freedom and plenty for everybody. That is a genuine socialist society.. (ibid.)
The greatest weapon of the Fascists is anti-Communism. Hitler built up a ghastly fear of Communism. He
was bitterly anti-Communist. Under the hysteria of anti-Communism, people forget the real dangers embodied in the
Fascist himself..' (Page 6, Hitler =s Force in British Guiana by Moses Bhagwan, published by the P.P.P. from
Freedom House.)
We must not be divided on the issue of Communism. Communism is winning throughout the world . it
will win everywhere.. (Speech by Dr. Jagan to P.P.P. Annual Congress, April 1962, reported in Sunday Times, May
13th, p.4)
We are a Socialist party and nationalisation of the sugar industry, and indeed of all major industries, is our
objective. In the interim, while British Guiana is still tied to British imperialism, with limited constitutional powers,
certain reforms should be undertaken to break the back of imperia..sµ.. (Page 29. Forbidden Freedom by Dr. C.
B. Jagan, published by Lawrence and Wishart, 1954.)


APPENDIX VI
EXTRACTS FROM THE LOCAL PRESS CONTAINING ANTI-GOVERNMENT PROPAGANDA
THURSDAY 1st February
CHRONICLE
Headline .Government to Squeeze Dollars from Workers..
POST
Headline .Budget . It’s Staggering.
Page 3 Article .Budget is in keeping with Government . Marxist. Bottle of Rum will now
cost $3.10..
Town Talk .Archangel Jacob Messenger of Death.. .Malice, Meanness and Malevolence
thrown in by Dr. Jacob..
SATURDAY 3rd February
CHRONICLE
Front page Letter to Burnham and d'Aguiar by E. S. Phillips .I suggest that you both
appear on one platform . . . . a general uprising against this budget and will force Jagan's
Government to either amend their ideas or resign..
SUNDAY 4th February
CHRONICLE
Headline .Tax Avalanche will Crush Working Class..
Story .The small working class man to be soaked to the tune of some $9
million.
Inner Headline .Slave Whip Budget..
Leader .Budget is Marxist.. A .vindictive and malicious spirit prowls through the
budget..
GRAPHIC
Article .Keep that hand out of my pocket. critical.
MONDAY 5th February
GRAPHIC


Sub-headline .The Budget . First step Leftward.. Taxation of Companies will make them
cut down operations and so increase unemployment.
POST
Editorial .Food Tax . It cannot help hitting the poor man too hard for him to bear..
Page 3 Highly critical letters.
TUESDAY 6th February
CHRONICLE
Leader The entire country has been thrown in crisis bordering panic. Defenders
of Freedom letter signed by C. I. Sebastian and E. N. Hutchison calls for joint action on
part of P.N.C. and U.F. to .build and preserve a way of life such as we should be
prepared to live when we become independent..
WEDNESDAY 7th February
CHRONICLE
Letter .Iniquitous Budget. and .Stir yourselves . down with this shameful Budget. Down
with the Government..
Open Letter to
Prince Philip Jagan Government is Communist, no Independence, etc.
POST
Page 3 Vindictive letters. Full page.
FRIDAY 9th February
CHRONICLE
Letter .Budget will bring misery to country.. Ends. .This is trodden Democracy. Let’s unite
and fight for our rights..
Letter on back page Open letter to Burnham and d=Aguiar .all of us are agreed that we are faced with an
eventual dictatorship. Dr. Jacob=s Radical Budget bears this out in no uncertain terms,
etc., etc. Unite and save us all..
POST
Page Article .Distrust and suspicion mixed with Hate. headline.
SATURDAY 10th February
CHRONICLE
Headline .Unite and Fight. report on mass meeting.
Centre Page Headline .Budget will tax food from poor man’s Mouth..


POST
Headline Page 1 .Jagan Government Must Resign..
Page 2 Editorial: Tax on rum will result in .more broken homes and delinquent children..
Page 3 Anti-Government letters.
SUNDAY 11th February
CHRONICLE
Headline Page 2 .End-of-Election Budget..
.Independence will give them the power to finish with elections for good . They are
impenitently and avowedly communists. If free elections are banned the constitution will
he banned too.. .If we could fight together at the barricade and hold back the gathering
Storm we should be able to make the country safe for our children..
Page 5 Commentary: .Dictatorship by Budget.. The dictatorial purpose of Jagan=s Government
is proved beyond doubt by several tax proposals in the 1962 Budget, the weight of about
90 per cent. of which will fall on the working class etc., etc. Now more than ever before
the red claws of Jagan’s Communism are exposed naked for all to see. And this is only
the smoke, the fire comes later. If now, while Britain still exercises sovereignty here,
Jagan can move openly to confiscate people’s property and their money and destroy our
Free Press, what wouldn’t he do with the full powers of independence he brings in his
Communist forces here to back up with open Communist dictatorship?
Centre Editorial .Big Shots. Little Shots. . If, as has been suggested the Government set out to create tension in
order to underscore the poverty of the economy and incite popular clamour for
independence then they shouldn't be surprised at the complete fulfilment of their
expectation. Marxism believes in the inevitability of violence as the midwife of an old
society when it is pregnant with a new one.
Article Page 1 .What the Tax Means.. .What it means is reduce all to a position of servitude so that
only the State will be wealthy so that the State which now controls your money will
control your services and finally your family, your children..


ARGOSY
Headline .Government Proposed Muzzle of Press, Radio..
WEDNESDAY 14th February
CHRONICLE
Leading Article .Radio Tied or Free. threatens BGBS if Jagan is allowed to continue its use.
GRAPHIC Jackson (President, Post Office Workers’ Union) says .Dr. Jagan wants to substitute
British imperialism in the country with Soviet imperialism..
THURSDAY 15th February
CHRONICLE
Leader .What we think. The Only Way Out.. .The resignation of the Government is necessary to the
restoration of the nation’s normal life and the safeguarding of the working classes against
victimisation.. Spreads rumour of dismissal of Civil Servants and refuses to accept
Premier’s denial . .This is a Government of foxy grey beards.. .This is a veteran junta
misruling the country..
FRIDAY 16th February
CHRONICLE
Editorial Blames Government for the leaders breaking the ban. Declares that crowd was right.


APPENDIX VII
THE BUDGET
A. Summary of the tax proposals in the Budget Speech made by the Minister of Finance on 31st January, 1962
1. Increased import duties on not-essentials (e.g., alcoholic drinks, tobacco, concentrates for non-alcoholic
drinks, tea, motor spirit, perfumery, cosmetics, dress fabrics, footwear, glassware and chinaware, jewellery, radios,
refrigerators and other household electrical appliances and motor cars) and on items for which adequate substitutes
could be supplied from local production (e.g., meat, fish, butter, milk (excluding condensed milk and milk-based
infant foods), cheese, fruit, fruit juices, jams, coffee, confectionery, prepared paints, toilet soap, paper bags, and
some varieties of clothing.
2. Introduction of export duty of about 4 per cent. f.o.b. greenheart timber.
3. Increased excise duties on rum and other spirits (from $9.60 to $14.40 a proof gallon) and on beer (from
75c. to $1.40 a liquid gallon).
4. Increased licence duties for Motor Vehicle Drivers; Money lenders; Pawnbrokers; Bonded Warehouses;
Liquor Licences.
5. Increased Auction dues.
6. Increased Stamp duties.
7. Income Tax
I. PERSONAL
(a) Reduction of personal allowance from $900 to $750.
(b) Reduction of wife allowance from $750 to $600.
(c) Introduction of flat rate child allowance of $300 in place of 3-tier system of $250/350/500
according to age.
(d) Limitation to four of number of allowances for dependent relatives and children.
II. COMPANIES
(a) Minimum income tax payment to be based on an assumed income of 2 per cent. of turnover in the
case of mining, manufacturing or mercantile businesses (not agriculture) even where a loss occurs,
but adjustable against future profits.
(b) Restriction of provisions regarding trade losses to allow only the indefinite carry-forward of loss
from the same source but disallowing the set-off of loss against other income in the sane year.
(c) Removal of present tax concessions for new enterprises and introduction of new provision under
which such new enterprises as were primarily concerned with mining, manufacturing or
processing activities will be allowed to write-off 70 per cent. of any capital expenditure incurred
during the first five years of their operation in British Guiana as a charge on their current profit.

87
(d) Reduction of initial allowances for non-tax-holiday companies from 40 per cent. to 20 per cent.
(e) Disallowance of entertainment expenditure.
(f) Allowance on expenditure on advertising to be limited to 3 of 1 per cent. of turnover and to
exclude general or “prestige” advertising.
(e) Disallowance as an expense of any excessive charges in respect of directors. emoluments.
8. Introduction of Capital Gains Tax on net property at ordinary income tax rates with highest rate of tax
fixed at 45 per cent.
9. Introduction of Annual Tax on not property at rates increasing from 2 per cent. per annum on the first
$150,000 of property in excess of $50,000, to 12 per cent. on property in excess of $1.
10. Introduction of a Gift Tax on transfers of property inter vivos at rates similar to the existing Estate
Duty.
11. Introduction of compulsory savings scheme of 5 per cent. of wage and salary income and 10 per cent.
of other income, the income of self-employed in excess of $5,000 to be regarded as falling in the higher rate. Income
under $1,200 per annum to be exempt. Companies make a contribution of 10 per cent. flat on all profits with no
exempt income. Government bonds to be issued to contributors, repayable at the end of seven years with tax-free
interest at 3.75 per cent.
B. Modifications announced by the Premier in his broadcast of 14th February, 1962

88
1. Removal of the increase on duties on most of the imported commodities taxed. The imported
commodities on which tax remained were motor-cars, spirits, tobacco, coffee extract and concentrates.
2. Modification of the Compulsory Savings Scheme by raising the lower limit from $1,200 per
annum to $3,600 per annum.


APPENDIX VIII
CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE DISTURBANCES
1961
Tuesday, 18th July New Constitution came into effect (with the exception of Article 22 and
Parts III and VI dealing with the Executive and the Public Service).
Friday, 4th August Guillebaud report on Wages, Salaries and Conditions of Service in the
Public Service of British Guiana submitted to Governor.
Monday, 21st August Elections held under the new Constitution.
Tuesday, 5th September Remainder of new Constitution brought into force by General Order No. 63 and
new Constitution became fully effective.
Thursday, 14th September Guillebaud Report released, and Unions and Staff Associations requested to
submit comments by the 16th October, 1961.
Friday, 6th October Opening of Legislative Assembly. Demonstration outside the Public
Buildings. All P.N.C. members left the Chamber when the Governor began to
read the speech from the throne.
Monday, 18th December Extension of Exchange Control restrictions to payments to countries within the
Sterling area.
1962
Tuesday, 2nd January Statement by Minister of Finance on the Government's decision on the
Guillebaud recommendations.
Wednesday, 24th January Meeting between Premier and representatives of Unions and Staff Associations
at which the Guillebaud recommendations were discussed. Premier makes
certain concessions.
Wednesday, 31st January Minister of Finance presents Budget proposals to Legislative Assembly and
announces postponement of debate thereon until 12th February, so that the
public may have time to study proposals.
Sunday, 4th February P.P.P. meeting at La Penitence Market. Premier explains Budget
proposals. Hostile reception. Attacked with bottles and stones.
Monday, 5th February Public appeal by Premier to Savings Dank depositors not to withdraw
their deposits.
Tuesday, 6th February Special meeting of the Georgetown Chamber of Commerce condemns
most of the Budget items and appoints committee to report on what steps to
take.

Wednesday, 7th February Arrival of Duke of Edinburgh. Meeting at Legislative Assembly. Premier met by
hostile crowd on leaving Public Buildings. Large crowds demonstrate against
Budget and Government with placards and posters outside Public Buildings.
Press reports that the T.U.C. have denounced the Budget.
Friday, 9th February Legislative Assembly meets and considers Constitution Committee.
Opposition stage walk out. Large crowds in hostile demonstration around Public
Buildings. Government announce further postponement of Budget debate to
unspecified date to allow of numerous memoranda being studied and for further
consultations. The Government invites the three Chambers of Commerce and
T.U.C. to make representations on Budget. Press reports that the T.U.C. have
decided to call all workers to .down tools. as from 2 p.m. on Tuesday, 13th
February. The Premier makes a statement to the House of Assembly about
evidence of a plot to overthrow the Government and to assassinate himself and
others of his close supporters. Premier met by hostile crowd on leaving the
Public Building. U.F. meeting at Bourda Green.
Saturday, 10th February The Premier gives Press Conference over B.G.B.S. Warns of plot to overthrow
the Government.
Sunday, 11th February C.S.A. and Government workers hold mass protest demonstration and march.
Meeting at Parade Ground on their demands for wages, etc. P.N.C. hold mass
meeting at Bourda Green. Press notice published calling for Trade Union
.Down Tools. demonstrations from 2 p.m. on Tuesday, 13th February.
Monday, 12th February Police Emergency Plan put into operation. A series of processions and meetings
held by the United Force in the City, converging on the Public Buildings in the
afternoon. Mass P.N.C. meeting at Bourda Green.

Tuesday, 13th February Picketing of shops and large stores in Water Street. Civil Servants go on strike at
1 p.m. T.U.C. mass demonstration with C.S.A. participating at 2 p.m. Rumour
of dismissal of Civil Servants spreads. T.U.C. calls for general strike at meeting.
Premier denies rumour of dismissal of Civil Servants over B.G.B.S.
Wednesday, 14th February General strike including essential services commences. British Guiana
Volunteer Force embodied. Area around Public Buildings declared restricted by
Proclamation by the Governor. Organised processions by United Force and
People's National Congress. Premier announces in broadcast modifications of
the Budget proposals.
Thursday, 15th February General strike continues. Processions led by Burnham and d'Aguiar break
Proclamation and march into prohibited area. Crowds dispersed only after the
threat of tear smoke. T.U.C officials meet Minister of Finance and agree
to submit recommendations in writing the following morning. Mass T.U.C.
meeting at Parade Ground. Ishmael calls on crowd to go and picket the
Electricity Corporation next morning. P.N.C. hold meeting following T.U.C.
meeting.
Friday, 16th February All shops closed. Demonstrations. Meeting at Parade Ground. Crowd
marches on Electricity Corporation and Riot Squad uses tear smoke. Rumour
that child has been killed starts. Electricity Corporation forced to close and
Electricity supply fails. As a consequence water supply fails. Small
demonstration at the Premier’s house: 11.30 a.m. Between noon and 4.30 p.m.
several demonstrations in the neighbourhood of Freedom House. Rifle fire used
and several members of the Police Force wounded, one fatally. Between 3.10
and 4.15 p.m. three major fires started at Thani's and Kirpalani's stores. Arson
and looting commences. State of Emergency proclaimed. Arrival of British
troops around 2.30 p.m.

92
APPENDIX IX
BRIEF NOTES ON PERSONS WHO FIGURED IN THE INQUIRY
Dr. C. B. JAGAN. Premier and Minister of Development and Planning. Aged 44. Qualified dentist and B.Sc.
Sociology (U.S. degrees). Indian. Elected Member of Legislative Council 1947, and appointed a Minister in 1953.
Appointment revoked on suspension of the Constitution in 1953. Founder and leader of the People's Progressive
Party. Elected Member of Legislative Council 1957 (Minister of Trade and Industry). Re-elected at 196! elections
and appointed Premier and Minister of Development and Planning.
Mrs. JAGAN. American of Czech extraction (nee Rosenberg). Met and married Dr. Jagan whilst he was a student in
U.S.A. Former Member of Legislative Council (1950-53)** and Minister (1957-61). Did not seek re-election 1961.
General Secretary P.P.P.
B. H. BENN. Minister of Natural Resources. Aged 38. African Member of the Editorial Board of Thunder, weekly
newspaper published by the People’s Progressive Party. Elected Member of the Legislative Council for the
Essequibo Islands and the Interior, 1957. Member of Legislative Assembly for Demerara Coast West, 1961.
B. S. RAI. Formerly Minister of Home Affairs. Aged 41. Indian. Joined British Guiana Civil Service, 1938.
Resigned 1949. Elected Member of the Legislative Council for Central Demerara, 1957. Minister of Community
Development and Education 1959. Elected Member of Legislative Assembly for Demerara Coast East (People's
Progressive Party) 1961. Appointment as Minister of
Home Affairs revoked June, 1962.
Dr. C. R. JACOB, Jr. Minister of Finance. Aged 45. Indian. Assistant General Secretary, P.P.P.; Secretary, PPP
Education Trust; Press Relations Officer, P.P.P.; Member, Editorial Board, Thunder; Director, New Guiana
Company Limited. Elected Member of Legislative Assembly for Vreed-en-Hoop (P.P.P.) 1961.
Dr. F. H. W. RAMSAHOYE. Attorney-.General. Aged 32. Indian-African. Barrister. Member of Law Officers
Department; then private practice with Mr. Burnham; then alone. Elected Member of Legislative Assembly for
Canals Polder (P.P.P.) 1961.
L. F. S. BURNHAM,Q.C. Aged 40. African. Leader of Peoples National Congress. Elected Member, Georgetown
Town Council, 1952; President, B.G. Labour Union, l952-l956. Elected Member of the House of Assembly for
Central Georgetown in 1953, and appointed Minister of Education. Appointment revoked following the suspension
of the Constitution in 1953. Broke away from PPP to form his own party 1955. Elected Member of the Legislative
Council for Central Georgetown, 1957. Member of Legislative Council for Central Georgetown, 1957. Member of
Legislative Assembly for Ruimveldt, 1961. Mayor of Georgetown 1956-57 and 59.


P. S. D=AGUIAR. Aged about 50. Portuguese extraction. Leader of the United Force. Managing Director,
d=Aguiar Bros. Ltd., Rum and Soft Drinks Merchants. Managing Director and founder of Banks Breweries, Ltd.;
Chairman of Special Committee on Government Employees Wages and Member of Panel of Advisers to Labour
Commissioner. Founder of Banks Brewery, Barbados. Bought Daily Chronicle 1961. Elected Member of Legislative
Assembly for Georgetown Central 1961.
Senator A. G. TASKER, O.B.E. Aged 46. English. Director of Public Relations, Booker Group of Companies in
British Guiana. Appointed to the Senate by the Governor, 1961, under Section 47 (2) (c) of the Constitution.
Senator Miss M . A. JARDIM. Aged 25. Assistant Personnel Officer, the Booker Company, 1961. Active work for
the United Force. Appointed to the Senate by the Governor to represent the United Force, 1961, under Scction 47 (2)
(b) of the Constitution.
W. R. WEBER, Q.P.M., C.P.M. Commissioner of Police. Aged 53. Joined the British Guiana Police Force as a
Sub-Inspector in 1928 and rose to the rank of Deputy Commissioner of Police in 1956. Appointed Commissioner of
Police in 1959.
R. A. ISHMAEL. President, Trades Union Council, since 1960. General President, Man Power Citizens Association
since 1954.
J. B. G. KELSHALL. Trinidadian. Aged 51. Private Secretary and Public Relations Officer to the Premier, 1961.
Member of the General Council, P.P.P., 1961.
[** Editor’s Note: The .1950-53" date in the text is incorrect. Mrs. Jagan was first elected in 1953.]

93
APPENDIX X
STATEMENT OF TROOP MOVEMENTS
A. ARMY
Friday, 16th February
14.30 hrs. One Rifle Company (A Company) of the 1st Royal Hampshire Regiment stationed in camp at
Atkinson Field arrived in Georgetown.
16.15 hrs. The first elements of reinforcements from Jamaica (Tactical Headquarters and two Rifle
Companies of the 1st Royal Hampshire Regiment) arrived at Atkinson Field. These troops reached
Georgetown at 19.00 hrs.
Saturday, 17th February
Balance of reinforcements from Jamaica arrived at Atkinson Field. The first company of the
reinforcements from the United Kingdom reached Atkinson Field (Two Rifle Companies of the
1st East Anglian Regiment and one Rifle Company of the Duke of Edinburgh’s Royal Regiment).
Monday, 19th February
United Kingdom reinforcement completed.
B. NAVY
Friday, 16th February
07.45 hrs. H.M.S Troubridge (Commander T. A. Q. Griffiths, R.N.) and H..M S Wizard (Commander D. J.
Farquharsen, R.N. arrived outside the .bar. to Georgetown harbour.
16.45 hrs. H.M.S. Troubridge entered the harbour and secured alongside at Sprostons No. 1 jetty and
immediately despatched an Internal Security Platoon to Police Headquarters.
17.05 hrs. H.M.S. Wizard secured alongside H.M.S. Troubridge and despatched an Internal Security Platoon
to the Power Station.
Saturday, 17th February

94
16.40 hrs. H.M.S. Vigilant (Lieutenant Commander J D. B. McCarthy, R.N.) arrived and berthed alongside
Sandbach Parker Wharf and despatched an Internal Security Platoon to relieve the Platoon from
H.M.S. Troubridge.
18.10 hrs. H.M.S. Urchin (Captain T. T. Lewin, M.V.O., D.S.C., R.N.) berthed alongside H.M.S. Vigilant.

95
APPENDIX XI
STATEMENT OF CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE SUSTAINED; CLAIMS MADE ON INSURANCE
COMPANIES; AND TEAR GAS USED.
A. CASUALTIES
Killed
Police 1
Civilians 4
Injured
Police 39
Civilians. 41*
* It should be noted that there may have been other civilian casualties which were not reported.
B. DAMAGE
Business Premises
Destroyed by fire 56
Damaged 21
Damaged and looted 66
Market Stalls
Damaged and looted 29
Police Vehicles
Damaged by fire 2 P.W.D. trucks
Otherwise damaged 3 cars
1 van
1 Land Rover
Private Vehicles
Damaged by fire 5 cars
Road Traffic Signs

96
Damaged 51
C. CLAIMS MADE ON INSURANCE COMPANIES
$
Hand-in-Hand Mutual Fire Insurance 1,500,000
B.G, and Trinidad Mutual Fire Insurance 2,238,814
Royal Insurance Company 25,000
Anthony Gibbs & Son (Insurance) Ltd 5,668,543
New India Assurance Company 942,879
Phoenix Assurance Company 1,030,000
Total 11,405,236
D. TEAR SMOKE USED DURING RIOT INCIDENTS
L.R. Shells 60
S.R Shells 62
Speed heat and C.S. grenades 115
Three-way grenades 24
1.5 Cartridges 33

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Report: Disturbances in British Guiana in February 1962

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