Alex
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Alex Constantine
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The Able Danger "investigation" was a
simple but
slick
piece of prestidigitation, a psyop.
Who "demanded" a "probe" of Able Danger?
Curt
Weldon –
no Abbie Hoffman – Fox News,
"conservative"
pundits,
and ...
"Congressman Duncan Hunter (Chairman, House Armed Services Committee),
Congressman Peter Hoekstra
(Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence),
Congressman Frank R. Wolf, Senator
Charles E. Grassley (Chairman, Senate Finance Committee), Senator John
McCain, and Senator Joseph Lieberman."
Joe Lieberman isn't one to call for legitimate investigations ... the
demand and ensuing "scandal"
was meant to accomplish one thing – reinforce in our heads
the belief that 19 hijackers on the
military-base and strip-tease circuit plotted the devastations in New
York and Washington. "Able Danger
tracked the HI-JACKERS and failed to intercede ..." Gasp! ... This
assumes the 19 Muslims who entered with
passports (arranged by the CIA) did the deed, so Able Danger was
dangerously enabled to surface ... as a
psyop tool ... to maintain our focus on "outside agitators."
An honest investigation was untenable from the start: " ... a review of
Able Danger records is impossible,
since the Able Danger records were destroyed." In the end, "the
Inspector General report is grossly
incompetent, or deliberately dishonest, in its process of
discovering and reporting facts and in its analysis. ... "
But the psyop, the psychological reinforcement of the media's
"post-hypnotic" suggestions – hammering it
into our little heads that foreign nationals were responsible for death
from the heavens – was pulled
off without a giggle from the press. The "scandal" has dissipated, but
our own false beliefs were reinforced.
Mission accomplished.
– AC
-----------
http://www.abledangerblog.com /rebuttal.pdf
REBUTTAL
OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
REPORT
ON THE
ABLE DANGER PROGRAM
2
Background
Beginning with a letter dated October 7, 2005, from Congressman Curt
Weldon, Vice
Chairman of the House Committees on Armed Services and Homeland
Security, the
Department of Defense (DoD) Office of the Inspector General was
directed to conduct an
investigation into allegations: 1) that a DoD intelligence program
called Able Danger
discovered 9/11 terrorists one year before the September 11 attacks; 2)
that DoD failed to
share that intelligence with the FBI, thereby losing the best known
opportunity to prevent the airliner hijackings
and attacks on New York and Washington; 3) that DoD
terminated Able Danger prematurely, thereby losing further
opportunities to collect early warning of the impending 9/11 attacks;
and 4) that DoD undertook
inappropriate and illegal retaliatory action against Lieutenant Colonel
(LTC) Anthony A. Shaffer for making the
above allegations to the U.S. Congress.
Congressman Weldonís October 2005 request to the DoD
Inspector
General for an investigation was joined by numerous other
members
of Congress
who issued letters and verbal directives continuing into 2006
demanding that the Inspector General investigate
the Able Danger affair. Among those pressing the Inspector
General to conduct an investigation were Congressman Duncan Hunter
(Chairman, House Armed Services Committee), Congressman Peter Hoekstra
(Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence),
Congressman Frank R. Wolf,Senator Charles E. Grassley
(Chairman, Senate Finance Committee),
Senator John McCain, and Senator Joseph Lieberman.
On September 14, 2006, the DoD Office of the Inspector General issued
their report
ìAlleged Misconduct By Senior DoD Officials Concerning the
Able
Danger Program and Lieutenant Colonel Anthony A. Shaffer,
U.S. Army Reserve.î The report concludes,
ìThe
evidence did not support assertions that Able Danger identified the
September 11,
2001, terrorists nearly a year before the attack, that Able Danger team
members were prohibited from sharing information with law
enforcement authorities, or that DoD officials reprised against LTC
Shaffer for his disclosures regarding Able Danger.î
The Inspector General report was released to the press before any
member of Congress requesting the report received a copy or briefing.
Moreover, the report itself was unusual for being unclassified,
although it dealt with highly sensitive subject matter both as
regards national security and personnel.
A reliable source working in the DoD Office of the Inspector General
alleged to the Congress that the report was completed and could have
been released much earlier, in July 2006, but the Inspector General
deliberately delayed release of the report until September 2006.
The timing of the release of the report coincided with the completion
of the FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Bill, other
major legislation including border security, and the mid-term
congressional elections, giving the Congress little
opportunity to respond to the Inspector General report promptly.
3
As shall be demonstrated, the Inspector General report is grossly
incompetent, or deliberately dishonest, in its process of discovering
and reporting facts and in its analysis. The bottom line of the
Inspector General report isthat numerous senior members of the
Able Danger team are liars, a necessary conclusion in order to
completely exonerate senior DoD and Administration officials of
bungling a
near ideal opportunity to prevent the 9/11 attacks.
Unfortunately, this erroneous conclusion from the DoD
Inspector
General is not surprising,
given the long history of that office in covering-up
embarrassments to DoD and presidential administrations.
Since the DoD Inspector General Office has failed in its duty to
competently investigate the Able Danger affair, the U.S. Congress must
exercise its oversight powers and conduct its own independent
investigation.
This rebuttal to the Inspector General report is a first step in that
process.
Congress and the DoD Inspector General: Checks and Balances
Merely because the Congress asked the DoD Inspector General to
investigate the Able Danger affair, some in the press have treated the
DoD
Inspector General report on Able Danger as definitive, the final word
on the subject.
This reflects a misunderstanding about the constitutional relationship
between Congress and the Department of Defense,
and about how the process of congressional oversight works.
Under the Constitution of the United States, the Congress is
responsible for ìregulatingî the activities of the
armed
forces of the United
States, including the expenditure of monies, the administration of
programs, and the management of personnel.
Congress routinely tasks the DoD Inspector General to conduct a fact
finding investigation as a corrective
or as a first step in the process of exercising its oversight powers.
Usually Congress can rely upon the DoD Inspector General to conduct an
impartial investigation and administer correctives.
However, most matters of concern to the Congress andthe DoD Inspector
General do not
put at risk the reputations of senior DoD officials, or of presidents
and their administrations, that would pose a special challenge
to the integrity of an investigation conducted by the DoD Inspector
General. Congress understands that in cases of major
national controversy, where careers and reputations of senior officials
are at stake,
the objectivity of the DoD Inspector General may be challenged.
Afterall, the DoD Office of the Inspector General is part of the
Department of Defense and the careers of its personnel depend upon the
Department. Common sense suggests that in some cases DoD may
not
be trustworthy to investigate itself. For that reason, the
founding fathers vested powers to ìregulateî the
armed forces, not in the armed forces themselves,
or in the commander-in-chief (the head of the armed forces), but in
Congress.
Unfortunately, there are many historical precedents warning that the
Department of Defense cannot always be relied upon to objectively
investigate itself. Indeed, there are cases where the DoD
Inspector General has failed in its duty to faithfully discover
and 4 report facts.
There are cases where the Office of the Inspector General has become a
co- conspirator with DoD, or with a presidential administration,
in trying to conceal facts embarrassing to the Department.
For example:
• USS Iowa Affair. On April 19, 1989, a gun turret
explosion on the USS Iowa killed 47 sailors.
The DoD Inspector General defended an attempted Navy cover- up that
leaked false allegations to the press blaming
two sailors for the explosion, supposedly the result of a homosexual
affair turned homicidal.
The sailors were
not homosexuals, did not cause the explosion, and their families
protested thedefamation of their sons.
The DoD Inspector
General defended the false allegations leaked to the press claiming
they did not malign the characterî of the sailors.
The DoD Inspector General even praised the malicious lies against the
sailors stating,
Some of the leaks may more properly be described as good investigative
journalism.
• Tailhook Scandal. At the September 1991 Tailhook
convention, numerous female U.S. Navy officers were sexually harassed
by some of
their male colleagues. The DoD Inspector General report on
the
Tailhook scandal was judged so untrustworthy as to be inadmissible
as evidence in court. In a 1994 trial on Tailhook
before
the U.S. District Court in Las Vegas, Justice Philip Pro tossed out
the DoD Inspector General report describing it as not sufficiently
trustworthy and ìreplete with double hearsay
and summaries of testimony attributed to various unidentified
individuals who were not subject to cross examination.
• DoD IG Fails Peer Review. In 1997, 2000, and
2001, the DoD Inspector General underwent a review of its standards and
practices by
peer Inspectors General from other departments and agencies.
They found that the quality of work by the DoD Inspector
General
was inadequate, did not comply with U.S. government auditing
standards, and was insufficiently documented, reviewed, and supervised.
Moreover, the 2000 peer review found that the DoD
Inspector General altered and destroyed documents in an attempt to
cover-up its shortcomings.
• Strategic Tanker Cover-Up. In 2004, Pentagon
plans to replace KC-135 tankers with Boeing KC-767 tankers, that were
converted to
this purpose from civilian aircraft, was found to be against the
national security interests of the United States and the result
of a corrupt deal between governmentand industry
officials.
The procurement scandal and investigation by the DoD Inspector General
resulted in the jailing of a low-level DoD official. The
Senate
Armed Services Committee criticized the DoD Inspector General for
covering-up wrongdoing by senior officials,
and urged Defense Secretary Rumsfeld to ìtake actions to
hold those responsible accountable.
Otherwise the fallout from the Air Force
procurement scandal will have disastrous effects on the integrity
of the acquisition system.
• Atomic Veterans, Agent Orange, POW/MIAs, Gulf War Syndrome.
The Department of Defense has often, on matters of major
national concern, failed to adequately investigate itself to satisfy
the American people, moving Congress, the 5 press, and public
groups to conduct independent
investigations. For example, during the 1950s did U.S.
military
personnel exposed to atomic tests suffer ill effects and die
prematurely from radiation-induced
diseases? During the Vietnam War, did U.S. military personnel
exposed to the defoliant ìagent orange suffer effects
injurious
to their health?
Did the United States government make a maximum effort to recover all
U.S. personnel held prisoners-of-war or missing-in- action
during and after the Vietnam War?
During the first Persian Gulf War, did thousands of U.S.
soldiers
suffer effects injurious to their health from exposure to low-levels
of chemical agents released by U.S. bombing of Iraqi chemical weapon
depots? Unfortunately, the Department of Defense
has not always acquitted itself honorably and well in answering
questions such as these.
Consequently, controversy surrounding many of these
issues has continued for years, even decades.
Congress showed due diligence in the exercise of its
oversight
powers by tasking theDoD Office of the Inspector General to investigate
the
Able Danger affair. The Able Danger affair is a major
national controversy, where the reputations of senior DoD
officialsóand of presidents and their
administrationsóare
at stake over responsibility for the failure to prevent the 9/11
hijackings and attacks
on New York and Washington. Therefore, it was incumbent on the DoD
Inspector General to conduct an investigation
and produce a report that is factually and analytically unimpeachable.
Congressional responsibility does not end with receipt of the Inspector
General report. The Congress would be remiss in its constitutional
duty if it simply ìrubberstampedî the Inspector
General
report. The U.S. Congress owes to the American people a
healthy
skepticism toward the DoD Inspector General report on Able Danger.
Even a casual reading of the Inspector General report on the Able
Danger affair raises serious questionsóif not
impugnsó
the report ís
factual
and analytical integrity. What ís Wrong With The DoD
Inspector General Report?
Summarizing the problems with the Inspector General report on the Able
Danger affair:
1) The report falsely alleges that there is no evidence that the Able
Danger program discovered Mohammed Atta and other 9/11 terrorists
prior to the September 11 attacks.
2) The report falsely claims to prove that the Able Danger project
never produced a chart identifying Mohammed Atta, the 9/11 ringleader.
3) The report falsely claims the Able Danger witnesses are not
credible, and is so clearly hostile and biased against those
witnesses that it concocts false ìevidenceî in an
effort
to discredit them. Generally, as is evident in the
examination
that follows of the three
specific analytical failures described above, the DoD Inspector General
did not exercise duediligence
in collecting and reporting facts and interviewing witnesses, and
neglected or deliberately ignored exculpatory evidence.
The report falsely alleges that there is no evidence that the Able
Danger program discovered Mohammed Atta and other 9/11 terrorists
prior to the September 11 attacks.
6
The DoD Inspector General concludes, The evidence did not
support
assertions that Able Danger identified the September 11, 2001,
terrorists nearly a year before the attack More specifically,
what the Inspector General means by this is significantly
clarified in the body of their report (p. 3):
Our review of Able Danger team records found no evidence that Able
Danger team members had identified Mohammed Atta or
any of the other terrorists who participated in the 9/11
attack.î (Italics added.)
Yet finding evidence in the ìAble Danger team
recordsî of the discovery of Mohammed
Atta or other terrorists who participated in 9/11 should no longer be
possible as, according to testimony by the Able Danger team members
to the Congress, those records were destroyed. The Inspector
General report confirms that the Able Danger records
were, in fact, destroyed (p. 3): ìWe found that large
quantities
of data that had been collected at two locations as part of the Able
Danger
data mining mission were destroyed. One intelligence analyst told us
that he destroyed approximately 2.5 terabytes of Able
Danger data that had been collected at the Land Information Warfare
Activity (LIWA),
Fort Belvoir, VA
The Inspector General report does not explain how they could have
conducted a review
of now non-existent Able Danger records. The
Inspector General report mentions the destruction of Able Danger
records in order to assert that destroying the Able Danger
data was legal and ìfollowed established
procedure
andviolated no regulationîóan issue that was never
in
dispute.
The Inspector Generalís assertion that they reviewed Able
Danger records is glaringly
contradicted by, and cannot be reconciled with, the fact that those
records were destroyed.
The Inspector General report makes no mention of the existence of
pre-9/11 data on Mohammed Atta and other terrorists who participated
in the September 11, 2001, attacks located in other U.S. government
databases that would certainly have been
collected by the Able Danger data mining operation. Investigation by
the U.S. Congress
found, for example, that Mohammed Atta and other 9/11 terrorists appear
hundreds of
times in various U.S. government databases prior to the attacks of
September 11, 2001.
Indeed, Mohammed Atta, the ringleader of the 9/11 terrorists, left a
conspicuous paper trailî in connection with the
September 11
conspiracy
that certainly would have been detected by Able Danger. Atta
associated with prominent known terrorists, such as Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed,
Osama Bin Ladenís right hand man in planning the 9/11 plot.
Mohammed Atta traveled back and forth to the United States, Germany,
and Spain on a
passport. He had a large bank account in the United States
and
conducted large cash transfers in order to finance the 9/11 operation.
While in the U.S., Atta enrolled in flight training school to learn how
to fly large commercial airliners.
While in the U.S., Atta received a traffic ticket for driving
without a license.
Atta applied for a driverís license under his own name.
7
Further, former Attorney General John Ashcroft in a recently published
book (Never Again: Securing America and Restoring Justice)
reveals that the Clinton Administration National Security Council had
intelligence on an al Qaeda presence in the United States
in the year 2000, just as alleged by the Able Danger
witnesses. According to Ashcroft, the highly classified NSC
Millennium After Action
Review ìwarned of a substantial al Qaeda network and
affiliated terrorist presence within the United States, and it was
critical of the nationís security measures taken prior to
2000.î Ashcroft notes that it is this classified
NSC memo
that former National Security
Advisor Sandy Berger attempted to steal from the National Archives and
destroy, prior to President Clintonís testimony
before the 9/11 Commission.
It is inconceivable that the Able Danger data mining operation would
have failed to collect some or all of the copious data on Mohammed
Atta and other 9/11 terrorists in U.S. government and other public
records prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001.
Yet the Inspector General report ignores this data and its significance
to Able Danger.
When the Inspector General briefed Congressman Weldon on their report,
Weldon criticized the Inspector General for excluding from
their report any mention of the pre- 9/11 data on Mohammed Atta and
other 9/11 terrorists existing in other government
databases. The Inspector General acknowledged the existence
of
this data, but argued that it was irrelevant to their tasking, that
focused
narrowly on the Able Danger database.
Therefore, the Inspector General reportís assertion that
they conducted a review
of the Able Danger records, and found no evidence of Mohammed
Atta or other 9/11 terrorists, is highly misleading on two counts.
First, a review of Able Danger records is impossible,
since the Able Danger records were destroyed. Second, the
Inspector General defined their tasking so narrowly as to exclude
pre-9/11 data
on Atta and other terrorists existing in other government databases,
that certainly would have been collected by Able Danger.
Sources within the U.S. Intelligence Community have told the U.S.
Congress that some Able Danger records still survive proving that the
program detected Mohammed Atta and several of his fellow terrorists
prior to 9/11. These sources have not yet provided
evidence to prove their allegations, claiming they cannot do so without
sacrificing their anonymity, that they insist on preserving because they
allegedly do not trust the Inspector General and fear retaliation from
DoD.
Perhaps significantly, buried in the middle of the Inspector General
report is what some might describe as a Get Out Of Jail Free
card for
the Inspector General, just in case surviving Able Danger records
identifying Mohammed Atta are discovered. TheInspector
General
report concedes that Able Danger may well have detected
Mohammed
Atta and other 9/11 terrorists prior to September 11, 2001, but argues
such an intelligence
coup would be insignificant. According to the Inspector
General report (p. 34),
Although it is conceivable that the name Mohammed
Attaí or
a photograph of Mohammed Atta may have appeared along with thousands of
other bits
of information examined by the Able Danger team, neither
Mohammed Atta nor any other 9/11 terrorist was identified
in a manner that would have linked them to al Qaeda or
justified more focused information gathering.
The concession by the Inspector General that Able Danger might have
detected Mohammed Atta and other 9/11 terrorists before
September 11, 2001, is immensely important, is in fact at the heart of
the entire controversy over Able Danger. Yet the
Inspector General fails to include this finding in its summary or among
its key judgments. Nor does the Inspector General allow the acknowledged
possibility that Able Dangermight have detected Mohammed Atta to soften
or make more circumspect its assertions
about the supposed insignificance of the Able Danger program or the
implied dishonesty of the Able Danger team.
The Inspector Generalís attempts to dismiss the significance
of
Able Dangerís detection of Mohammed Atta and other 9/11
terrorists are unpersuasive.
Since the purpose of Able Danger was to discover al Qaeda terrorists,
the detection of Mohammed Atta and other 9/11 terrorists by Able Danger
would, contrary to the Inspector General, have constituted the
establishment of a possible link with al Qaeda.
The 9/11 Commission concluded that the discovery by the FBI of
the least important of the 9/11 terrorists,
Zacarias Moussaoui, about one month before 9/11, constituted
the
best opportunity to stop the airliner hijackings and attacks on New
York and
Washington of September 11, 2001. Surely, the discovery by Able Danger
of the 9/11 ringleader, Mohammed Atta, about one year before 9/11,
would have been an even better opportunity to prevent the September 11
catastrophe.
That the Able Danger team appreciated the significance of their
discovery is proven by their thwarted efforts to inform the FBI, and by
their willingness
to risk their reputations by testifying to Congress after 9/11.
But of course, the Inspector General claims that none of the
senior members of the
Able Danger team who have come forward are trustworthy.
On the issue of whether Able Danger detected Mohammed Atta and other
9/11 terrorists before September 11, 2001,
the single most important fact bearing on this question is conceded by
the Inspector General, but not included in their report.
Pre-9/11 data on Mohammed Atta and other 9/11 terrorists exists in
other U.S. government databases.
Through incompetence or dishonesty, the InspectorGeneral
report fails to acknowledge this fact or to deduce the obvious
conclusion.
The existence of pre-9/11 data on Mohammed Atta and other 9/11
terrorists in U.S. government databases proves beyond a reasonable doubt
that the Able Danger data mining operation must have collected at least
this data on Atta and other 9/11 terrorists.
Thus, the best evidence supports the single most important and most
controversial claim of the Able Danger witnesses who testified to
Congress. As the Able Danger witnesses are proven credible on
this crucial point, their general trustworthiness is also proven, and
their entire testimony, though there may be the usual inevitable errors
of detail, should be deemed generally credible and true.
The DoD Inspector General report falsely claims to prove that the Able
Danger program never produced a chart identifying Mohammed
Atta, the 9/11 ringleader.
The cornerstone of the Inspector Generalís case that Able
Danger
never detected Mohammed Atta is a single chart that, according to the
Inspector General, is the source of a false collective memory among the
Able Danger team that they detected Mohammed Atta.
However, although several of the Able Danger team recollected a chart
showing Mohammed Atta as an illustration of their program ís
achievement against al Qaeda, all recognized that the chart was
relatively unimportant, was merely a symbol of the Able Danger
program ís real achievement against al
Qaeda the data mining effor tó the records of which were all
destroyed.
For example, Mr. Erik Kleinsmith, a senior member of the Able Danger
team, who led the data mining project, noted pointedly
in his February 15, 2006, testimony to Congress that the
chart and its picture of Mohammed Atta was unimportant,
compared with Able Dangerís collection of
copious data showing an alQaeda presence in the United States.
Kleinsmith: One of the questions was whether
or not I recognized or remembered seeing Mohammed Atta .
And I reiterate that I do not remember seeing his name or face on a
specific chart. But the more important
point is that we were tracking hundreds of names, and we were creating
dozens of charts for SOCOM. And while most of these
charts contained information and intelligence that needed further
analytical vetting, we were still able to identify a significant
worldwide
footprint with a surprisingly large presence within the United
Statesî
Kleinsmith in earlier testimony to Congress, on September 21, 2005,
made the same point, that a specific chart was unimportant compared
to the real achievement of Able Danger, the highly successful data
mining effort against al Qaeda:
We were able to collect an immense amount of data for analysis that
allowed us to map al Qaeda as a worldwide threat
with a surprisingly significant presence within the United
States.î Significantly, Kleinsmith also testified that the
Able
Danger program produced its own
charts (that were subsequently destroyed), and that these charts were
more sophisticated than charts (only one or two) provided by a
contractor,
Orion Scientific: We also had printouts of charts that we had
produced the charts that we had produced, as well as one
chart or two that Orion Scientific had provided to us, but we had
already gone beyond their analysis.
So both soft copy and hard copy was deleted or destroyed.
Nonetheless, despite the fact that the Able Danger program was about
data mining against al Qaeda not about producing charts the
Inspector General report focuses its analysis of Able
Danger
almost exclusively on ìprovingî that Able Danger
never
produced a chart showing Mohammed Atta. According tothe
Inspector
General report (p. 3),
The preponderance of witness testimony indicated that recollections
concerning the identification of 9/11 terrorists
were linked to a single chart depicting al Qaeda cells responsible for
pre-9/11 terrorist attacks, which was obtained but not produced by the
Able Danger team. The chart (Figure 1 of this report) was
produced by Orion Scientific Corporation (Orion) in May 1999 and
contained the
names and/or photographs of 53 terrorists who had been identified and
in many cases, incarcerated, before 9/11, including a Brooklyn cell,
but it did not identify Mohammed Atta or any of the other
terrorists who participated in the 9/11 attack.
Yet, as noted in Kleinsmithís testimony above, the head of
the
Able Danger data mining effort stated specifically that the Able Danger
team
produced its own chartsóthat were more sophisticated than
the
ìone chart or two provided by Orionóand that the
Able
Danger charts,
both soft copy and hard
copy, were destroyed. Kleinsmith
should know the fate of the Able Danger charts better than anyone,
since he, in reluctant obedience to orders from DoD lawyers, personally
destroyed the Able Danger database.
Why does the Inspector General believe that the Orion chart is
the Mohammed Atta chart, even though the chart does not show
Atta,
and
even though the Able Danger team denies that this is the correct chart?
The Inspector General relies on the memories
of the Able Danger witnesses about details of the chart to conclude
that the Orion chart is the correct chart.
According to the DoD Inspector General report,
ìThe
evidence indicated that the chart recalled by these key witnesses is
the chart [by Orion]
at Figure 1 of this reportóDr.
Preisserís
denials notwithstanding.
It bears the title mentioned by CAPT Phillp ott in a
contemporaneous memorandum and contains information described, in
various ways, by LTC Shaffer and Dr. Preisser.î
As to the existence of a chart produced by Able Danger showing Mohammed
Atta, the Inspector General asserts that the collective memories
of the Able Danger witnesses ìwere in error.î
The reasoning employed by the Inspector General to conclude that the
Orion chart is the correct chart, and the object of a collective false
memory of Mohammed Atta by the Able Danger witnesses, is clearly
erroneous. The InspectorGeneral relies on the memories of
the Able Danger witnesses concerning trivial details to single out the
Orion chart, but rejects their memories as in error and unreliable on
the central matter of the existence of a chart produced by Able Danger
showing Mohammed Atta. Logically, the Inspector
General cannot have it both ways, cannot deem the Able Danger witnesses
reliable for purposes of identifying the correct chart, but
unreliable when they disagree with the Inspector General.
Moreover, the Inspector Generalís analytical basis for
singling
out the Orion chart is highly dubious. The details provided
by
the Able
Danger team, such as the chart title, the arrangement of photographs,
colors and etc., were common to charts produced by the
Able Danger team too. After all, the Able Danger and Orion
charts
were both serving the same purpose, attempting to illustrate visually
the
achievements of the Able Danger data mining operation. It is
commonplace in Intelligence Community analysis, indeed in most
analytical endeavors, for charts, outlines or other illustrations to
evolve and be replaced with more sophisticated versions, richer in data
and
analysis, as the analytical enterprise progresses.
Obeying Occamís Razoróthe simplest
explanation
is themost logicalóthe most logical explanation for the
conundrum of the Mohammed Atta
chart is not collective false memory, or collective false
witness.
The Able Danger team superceded the work of Orion and
produced
their own chart showing Mohammed Atta, that was later destroyed
along with the rest of the Able Danger database. This theory
is
consistent with the testimony of the Able Danger witnesses, and with the
known fact that Able Danger should have collected data on Mohammed Atta
and other 9/11 terrorists, as that data existed
and still existsóin other U.S. government databases that
were among the targets of Able Danger collection.
The Inspector General report bases its entire case upon the fiction
that the Orion chart is the correct chart, allegedly the object of a
collective false memory about Mohammed Atta. Based solely on
this erroneous conclusion, the
Inspector General dismisses the achievement of Able Danger in providing
early warning of the 9/11 attacks, and slanders
the reputation of the Able Danger team.
The DoD Inspector General report falsely claims the Able Danger
witnesses are not credible, and is so clearly hostile and biased against
those witnesses that it concocts false evidence to
discredit them. Bias in the Inspector General report is
notable from
its very beginning, where the Inspector General fails to provide brief
biographies or background descriptions of the Able Danger witnesses,
whose alleged lack of credibility is crucial to the Inspector
Generalís case. CAPT Phillpott was entrusted to
run the
Able
Danger project because of his stellar performance as an Annapolis
graduate and serving naval officer, and has now been promoted to
command a
destroyer. LTC Shaffer ran another classified
operation
associated with Able Danger called ìStratus Ivy, the
detailsof
which are still classified.
He won a Bronze
Star conducting lethal intelligence operations against Taliban and al
Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan, and was recently
promoted to command a U.S. Army battalion. Dr. Preisser is a
double Ph.D. who served in the U.S. Army's Land Information Warfare
Activity
at Ft. Belvoir, where she invented the computer software for data
mining against al Qaeda, that made possible the Able Danger project.
911review.org has over 3,000 pages of
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These facts about the Able Danger witnesses do not support the
Inspector General in making a case against their credibility.
The Inspector General report asserts (p. 34), While
several key witnesses primarily LTC Shaffer, CAPT Phillpott,
and Dr. Preisseróclaim to have seen Mohammed Atta's picture
on
an Orion chart that was provided to CAPT Phillpott in January/February
2000,
their recollection was not credible. The conflicts and
inconsistency in their testimonies, coupled with other evidence
concerning the charts at
issue, provided overwhelming rebuttal to their claims.î
(Italics added.)
Yet the Able Danger witnesses do not claim to have seen Mohammed
Attaís picture on an Orion chart. They saw Atta on
a chart
produced by
Able Danger. They also downplay the importance of the chart,
as it was merely to illustrate the detection of Atta
as an al Qaeda operative by the Able Danger data mining operation and
his being cataloged in the database.
As noted earlier, the Inspector General ignores denials by
the
Able Danger witnesses that the ìAtta Chartî was
made by
Orion and concludes
insteadóbased on very dubious reasoning and no real
evidenceóthat the ìAtta
Chartî was made by Orion, did not in fact
depict Mohammed Atta, and the non-existent picture of Atta on the Orion
chart is a collective false memory by the Able Danger witnesses.
In a breathtaking example of circular reasoning, the Inspector General
condemns the credibility of the Able Danger witnesses because
they
disagree with the Inspector General theory that the ìAtta
Chartî is an erroneous memory
of the Orion chart, a theory that
itself is erroneous, but is treated by the Inspector General like known
truth. Thus, LTC Shaffer, Dr. Preisser, and Mr. Smith are
judged
non-credible by the Inspector General because they would not change
their testimony about seeing Mohammed Atta on an Able
Danger chart, and refused to embrace the Inspector Generalís
theory about the Orion chart. Smith had the ìAtta
Chartî posted on his
wall
and saw it every day for over a year, but even his memory is condemned
as unreliable by the Inspector General.
Indeed, a pattern evident in the Inspector General report is that the
more strenuously a witness disagrees with the Inspector General about
the Orion
chart theory, the more harshly they are condemned.
However, neither is there salvation for Able Danger witnesses who agree
with the Inspector Generalís theory about the Orion chart.
When CAPT Phillpott begins to doubt his own memory and concedes that
the Inspector General might be rightóunder repeated
cross examination where the Inspector General falsely claims that their
theory about the Orion chart is proven
factóPhillpottís
credibility is
condemned, his memory judged unreliable, by the Inspector General,
along with the other Able Danger witnesses.
The Inspector General, in order to support their assertion that the
Able Danger witnesses are ìunreliableî and
ìnot
credible,î offers
ìsummariesî of their interrogations of the Able
Danger
witnesses. Full transcripts of the interrogations would be
far
more revealing and
objective evidence bearing on the legitimacy
andprofessionalism of the interrogation process, but are not provided
because they would not
serve the Inspector Generalís purpose. The
ìsummariesî of the interrogations
are carefully edited by the Inspector
General to highlight every apparent inconsistency in testimony, no
matter how trivial, in an effort biased to impugn the credibility of
the Able
Danger witnesses.
Conspicuous by its absence from the transcripts are the queries and
cross-examination of the Inspector General.
A skilled interrogator can easily ìset
upî a
witness to provide apparently inconsistent or contradictory testimony,
especially when the interrogator has the advantage of editing the
transcripts afterwards.
For example, consider the Inspector Generalís interrogation
of
CAPT Phillpott. The Inspector General report, in their
summary of
the
Phillpott interrogation, gives this admission of error by CAPT
Phillpott, that is by far the strongest evidence offered by the
Inspector General favoring their theory that the ìAtta
Chartî is a false memory:
CAPT Phillpott testified, ìWell, I mean, obviously
thereís a compelling amount of evidence
that would
make it appear that I did not see Mohammed Atta.
And I will absolutely grant you that based on what
youíre
showing me my recollection could have been wrong. But I still
need to stress that if I told you that
I didnít think I saw Mohammed Attaís face, that
in fact
would be lyingÖI honestly believe that I saw Atta on the chart.
(p. 18)
Reading between the lines of the Phillpott interrogation, it is obvious
that the Inspector Generalís cross-examination was not an
objective
search for truth, but an effort to convince Phillpott that there is
ìa compelling amount of evidenceî supporting
the Inspector General's theory about the Orion chart.
The Inspector General tried hard to make CAPT Phillpott doubt
himself,
and succeeded, but only because they misrepresented themselves as
ìhonest brokersî in fact finding. CAPT
Phillpott
mistakenly trusted
the Inspector General who was, in reality, his prosecutor.
Most of the Inspector Generalís case attacking the
credibility
of the Able Danger witnesses is based on their trivial errors of memory
over exact dates and precise events found during the interrogation.
However, few people are likely to remember such details
associated with events that transpired a half-decade ago.
In many cases, the Inspector General report attempts to create the
impression of serious contradictions or lapses in memory between the
Able
Danger witnesses, where none exist. For example, the
Inspector
General makes much of a ìcontradictionî between LTC
Shaffer and Dr. Preisser over their memory of meeting at a
Starbuckís coffee house, where LTC Shaffer remembers
Preisser
showing him the
ìAtta Chart.î They both remember meeting
at
Starbucks shortly after September 11, 2001. But Dr. Preisser,
during her interrogation, denied bringing a large paper
ìchartî to Starbucks:
Preisser: ìStarbucks had those little tables.
That chart, I would have had to have rolled out.
I canít imagine myself
doing that.î (p. 28)
But Dr. Preisser did have a ìbriefing on the computer not a
hard
copy chartî that she did likely show LTC Shaffer at
Starbucks.
So the
ìcontradictionî between LTC Shaffer and Dr.
Preisser over the Starbucks meeting is not really
a contradiction at all, but a strained attempt by the Inspector General
to create the appearance of a contradiction over the
definition of the word ìchartî as used by LTC
Shaffer and Dr. Preisser.
The Inspector General report routinely
excludesexculpatory
evidence supporting the credibility of the Able Danger witnesses.
For
example, the Inspector General strongly implies that LTC Shaffer lied
about DIA
accidentallyóand illegallyómailing classified
materials
and a U.S. government Global Positioning System (GPS) to Shaffer when
returning his personal property. The Inspector General
implies
that LTC Shaffer stole the GPS and put it in the box received from DIA
in order
to make DIA look incompetent. Yet the Inspector General report fails to
mention that two attorneys witnessed Shaffer
receiving and opening the box and discovering classified material and
the GPS from DIA.
14
The Inspector General report excludes sworn testimony from the
attorneys supporting Shaffer.
The Inspector General report makes a solitary recommendation, that
strongly suggests LTC Shaffer is telling the truth about receiving
classified material and a GPS from DIA, even though the Inspector
General does not want to admit it. The Inspector General
report, Section VII ìRecommendationsî comprises
this single sentence: ìWe recommend that the Director,
DIA, review procedures concerning disposition of personal belongings
when abandoned by DIA employees and procedures for
rendering military performance reports to ensure that Service
requirements are met. If Shaffer is lying about receiving
classified material and a GPS from an incompetent DIA, why does the
Inspector General recommend a review of DIA procedures?
The Inspector General report employs a double standard in treating Able
Danger witnesses on the one hand,
and witnesses hostile to the Able Danger team on the other.
For example, the Inspector General speculates why one
or more of the Able Danger witnesses might lie about detecting Mohammed
Atta before 9/11.
The Inspector Generalreport never speculates
why those hostile to the Able Danger witnesses might lie.
Indeed, two of the hostile witnesses, Dieter Snell of the 9/11
Commission and COL. Worthington, are praised by the Inspector General
report, as if their testimony is unimpeachable. Yet Snell and
Worthington would suffer damage to their professional
reputations, and in the judgment of history, if the Able Danger
witnesses are believed.
The Inspector General report attempts to discredit two of the most
important Able Danger witnesses LTC Shaffer and Dr. Preisser
by suggesting that they played merely minor roles in the Able Danger
program, a gross misrepresentation of the facts.
Although CAPT Phillpott, who ran the Able Danger program, describes LTC
Shaffer as an important member of the team, the Inspector General
gives equal weight to an anonymous source describing Shaffer as merely
an errand boy.
The Inspector General simply asserts, without proof, that Dr.
Preisserís role in Able Danger was minoró
neglecting to
mention the fact that she invented the
software for data mining against al Qaeda that made Able Danger
possible. It is no exaggeration to say that the Able Danger
project
would not exist were it not for Dr. Preisserís
expertise.
The Inspector General makes much of the absence of many witnesses able
and willing to corroborate the testimony of the Able Danger team that
they detected Mohammed Atta before 9/11. But as Able Danger
was a small, deeply classified program, there would not
be many more witnesses than those principal actors in the Able Danger
program who have already come forward.
Nor is it surprising that other witnesses may be reluctant to
volunteer, since the Inspector General vilifies the character
of every witness supporting the Able Danger team.
Finally, the Inspector General has not earned the right
to
challenge the credibility of the Able Danger witnesses by exercising
due diligence in
the conduct of their investigation. For example, the Inspector General
did not exercise its power to subpoena witnesses and
evidence. Cooperation with the Inspector General by
departments,
agencies, and individuals was voluntary.
The Inspector General did not polygraph witnesses, including hostile
witnesses. The Inspector General allowed hostile witnesses to
offer testimony
anonymously. The Inspector General failed to discover, and
then
ignored discovery by the U.S. Congress, of pre-9/11 data in other U.S.
government databases on Mohammed Atta, that confirms the allegations of
the Able Danger team.
The Inspector General failed to discover, and then ignored discovery by
the U.S. Congress, of at least one more
witness, a former member of the Able Danger project, who confirms the
detection of Mohammed Atta about one year prior to 9/11.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General
report, Alleged Misconduct By Senior DoD Officials
Concerning the Able Danger Program And Lieutenant Colonel Anthony A,
Shaffer, U.S. Army Reserve,î shows strong
evidence of bias and is deeply flawed analytically.
Therefore, the DoD Inspector General report is untrustworthy
to
serve as a basis for public policy or history regarding the Able Danger
affair.
This critique of the DoD Inspector General report does not constitute a
point-by-point or line-by-line rebuttal, although such a rebuttal in
detail is certainly possible. The errors in methodology and
analysis found in the Inspector Generalís treatment of the
key
issues of
the Able Danger affair are repeated and replete
throughout the
Inspector Generalís report,including on issues of lesser
consequence, such as the
reprisal by DIA against LTC Shaffer for revealing to Congress that the
Able Danger program detected Mohammed
Atta before 9/11.
On the key issues of the Able Danger affair, this critique has
demonstrated that the preponderance of evidence points to conclusions
exactly opposite those drawn by the DoD Inspector General.
Contrary to the Inspector General, the preponderance of
evidence indicates the Able Danger team did detect Mohammed Atta and
other 9/11 terrorists about one year prior to the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001. Contrary to the Inspector
General,
the preponderance of evidence indicates that the Able Danger program
did make a chart depicting Mohammed Atta. Contrary to the Inspector
General, the preponderance of evidence indicates that the
testimony of the Able Danger witnesses to the U.S. Congress is credible
and true.
The DoD Inspector General having failed in their task to provide a
credible and trustworthy investigation of the Able Danger affair,
it is now the responsibility of the U.S. Congress to exercise its
oversight powers and conduct an investigation. The DoD
Inspector General should be included as an object of that
investigation, as their report is apparently a cover-up for senior
officials at DoD, and
has made the Inspector General part of the Able Danger affair.
alexconstantine
.blogspot.com
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Danger part
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